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provide a balanced and scholarly discussion of a governmental 
phenomenon that is a source of great pride to this nation as well 
as continuing controversy: The delicate balance between judicial 
independence and judicial accountability. It is especially 
appropriate that the event was dedicated to our former Chief 
Justice, Donald Wright. Appointed by then-Governor Ronald 
Reagan, who clearly has strong notions on the role of the 
judiciary, he nonetheless struck out on a course that epitomized 
that role of the court as an arbiter between societal impulses 
and our basic dedication to constitutional principles. 
The role of the court in our social and governmental 
structure is a subject of debate dating well back to the founding 
of this Republic. As Judge Hogeboom states in his introductory 
remarks, the actions of royal judges were a source of discontent 
that contributed to public's rise to the call for revolution. 
Yet this on-going controversy, though it taxes our best thought 
as citizens and scholars, should not be a cause of dismay. There 
is a useful dynamic to the debate itself, for its very existence 
leads to a continual reassessment by those who serve our bar and 
bench of their motives, philosophies, and aspirations for the 
perfection of justice. It inspires a continual act of renewal 
that repeatedly brings us back to the center course, without the 
radical disruption of institutions that plagues so many other 
nations. 
It is my sincere hope that this record of the proceedings of 
the first Donald R. Wright Memorial Symposium will serve as a 
useful tool to those in government service, members of the press, 
academia, and the public in general, in their review of present 
court controversies and their consideration of the fundamental 
place of the judiciary in our society today. 
SESSION ONE 
SESSION ONE 
Chief Justice Wright and the 
Development of the California Judiciary 
JUDGE WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM: I would like to welcome you here 
today on behalf of President Zumberge who sent his regrets that 
he is unable to be with you. 
My name is William Hogeboom. I am General Counsel for the 
University of Southern California. It's a great pleasure for me 
to be here because I know personally so many members of your 
distinguished panels; but more importantly, I think, if you'll 
pardon me, just a personal aside, because any program that's 
dedicated to the memory of Chief Justice Wright is a program that 
I would like to be identified with. 
I first met Don Wright shortly after my graduation from law 
school when he interviewed me for a job in his then two-man law 
firm in Pasadena. He showed then the kind of wisdom he's always 
shown. He didn't hire me. But over the next several years I 
became personally acquainted with him and we became good personal 
friends, and Don and Margo and Betty and I have had many wonder-
ful evenings together. He went on, as you know, to become a 
Municipal Court Judge in Pasadena and a Superior Court Judge in 
Los Angeles. He was later elected the Presiding Judge of that 
court. One of the high points of my life was when I was appoint-
ed a judge of the superior court and Don Wright swore me in. 
It's been a wonderful experience knowing and working with Don 
over the years, and I am delighted that the program is dedicated 
to his memory. 
The issues which you discuss here relating to how we maintain 
an independent judiciary and yet maintain an accountable judici-
ary have been with us and have been emotional issues for more 
than 200 years. Certainly our own founding goes back in large 
part to the discontent of the colonists with the actions of royal 
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SENATOR BILL LOCKYER: Thank you. I think I am technically 
not the one who will introduce the panel. I think this is a 
panel of welcoming folks, if you'll tolerate that. 
It's my pleasure, as the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, to welcome you to this symposium. In that context I 
should both apologize or brag-- I'm not sure which is the case 
-- about being the first nonlawyer in recent memory to chair that 
Senate Committee. This event is one which is jointly sponsored 
by USC, by the Senate Office of Research, and the Senate Judici-
ary Committee. We're pleased to welcome each of you today to our 
first Donald Wright Memorial Symposium. We hope this will evolve 
into an annual event where we would bring together academicians, 
political leaders, journalists, and jurists to discuss the vital 
issues of our legal system in a dispassionate and thoughtful 
forum. 
I need not dwell on the fact that the subject of today's 
forum is a timely one. During this next year, a political cam-
paign year, we will observe the most rigorous examination of an 
American court since the Supreme Court "packing" controversy 
during FDR's presidency. All modern forms of campaigning will be 
wheeled into play to convince the public of the propriety or 
impropriety of retaining currently seated justices. Of course, 
we today are not to guarantee the quality of that debate, nor are 
we advocates of one position or another necessarily. But we can 
at least establish in our minds, and for the public's benefit, 
appropriate standards whereby performances for judiciary may be 
judged. 
I'm especially indebted to Dr. Larry Berg, the Director of 
the Institute of Politics and Government here at USC; to the 
faculty and staff of the University who have been helpful in 
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misleading. It is entitled "Chief Justice Wright and the devel-
opment of the California Judiciary." Now that might lead you to 
believe that we're about to hear about the relationship between 
Chief Justice Wright and the development of the California Judi-
ciary. This is not true. What we are going to hear about is one 
paper about Chief Justice Wright and another paper about the 
development of the California Judiciary. 
However, I think that in itself makes a point. It is one 
thing to look at the past and try to draw lessons from it, and 
it's another thing again to determine how to look at the past. 
There are so many ways to look at the past and so many lessons to 
draw from it. What we have to look forward to this afternoon are 
two such approaches, quite different, and I believe, having had 
the opportunity to read the papers in advance, quite valuable, 
each in its own very different way. We have one paper looking at 
how we got started in our present system of electing California 
judges, and another paper looking at a model of former Chief 
Justice Wright, a very highly regarded model for the role of 
Chief Justice of California Supreme Court. 
So without further ado, let's turn to the papers. The first 
speaker will be Professor Leo Flynn, who is a professor of Gov-
ernment at Pomona College. I might say that for a law professor 
such as myself one of the great pleasures of coming to interdis-
ciplinary conferences of this sort is that the papers tend to be 
so much shorter than we get in legal academia. I think :'ve read 
footnotes in law reviews that are longer than Professor Flynn's 
paper. Yet sometimes those footnotes and those articles they are 
attached to have less to say than Professor Flynn's paper. I 
think you will find that what he has to say is not only informa-
tive and extremely interesting, but in some respects quite 
surprising. Professor Flynn. 
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In 1879, we adopted a second Constitution and maintained the 
same system for selection: election in contested electoral con-
tests though the terms were extended to twelve years and the size 
of the supreme court enlarged from three to seven, with a provi-
sion allowing the court to split into two separate branches to 
hear cases. 
The origins of the judicial referendum was the tremendous 
growth in Los Angeles County after the turn of the century. As 
early as 1914, the prestigious Commonwealth Club of California, a 
San Francisco-based organization, had a subcommittee undertake a 
study of the selection of trial court judges in Los Angeles Coun-
ty. In 1915 that committee brought to the general membership a 
proposal for merit system selection whereby a panel, rather than 
the electorate, would select trial court judges to sit primarily 
on the superior courts throughout California. The voluntary bar 
association of Los Angeles County supported that in 1915, and the 
issue remained alive until 1936. 
When the state bar became a legal institution in 1926, it 
established a committee under the chairmanship of a former Supe-
rior Court Judge, John Perry Wood, which committed itself to 
placing a variant of the Commonwealth plan on the statute books. 
It was a plan, before the Legislature in 1928, which would pro-
vide for commission selection. The proposal apparently died in 
the Legislature, so far as I can tell. From 1929 through 1932, 
there was a great deal of maneuvering and the Bar actually estab-
lished a committee to lobby the Legislature. 
In the 1933 session of the Legislature, after a great deal of 
negotiations, the Bar achieved a constitutional amendment, estab-
lishing a new variant of merit system selection. It called for 
nominees for any open judgeship to be made by a commission 
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Commonwealth Club, which by 1933 
was cons stent the 
s bus s 
groups in this country and which was particularly strong in Cali-
fornia, as evidenced by the political victories of Hiram Johnson. 
The political philosophy of Progressivism tended to be suspicious 
of elective partisan politics on grounds that it resulted in a 
great deal of irrationality in voter selection, and that it was 
not very useful in producing good public policies necessary to 
the public interest. The general preference among the Progres-
sives was for effective managerialism, a belief that profession-
alism, systematic businesslike technique would produce good 
government. This general ideology was expressed in the debates 
and the reports of the Commonwealth Club and by the supporters of 
what was to become ACA 98. 
Specifically, their complaint was first, that there were too 
many judges in Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County was too 
large and too diverse for anyone to have personal knowledge or 
even an effective way of measuring the productivity or competence 
of trial court judges. Secondly, that the process of campaigning 
was distracting from judicial duties; that is, judges spent their 
time campaigning and fund raising in order to effectively cam-
paign, and that this gave the appearance of corruption which was 
inconsistent with both the Bar and the progressive view of good 
government. 
To document this, there were two sets of evidence that the 
Bar and the proponents of change offered: One, we will know that 
we don't have the highest type judges on the court. s is a 
theme that runs from 1914: that the better lawyers do not want 
to sully themselves with electoral politics. Secondly, in 1930 
and 1934 the Bar Association sent out questionnaires to the judg-
es who were going to be up for election and asked them how much 
time they spent campaigning and did they like it. They answered, 
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The great complaint seemed to be that the uncertainty of 
facing a challenge, produced all of the bad effects and kept away 
the most competent and deserving lawyers. Unfortunately, I have 
no way of documenting or measuring s. 
When the Bar met at the State Convention in Pasadena, Cali-
fornia in September of 1934, there were reports about the Bar's 
activities to gain voter approval for ACA 98, now Prop. 14. The 
tone of the address delivered by the president of the State Bar, 
Hubert Wycoff, was one of self-congratulations. They felt that 
they had solid support because they had lined up notable organ-
izations. Yet he reported that at the last minute, unknown to 
the Bar, a separate initiative -- that is, a voter initiated 
proposal to reform the judiciary had surfaced. It was a new 
formulation of the old Coirunonwealth Club proposal, qualified for 
the ballot through the activities of the California Chamber of 
Commerce. This was designated Proposition 3. 
In several articles appearing 
Angeles County Bar Association and 
the bulletin of the Los 
the Journal of the State 
Bar, there is evidence that there was intense negotiation before 
the proposal by the Chamber of Commerce was submitted to the 
Secretary of State. Apparently, the important change made was an 
agreement to attack trial court judges, to make it possible for 
trial court judges to be covered at all by the proposal. I'm 
saying this is one of the things that carne as the greatest shock 
to me in my research. I had assumed that the purpose for reform 
was to deal with the problems of appellate court judges who were 
more frequently elected in California than were trial court judg-
es. I found that there was prac cally no discussion at any time 
and that, in fact, the Bar had chosen not to cover appellate 
court judges in their proposal. Yet, the proposal that surfaces 
from the Chamber of Commerce is a proposal that originally 
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i ation consisting 
of the District Court 
of Appeals, and instead of the State Senator, the Attorney Gener-
al of California was added. This seems to have been as a result 
of the criticism of Proposition 14. 
I had hoped to find out what the proponents of these two 
provisions expect the voters to do when subsequently voting to 
retain a judge? Under both proposals, judges appointed would 
serve for a period of one term of six years at which time the 
voters would have an opportunity to vote yes or no on their 
retention. The answer is, that there was practically no debate, 
except among the opponents, on the question of how the ratifica-
tion election would work. The assumption seemed to have been 
that the important concern was changing the selection process 
because that was where the civil law. At least so far as I can 
tell, the implicit assumption was that once judges were on, they 
would remain just as the current situation had been prior to 
1933, unless they became figures of notoriety or unpopularity 
which would be unlikely. 
What happened? Well, in 1934 the voters voted. By a very 
narrow vote, they voted to approve Proposition 3. By a smaller 
vote, but equally narrow, they rejected Proposition 14. So we 
adopted the provision in the State Constitution which gave the 
Governor the power to appoint the justices of the appellate court 
subject to the approval of the Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tion (today called the Corr~ission on Judicial Appointments) and 
provided these judges would be subject to a 
confirmation/ratification election after they finished some por-
tion of a term. 
In 1936, the Bar made another effort. They went to the Leg-
islature. They got William Knowland, then a State Senator from 
Alameda County, to carry legislation authorizing the largest 
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A number of the proponents said if this means anything, 
means that judges will not be forced to stand on the individual 
decisions. But beyond that, the record, at least the proponents 
and drafters and supporters, shows a marked lack of concern with 
this aspect of the system. Thank you. 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank you, Professor Flynn. Our next speak-
er, paper presenter, is Professor Julian Levi. Professor Levi 
has had so many very distinguished careers that it would be quite 
tedious to recount them in any detail, but he was a successful 
lawyer for many years in Chicago, was a professor of urban stud-
ies at the University of Chicago for a couple of decades or so, 
and since 1978, has been a professor of law at the Hastings Col-
lege of Law in San Francisco. His paper is not quite as short as 
Professor Flynn's. On the other hand, it has the equally impor-
tant virtue of not having any footnotes. It is a delightful 
paper on a delightful subject. 
PROFESSOR JULIAN LEVI: I must begin with two acknowledge-
ments. The first goes back to a story describing a teacher, who 
said he learned much from his parents, more from his teachers, 
but the most from his students. What you will hear this after-
noon would have been completely impossible without the services 
and the assistance and, I might even add the guidance of students 
at Hastings College of the Law, particularly those concerned with 
the Public Research Law Institute who gathered up most of these 
materials. 
The second comment is a personal comment. As a new immigrant 
so to speak to this state, it's a privilege to speak about what 
is, I think, a legend. It is even more a privilege to speak in 
the presence of a Governor who, in my judgement, is a legend. 
-15-
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Governor Reagan appointed him to the State Court of Appeal in 
1968, and then in 1970 appointed him Chief Justice of California. 
Hence, Chief Justice Wright came to the Chief Justiceship 
after twenty years of experience as a private practitioner of the 
law, after fourteen years of experience as a trial judge in a 
busy metropolitan court of general jurisdiction, and two years of 
full experience as an Appellate Judge. His opinions demonstrate 
that he understood the difficulties and the frustrations of pri-
vate practice; that he knew at first hand the responsibilities 
and problems of the trial judge made evident by his own practice 
of laboriously reading trial court records time after time; that 
he understood both the limitations and opportunities of appellate 
and supreme court service. 
More significantly, bench and bar as well as the general 
public understood that here was a Chief Justice who had earned 
that title. As one of his colleagues remarked from the very 
beginning of his term, "the Chief fit in well." 
Chief Justice Wright, in accordance with the Constitution and 
Statutes of California, had major responsibilities in the admin-
istration of the judicial system of the State. His skill as an 
administrator was a bright point of his tenure. The Chief has 
been described as a politically moderate justice with high intel-
lectual abilities, but even greater administrative skills. He 
was a judge's judge. Professional, quiet and undramatic in 
demeanor, he seemed to exude dignity, open-mindedness, fairness 
and compassion. 
The Chief understood that he administered best by persuasion, 
rather than by force of will or the powers of his office. He was 
an experienced and tactful administrator who maintained the 
traditions established by Chief Justices Phil Gibson and Roger 
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with the presiding judges and suggesting to them that assignments 
to the appellate department be rotated with a new judge added 
each year who would serve for a total of three years and then 
return to other assignments. 
Removing Associate Justice Marshall McComb was one of Justice 
Wright's most sensitive administrative accomplishments. In light 
of the fact that Justice McComb was conservative and the court at 
the time was liberal, Justice Wright did not want his removal to 
appear to be politically inspired. Therefore, he helped engineer 
a constitutional amendment that provided an avenue whereby Jus-
tice McComb's removal would not appear political. The amendment 
provided that, if a justice of the Supreme Court was involved, 
the recommendations of the Commission on Judicial Performance 
would be referred to seven randomly selected court of appeals 
judges. As a result of the creation of this special tribunal, 
Justice McComb's removal did not appear to be politically 
inspired. 
Justice Wright is remembered for being accessible and 
thoughtful. He returned phone calls. He put out a press release 
on every case in order to establish a public information office. 
He made special efforts to ensure that research attorneys were 
treated fairly. He made their pay comparable to civil service 
lawyers of equal seniority. As it has become evident, his admin-
istrative reforms were acceptable because he instituted them 
after consultation and in a way that was acceptable to the major-
ity of judges and his colleagues. 
With the petition for hearing system, the California Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Wright retained control over its dock-
et. From 1970 to 1977, the total number of filings increased by 
less than two percent. 
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as long as 
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I suspect the subsequent comment by then Governor Ronald 
Reagan, who had appointed the Chief Justice, that this was his 
"worst appointment" carne as no surprise to the Chief. Whether a 
particular decision would be a popular decision or not was irrel-
evant when measured against the core of judicial responsibility. 
Analysis of those decisions of Chief Justice Wright most 
widely cited reinforce these observations. 
In Vesely v. Sager, Chief Justice Wright speaking for a unan-
imous court permitted third persons to sue vendors of alcoholic 
beverages for serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated custom-
er who, as a result of intoxication, injured the third person. 
That ruling overturned prior California judicial precedents based 
upon concepts of proximate cause. The defendant in Vesely argued 
in light of these precedents change in judicial doctrine should 
be left to the Legislature. The Chief responded that the prece-
dents were judicially created and were patently unsound and 
totally inconsistent with the principles of proximate cause 
established in other areas of negligence law. Vesely was contro-
versial and was eventually overturned by the California Legisla-
ture after a wave of public protest. 
Similarly is the opinion in People v. Beagle where Chief 
Justice Wright again speaking for a unanimous Court imposed 
severe restrictions on the ability of prosecutors to discredit a 
defendant by referring to prior felony convictions. Before Bea-
~' the majority view in California was that a trial judge had 
no discretion under the California Evidence Code to exclude evi-
dence of a prior felony conviction offered for purposes of 
impeachment where the lawfulness of the conviction was estab-
lished or uncontested. In a methodically written opinion, the 
Chief rejected the majority view and held that by reading several 
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dissents, 46 were in criminal cases and only 8 were in civil 
cases. 
During Wright's tenure as Chief Justice, eight justices 
served with him. The dissenting activity among these justices 
can be broken down into categories. 
Justices Clark, McComb and Peters dissented along lines of 
idealogy and broad policy. 
Justices Mosk, Richardson, Sullivan and Burke when they dis-
agreed did so on specific factual determinations or on narrow 
technical grounds. 
Most remarkably, Justice Tobriner, who served throughout 
Wright's tenure, never wrote a dissent to an opinion authored by 
his Chief Justice. This record from a justice of Tobriner's 
competence and deeply felt convictions is a strong indication of 
how the Chief Justice time after time found a basis upon which he 
could unify the court. 
During these years Justice Clark was unique in the vehemence 
of the language of his dissents. He believed that the California 
Supreme Court not only was not following the United States 
Supreme Court as to defendant's rights, but on occasion inten-
tionally attempted to avoid review by shifting the ground of its 
decision to provisions of the California State Constitution rath-
er than the Federal Bill of Rights. 
Justice Clark, during his years on the Wright Court, wrote 16 
dissents to the 75 opinions of Chief Justice Wright on behalf of 
the majority of the Court. In these dissents, Justice Clark 
charged his colleagues "with incompetence," being "altogether 
unreasonable," their rulings "completely unrealistic," their 
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bench, the bar, the Governor, the press, or public opinion. 
He marched to the beat of no drummer, only to an ethical and 
, compassionate conscience. (Applause) 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank you, Professor Levi. When I made the 
switch six or seven years ago from government to Academe, there 
were some surprises, some pleasant and some unpleasant. One of 
the unpleasant surprises was to learn that at academic meetings, 
they have a role played by people and denominated discussions. 
This was an act of violence against the English language with 
which I had previously been unfamiliar. We will, during this 
session, refer to them as commentators. 
I am reliant from my introductions of these speakers on the 
list of biographies that I was handed when I arrived, and one of 
the speakers is not in that list. Fortunate , however, in this 
case that's entirely irrelevant. When I run into students, as I 
occasionally do, who hold the view that successful politicians 
are all either crooks or sell-outs or wishy-washy or whatever, I 
like to hold up as one of the primary exhibits against that point 
of view Pat Brown. Unfortunately, some of my students now are 
young enough so they don't know who I'm talking about; but for 
those who know anything about Pat Brown, it's a very persuasive 
exhibit indeed. So it is pleasure to introduce to you the 
former District Attorney of San Francisco, the former Attorney 
General of California, and 
Brown. 
former Governor of California, Pat 
HON. EDMUND G. "PAT" BROWN: Thank you very, very much. I am 
very, very surprised to hear there are s at the 
School of Law, the University of California at Los Angeles that 
haven't heard of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr. 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: They're getting young enough so pretty soon 
they won't have heard of Jr. either. (Laughter) 
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GOVERNOR BROWN: f he 1 be back -- It 
My remarks are be al. I want to com-
p two s excellent scussions 
on the relevancy of the Court of the 
State of Cali a. 
I had the great lege of inting, I 
s to 
going to 
Court of the State of Cali 
, nine mern-
a. And I'm 
names just so 1 a little 
idea of the philosophy a governor in making appointments to 
the highest court in this state. 
But you have to go back a 1 bit with me, because I was 
admitted to the Bar in October of 1927. I didn't the privi-
from high lege of going to college at all I went 
school into law I suppose was because I was always a 
young man in a hurry. However, not having gone to college gave 
me somewhat -- somewhat, I underl that -- of an inferiority 
and I always re were -- I m not so sure 
now, I always were were much 
smarter than I and I was to call upon other people for 






var s counties around the 
some who were so courteous to a 
so, I'll use the term, ug When 
evel best to get a real 
judges that I But when 
governor serving a per 8 
can stand that all 




s importance of a 
s before I ever 
before judges 
Area, and I was impressed with 
and some that were 
I became Governor, I tried my 
appointment of all of 
, and I think any 
11 700 or 800 
of the men or women that you 
sts. 
The fact is, however, that I think those 17 ars of practice 
ln the civil courts before the municipal court, the superior 
court, appellate courts, and occas l in Court of 
the State of California, never Court of the United 
States, and as District Attorney, you would run into the many 
judges that you appeared before or your deputies would make 
reports upon them. And one of the things impressed me very 
much in my appointments was Earl Warren. When I was District 
Attorney in San Francisco, Governor Warren appointed two young 
men who were extraordinarily able lawyers in my office -- a man 
by the name of Al Weinberger and a man by the name of Charles 
Perry -- both of whom were Democrats. Now, I mentioned that only 
to show you that here was a Governor that had appointed judges 
because of their ability -- not because of their political affil-
iation. He had to get their legal reputations from other lawyers 
and judges in San Francisco. And, Warren's method impressed me 
very much. I wanted to have a bench of able people of able men 
and women. But, the Warren appointments 
much. 
ssed me very, very 
You have to remember, too, that I became Governor after twen-
ty years of Republ an Governors; Earl Warren was Governor, I 
think, for a period of terms, t twe years. It was 
sixteen years -- no, was three terms of Earl Warren and a term 
and a half of Goodwin Knight. But before that, Governor Olson 
had appointed four judges. He had f Justice l 
Gibson. He had appointed Roger Traynor. He Justice 
Carter. And I can't think of the other j that he 
So here was a Democratic Governor nt jus s. Then 
Earl Warren, serving eleven years, only one; and Gover-
nor Knight only appointed one. And I came along -- they had been 
in office for along period of time, so was a natural change 
in the Supreme Court in the State of Cali a. 
-27-
I'm pointing this out to 
a Governor, how they can 
that Governor Reagan 
Jerry -- I son 








the appointments of 
they can be. I 
And I 
impor-
of the discussion the 
the of the 
appointments to the appellate courts. 
I might say, we 1 
back to Cu son Olson, Warren, 
the Governors going 
myself, Reagan, 
that Govenors Jerry, and now Governor Deukmej 
are really trying to appoint peop 
their appointments. 
-- I do 
that will do a job in 
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of Cali been 
t that the Supreme Court of the State 
as one of the st courts in the 
United States. Some of the Law Review writers, some of the other 
jurists throughout the state that it was during my admin-
istrat that the appointments not made by me, but the 
appointments made by Warren made the i Supreme Court the 
best court, even better than 
States. 
I want to just name 
of the kind of I 
to me. The 
had been a law 
1. In add 
he was as a tru 
I was str 
men and someone 
Court of the United 
le that I so you get an 
and the source of the 
rst man I was Ray Peters 
left law 
a Bar course; and, 
1 T add that ..!.. 
of San Francisco, I appointed two 
me because I made these two 
il There were two war veterans. They were 
both San Franciscans. But worked the Alameda District 
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Attorney's office. They came to me and an appointment and 
I appointed them. But they had not had two year's experience. 
The charter of the County of San Francisco that they had 
to have two years' Well, someone sued me for making 
an illegal appointment and a judgement aga t me for 
$10,000. I can only tell you that when the salary of the Dis-
trict Attorney of San Francisco was only $8,000 a year and to get 
a judgment for $10,000. So after I lost it, I had to put up a 
bond of $20,000 $20,000 so they wouldn't execute upon my prop-
erty. And then it went to the appellate court, and I'm not going 
to go into what happened; but Ray Peters, ting the opinion, 
reversed that opinion of the Superior Court. So the f st 
appointment that I made to the Supreme Court of the State of 
California was Ray Peters. 
Now, if you think that was real the motivating force, I 
think the lawyers will agree that Ray Peters was truly a 
jurist. Now, I'm not going into all Torn White had 
started in the just court of Los les. He's been in the 
municipal court; 's been court, the appellate 
court. And I appointed He was an elde man when I 
appointed him. I nk he was 68 years of age. And when I 
appointed him, he agreed to res the age of 70. 
The next ones were Matt ner, Paul Peek, Stanley Mosk, 
Louis Burke, and Ray Sullivan. And then I had the opportu-
nity of appointing Roger as the ef Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Cali a. 
In all of these appo s, of course, 
qualifications committee approval, consist 
tice, the senior presiding justice and the 
the State of California. I didn't want any J 
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II I sa d, " f 
I 
recommended for appointment to the Supreme Court later on. 
(Laughter) He had been appointed to the appellate court by 
another Governor. He came highly recommended to me by one of my 
large contributors. I could not forget the mean way that he 
treated me when I was a young lawyer. 
The other things that were important were the opinions of 
other lawyers. I would confer with Roger Traynor after he became 
the Chief Justice. And, I might say that he made several recom-
mendations. I accepted every one of them. I made recommenda-
tions and he accepted mine, of course, or they wouldn't have been 
approved by the Qualifications Commission. But, he recommended 
me to Ray Sullivan, who was in San Francisco. He had been an 
associate of William Malone who was the Democratic chairman. And 
I was a little bit, a little bit afraid to, not afraid, that's 
not the word. I didn't want to appoint a political figure. But 
Roger Traynor called me, came up to Sacramento, and he told me 
that Ray Sullivan was a great jurist. And as a result of that, I 
appointed him. And I think that the bench and Bar of California 
recognize Ray Sullivan as one of the best judges that I had the 
privilege of appointing. 
I'm calling these things to your attention so that you'll be 
able to see what a Governor does in trying to make good appoint-
ments. Governor Reagan, in his appointment of the Chief Justice, 
later said he was disappointed. He spoke critically of the Chief 
Justice, later said he was disappointed. But I think the bench 
and Bar agree with Stanley Mosk's opinion of this great Chief 
Justice. 
There are so many other things that I could say about the 
appointments to the supreme court, but let me conclude by saying 
that the appointments by the Governor, with the approval of the 
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rt supreme s 
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back on the appointments to the appellate courts and m not 
talking about the superior courts would take too to 
get into that) that are here ng at the or of the 
present system of appointments as an old Governor 
that it's a good one. Thank se) 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank 
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Governor. If there are lower 
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go 
, if anyone 
le future 
t of the two 
commentators ause 
business. He des 
he to leave 
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ernor Brown. 
Our last commentator is also whom I could have 
duced without the bi s, and also wou s de 
nitely an example of how, 
one can be a very successful 
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Majority Leader of the State Senate 
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red l of 
and expressed 
These are some of the things I bel ought to be taken into 
consideration. And the papers that were presented and the com-
ments of Governor Brown provided an excellent context for doing 
(Applause) 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank very much. 
GOVERNOR BROWN: I just want to say one thing in connection 
Rose Bird. I know this isn't a poli 1 meeting, but I 
't think people real e that the e I was 
Governor, I had 62 capital cases where they had exhausted all of 
their remedies before the court and was up to me as Governor. 
I had 62 cases, I let 40 die and I commuted 22. I'm not going 
into whether I did the right or the wrong thing, but I want to 
point out there was 62 cases during the eight years I was Gover-
nor. Before Rose B ever came during the eight years 
that Ronald Reagan was Governor, there was only one person exe-
cuted; and there were three years before Rose Bird was appointed 
by my son, and that there were none executed. So for eleven 
I le the office, there was one person execut-
ed, that's be Rose B ever carne along. What I'm trying 
to point out is that a Governor that believed in capital 
shment, Governor Reagan, 
during that period of time. 
are iz 
executions during the 
s years she's on 
wanted to pass that on. 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm 
one person was executed 
I don't think people realize that 
f Ju Bird for not having any 
that she's been, I the five or 
f Just Court. I just 
to se the of my 
of ing a question of my own to each of the paper present-
ers. I'll start with Professor Levi se in a way my question 
to you is connected to comment that Governor Brown just made. 
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United States Const 
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In short, for all of his extremely ss 
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unfortunate thing if any f Justice, and I nk case 
of Donald Wright it wouldn't have made any di ference, 
effect would be told if you decide a lar s ue is 
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by Governor Brown Senator Keene. F st, Second, 
the understanding that the fundamental job of the court is the 
administration of justice, an tract goal often , not 
always ach 
poll. 
not rel to latest opinion 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: ssor Flynn, I found the conclusion of 
your paper and your remarks today a 1 b ising. I am 
referring to cone ion history sn't tell us too 
much role of voter is supposed to be in these 
e or we can't te 1 too much about what fram-
ers of the thought. I think that it's implicit if not 
explicit in Senator Keene's remarks that although history may not 
give a direct answer to that que 
does seem to me 
ju wou 1 to 
hi of a no" 
tern seem to a 
should and cou 
goes to of the 
is not so much 
welcome comments on that We have 
alluded to whether j 
posed to back to the 
posed to be doing something dif 
should, and Just Brennan 
vote. 
s 
story very rarely does 
of a "yes" vote on 
out of that 
of this 
the judie 
as you s that 
I wou certainly 
on as you 
the law are sup-
founders or are sup-
(Ed Meese is saying they 
shouldn't or they can't). 
But aside from that debate, as a debate what the judges 
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should do, does that app to voters? Do you feel as a voter 
that you have an obligation to use the criteria that the 
of this system intended? Or is ss fferent 
the judicial process so when go the lot box to 
vote on this or anything else that you have a to apply 
whatever criteria you may think are pert 
whether whoever set this system up thought 
ria? 
regardless of 
were good c te-
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Well, I think you have to try to derive 
some criteria from the explicit decisions made by the framers 
here, and let alone what the public in ratifying this thought. I 
think you overstated the case. I think you probably can. The 
central concerns of both groups, for whatever motives, seem to 
have been that they didn't want the judges s money; spend-
ing their time campa ng. That does not seem to have been an 
activity given the fact that most judges were appointed. But 
nonetheless, people face pro There were, for some Los 
Angeles elections, as many as 104 candidates the voters 
faced. So people thought you'd a more tern, 
you'd have a system which the judges could act free from these 
forces. But this didn't tell people what were the standards 
which retention was to be measured. Not it be that we don't 
want the negative. We don't want all these bad things which 
follow from judges having to go out and se money, and $2 1-
lion is, I think, probably a reasonab for an llate 
judge. But even a superior court j should he the 
object of the hostility of some zed and well-f 
group, would face s We have a system that says that 
voters are supposed to ratify. Now, I believe that voters would 
have to come up with some cri a that takes account that 
we want the judiciary to be different than legislators. But 
there are obviously arguments tween jud 
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and judie 
lem. If I 
have a 
l accountability that makes that a very complex prob-
the legit that the voters are supposed to 
, then means I to dec what that 
ld be. Persona I would wou be incompe-
tence, outrageous criminal conduct, but probably something more 
than that; for instance, the allegations against Rose Bird are 
not that she's incompetent or that she's been criminal or even 
mal , but she has ignored and perversely interpreted 
law, c Those are 
charges that I think to be met on the merits, not just you 
can't raise that issue. The question is the merits. The ques-
tion is, is her conduct so far out of bounds that they should be 
rejected--that she should be rejected? And I think that that's 
what's the difficult problem. 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: , at this time me throw it up to the 
audience -- questions, comments, brickbats. Please give your 
name if you don't object. 
MR. PETER SCHRAG: My name is Peter Schrag. I'm the editori-
al tor for McClatchy Newspapers. 
is fact a 1 process k of things 
you're talking about malfeasance, criminal conduct, and so on. 
So sumably, that being place, the intention of the recon-
rmation s is something less than , isn't that cor-
rect? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Pre 
MR. SCHRAG: Doesn't give you some kind of further light 
as to what presumably one can infer about the intention of the 
people who framed the confirmation process? 
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PROFESSOR FLYNN: I be dense, t I assume it is 
something less than the actions that a recall would require. But 
that may be s because of the dif of the recall. s 
s for assessment. Presumab would mean 
that the judicial record wou be automatically fore 
the electorate, rather than hav ilize to get signa-
tures to have a recall. I think it may be ly different 
rather than necessarily stant dif 
MR. SCHRAG: You know, you might argue that would work 
the other way. When you have a justice whose problem is not 
ideological, being beyond the pale, but the problem is simply 
incompetence or something of sort as people believe was 
the case with Justice McComb at the end of his career. It may be 
that the recall process is not 1 to be over that 
kind of concern, because 
doesn't create the kind of 
recall. So it may be 
kinds of problems that some 
justices and that the 
competency problem. 
PROFESSOR LEVY: That 
obviously the con rmat 
the extreme kinds of 
le may be concerned it, but 
sion that is needed to start a 
the recall lends itself 
le seem to have 
tself 
be, bu I i 






ss a recall --
MR. SCHRAG: I think so, s. 
GOVERNOR BROWN: May I turn your, s 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Mr. S 
GOVERNOR BROWN: 
yourself to this extent? 
I turn quest 
When the voter goes 
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back on you 
the to 
vote recall or no recall, the cr are go to be 
applied are those to which voters have been educated. The 
s 
res pons 1 
circumstance . 
much as that 
of those princip 
to look at. 
're I 
sn't mean 
to be a 
which really 
MR. SCHRAG: That's 
(Laughter) 
I want 
GOVERNOR BROWN: I just want to s 
-- oh, don't have to go 
MR. SCHRAG: I I 1 t want to 
I mean 
GOVERNOR BROWN: , no, I was 
I was going to 
But I was just 
lists were 
State of Ca 
that are 
I'm 
carr s a very heavy 
voters under those 
to or con as 
and reaffirmation 
to be the ones that voters 
other except 
to educate me. Thank you. 
word. These 
1 ster here, Governor. 
to ask a stion. 
to leave f 
were ing and as the 
ist were now 
s lar to the 
I would vote against him. 
Even he No. 1 man at Stanford Law School, he's 




me and the lamppost. 
the same 
s it on. Because as 






s views or legal 
are some complete opposite 
else the Court. 
Rose Bird, between you 
It concerns me, but I don't 
s are there. But I had to 
, that's what was 
SENATOR KEENE: One t , may I? If, as you 
point out, the ceiling is somewhat lower the requ 
for impeachment, for example, I wou 
somewhat higher than. I just dis 
st that the floor is 
these us ces as a 
matter of politics and I don't like the way the decis came 
out. They're not obeying my 11. If they're ing to deliver 
' 
on the public opinion polls, I th that to be okay. If 
they're failing to deliver on the Cons 




and the laws, 
is, I 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Well, I think in the educational process, 
as you point out, the interest that can't be divorced from the 
fate of the individual justices is the institutional impact that 
contests elections which will be fought on issues 
performance comes very much like, the f l analysis, l 
judging individual cases, the one thing they said wanted to 
get away from. I think that's the problem. What's going to be 
the impact of rejecting s judge on the system? 11 is go 
back to a sense of fear? Obvious le are go to argue 
that the judge should have no greater than Governor 
Brown or Senator Keene, that 
ples and the hell th 
should stand for the pr 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: 
phone? 
may come s 
you. Bill. ll you go to the 
i-
SENATOR LOCKYER: I was catch Gove Brown before 





GOVERNOR BROWN: That what? 
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process for those 
lar those that 't 
SENATOR LOCKYER: didn't' make it. Without obviously 
naming any names, there probably were people that you considered 




not to make a 
s? kinds of 
lar appoint-
ment? Was there any pattern to that in the way that operated? 
GOVERNOR BROWN: Well, you know, under the Constitution, you 
your quali ations commission only on the appellate judges 
and the supreme court judges. On superior court judges, the 
State Bar of the State of California gives recommendations. It's 
been the practice of the Governor to ask the State Bar Board of 
Governors to give recommendations on appointments to the superior 
court. They give recommendations well qualified, qualified, not 
qualified -- three recommendations. I think there were one or 
two judges -- well, maybe more than that -- where they came up 
with the recommendation not qualified, but I appointed them any-
way. I might say that several of those they said not qualified 
were this is only the judgement of a Governor -- were very, 
as jurists. I can think of one son,as 
I'm talking to you now. But there were that I appointed 
were not quali ed turned out horrib If I had been 
later, I 't think I wou anyone that 
the Bar said was not ified. In the Supreme Court justices, 
the practice I was, I don't think was the practice of 
Ronald Reagan or or Deukmejian, to ta with the Chief 
Justice. Of course, I knew 1 Gibson very, very well dur my 
Attorney and he was a man that would call you and 
tell you why "I'd 1 to have so and so appointed." And Roger 
Traynor was exactly 
Let me tell you, if 
or an associate jus 
same way. 
're a Governor and the ef Justice 
of ity of Roger Traynor or Phil 
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G son tells you not to th s person or to nt this 
other person, well were on li com-
miss too, re not goi them. That was my prac-
ce. I don't know what Ronald Reagan's prac ce was. He 
appointed one judge was very -- the man we 
we're talking about today, Wright 
SENATOR KEENE: Clark and chardson were the other two. 
GOVERNOR BROWN: was a j but well 
regarded, but Clark was never regarded as a great lawyer. I 
think the consensus of the Bar was that he was a lawyer. A 
good human being and everything else, and I don't mean to comment 
upon him -- but as a lawyer I that was the of the 
bench and bar of the State of Cali a. 
But you're not going to reach perfect s business. 
The thing to do is to elect Governors and then won't 
have any problem. and lause 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: other we have a few s left. 
Any other comments? Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED: I Professor F 
the objective of the 1934 s was to j 
politics. If we assume that hasn't worked, and 
s out of 
we're look-
ing at now is contested 
are going to be lit 
real wondering whether 
contested elect s or 
the j 
in major c I I 
elect are better than 
ther we couldn t run a campa 
greater control over the issues if we actual had two c 
running for the office. And I'm s, Leo, whe you got 
into what kind of campa were actually when we had 
contested elections. turn into re on the 
-47-
s 
popular of lar deci ions, or were 1 l con-
tests in which each party put up a candidate and they went at it 
much along party lines? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Well, I must confess my on this, 
but I can tell you I'll to find out. It's certainly an 
intriguing st 
The only thing I know about is looking at the 19th and early 
20th century supreme court elections. Down the turn of the 
century, there were strong partisan ties the contested elec-
tions of the state supreme court. I believe they became nonpar-
tisan about the turn of the century. But they were actually 
partisan offices. And going back to the most famous of all ani-
mosities on the supreme court that made the Clark and everybody 
else a contest with mild, and that was'between David Smith Perry 
and Stephen Field of In re Nagel fame. You know it went all the 
way to their joint service on the state supreme court. And 
that was two men from different parties and two perspectives. 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Let me an observation intended to be 
s re to some of s, particu-
Senator Keene have said today and 
also 
that Professor 
the thought surely some of these as are going to 
over into the discuss tomorrow. 
It seems to me there are two p that cross each 
other this whole 
Brown alluded to when he sa 
Some of us 1 
1 Rehnquist's ideology. 
's not too ff 
ideology is and compare 
The simpler one is the one that Pat 
if was st, he'd be voting 
Rose B ; some of us 
If that's the standard we want to 
We just and see what the 
out own and we act accordingly. 
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The other place is s not that the j should fol 
the law, the judge shou be not be re 
the 1 on polls, but law. Now, 
1985. Around the that Professor is talk 






said that it really doesn't make sense to talk about judges 
following the law because 's no law 
that there's no text, there's no his there's 




lot of different views about how se ques should be 
resolved. If they're important enough, those come down to 
being different political views. Now that doesn't mean that 
there's no such thing as craftsmanship; it doesn't mean there's 
no such thing as integrity. But does mean if you that 
view, that it's some il to say a udge ld s 
follow the law. 
Now, the quest 
said, I assume that 
I'd l 
s will 
to put to 
over 
lemen, and as I 
tomorrow, you think 
the legal realists are wrong? Is Ed Meese ? Is Warren 
Berger right? That l you have to do is follow the text, or all 
you have to do is to out what framers ? Of, 
if the legal realists are r you take 
account and mix it up 
so on? 
l J cial independence and 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: se for use s extreme 
position. (Laughter) One doesn't have to have ei Ed Neese 
or Carl Llewellyn. In fact from a li cal sc of 
view, we've always with se polar ls. We 
have a lot empirical e that fact ju s don't as 
the legal realists. For a while my profession were a 
number of scholars who used to argue, us mathemat s, that 
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can prove that for 













We now have, I , almost evidence 
their phi-
ly, or even 
other 
that in fact judges are bound by something more 
losophy, how they want case to come out polit 
r break So a case can made clear 
way or 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, I would only add that because you don't 
have anything so perfectly tangible cal the law that is appli-
cable in all situations with a clear , doesn't mean don't 
have something suf le af judicial behavior 
that the judges feel 
their behavior is there 
to be consistent. I as 
to some extent predictab , you do 
have something that binds them. It may be something as elusive 
as magnetism. But in my j is there. 





j ss. I fi 
11 
of 
PROFESSOR LEVI: Of course Professor Lowenste , you're 
aware that the 
have 
al 1 
were ask is best being st 
these at the Harvard Law School where 
of that Law School e 
S II f 




as such is a of ss those who 
to suppress 
that as the takeoff 
who have not. And of course, if you take 
, there isn't an 1 lot to talk about 
there a 
very 
is what is mak our col s at Harvard 
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There is ng, 1 and one of these days I 
I have time to do 
about judges who are 
Court. Charles Evans 
ing t it. There is a cu s fact 
nted to the States 
example. At the time 
that Justice Hughes was , the was all 
kinds of oppos on the basis of what his ice was, who 
was representing, the amount money that he had made New 
York, etc., etc. But once Charles Evans Hughes got on the Court, 
he was behaving the way Charles Evans Hughes would behave at the 
time that he was thirty. 
One of the interesting s happens with judie 1 
appointments is that if you ly want to see, and I nk this 
is particularly true when you're talking about people posi-
tions as important as the Cali Supreme Court and the 
States Supreme Court, that the best ictor some ways about 
the way your justice is going to be is what was he as he emerged 
as a maturing adult. In other 's an awful lly 
difficult test. It s the one that one sense Governor 
Brown talked t before he to talk 
quist; and that is, you 
kind, the last and the overwhe 




human being is he, what kind of character, understand and 
compassion does he have. 
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Other than to assure P fessor 
do not want to be i with the tica l 
will avoid the temptat to abuse my 
the last word. I intended that statement to be 
think that it is an 
discussions tomorrow and 
that ld be 






I thank the panelists, those who are still present and those 
who are absent. (Applause) 
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PROFESSOR LARRY BERG: I'd 1 to make on announcement. 
We've had a 
ate. Over 
of trouble in scheduling the United States Sen-
we've had a of Senators here from 
toward the end f of the sess , wh 
is now, we 't come. This 
is also case with an ex-Senator B who will not be 
our dinner speaker tonight. However, I am pleased that Fred 
Graham, the CBS News Correspondent, winner of numerous awards and 
one of the 1 1 our 
speaker. We hope that you will j us at the Bonaventure Hotel. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to Senator 
Lockyer and to Senator Roberti, Senator Keene and the other mem-
bers of the California Senate and their staff with whom we've 
been working for really providing the impetus to get this confer-
ence going. We are delighted and I think this the kind of 
forum with which the Institute and the Univers 
associated. Thank you very much, Senators. 
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are proud to be 
SESSION TWO 
SESSION TWO 
Judicial Elections: Fundamental Issues 
PROFESSOR JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER: Good morning. I am John 
Schmidhauser of the Department of Political Science here at the 
University of Southern California. As the chair of this morn-
ing's panel, it is my distinct pleasure to welcome all of you and 
to introduce our distinguished panel. Our papers have been writ-
ten by Professors Gerald F. Delman and Gideon Kanner, both of 
Loyola Law School. Our discussants include Michael Bradury the 
former president of the California District Attorneys Association 
and currently the District Attorney of Ventura County; the Honor-
able Dorothy Nelson of the United States Court of Appeals and, I 
might add, a distinguished former member of the USC law faculty; 
and Professor Carl Pinkele of the Department of Political Science 
at Ohio Wesleyan University. 
We will start with Professor Uelmen's paper. Professor 
Uelmen. 
PROFESSOR GERALD F. UELMEN: It's especially appropriate that 
this conference was convened in memory of Chief Justice Donald 
Wright. Chief Justice Wright provides a wonderful example of the 
ability of California voters to separate their strong feelings on 
an issue like the death penalty from their evaluation of whether 
a judge should be retained. After he wrote the opinion s ing 
down the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment in 1972, 
the voters overruled his decision within 6 months, amending the 
constitution by a margin of 56%. Yet two years later they 
retained Chief Justice Wright for a 12 year term by a margin of 
70%. Apparently, they didn't agree with Governor Reagan's 
assessment of Donald Wright as his "biggest mistake." Today, we 
are once again hearing suggestions that we should vent our frus-
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tration about implementation of the death penalty by removing 
Chief Justice Wright's successor. Whether that's an appropriate 
suggestion largely depends upon what model or standard we utilize 
to evaluate judges in retention elections. This afternoon I'd 
like to examine three competing models, and analyse the support 
for each in terms of history, in terms of judicial ethics, and 
finally, in terms of practical politics. 
But let me start by at least outlining for you what the three 
models are. The first model I would describe as the political 
model. After having read Gideon's paper, I will give it a new 
title so we will call it the "hot kitchen model." Under this 
model, what we are doing in a retention election is simply decid-
ing whether we like the decisions judges make. We evaluate judg-
es just like legislators and governors. We decide whether we 
like the decisions they've made. And if we don't like them, we 
throw them out of office. It's a very result oriented model in 
terms of what is relevant. 
The second model I would offer is the .. impeachment model." 
Now some of you may have read the paper published by Professor 
Michael Moore, USC, in the L.A. Times several months ago, in 
which he suggested either a political model or an impeachment 
model. But his definition of the impeachment model was somewhat 
broader than the definition I would offer. I think the impeach-
ment model really means that we limit ourselves to the question 
of whether the judge acted improperly in office. The type of 
actions that could result in impeachment. And that means a mis-
feasance, doing something that the judge shouldn't do; or nonfea-
sance, not doing something the judge should do. but very seldom 
is malfeasance grounds for impeachment. Doing what a judge 
should do, but doing it slowly or sloppily or stupidly ordinarily 
does not qualify one for impeachment. 
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Professor Moore expands this model somewhat to say that his 
impeachment model would include a judge who acts outside the 
proper role of a judge by "taking the law in her own hands." And 
I have a little bit of trouble with that because as I read what 
the Professor is saying, he's suggesting that if a judge, for 
example, refuses to follow precedent and says, "I think that 
precedent is wrong and I'm going to continue to dissent," that 
judge would be "taking the law into her own hands. And if we 
applied that standard, then the chief candidates for impeachment 
would certainly have to include Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, 
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and now, as of Monday of this 
week, Justice Malcolm Lucas. 
I don't think that would be grounds for impeachment. I don't 
even think that is acting outside the proper role of the judge. 
But I think it does raise an issue that can be considered in 
terms of a third alternative model. 
I would suggest as an alternative to the political model and 
the impeachment model a simple competency model in which the 
standard we apply in evaluating judges in retention elections is 
simply whether they conform to accepted standards of judicial 
conduct. And I think accepted standards are available in the 
canons of judicial ethics that were drafted by an American Bar 
Association committee headed by Chief Justice Roger Traynor fif-
teen years ago. Those standards have, for the most part, been 
adopted in California as the California Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Now, let me look at the competing claims of these three mod-
els. First of all, in terms of history. Now, I'm not going to 
go over the same ground that Leo Flynn went over yesterday. He 
went over it very thoroughly. But there is one very troubling 
argument for the political model in the silence of the California 
Constitution. Clearly the Constitution says that judges shall 
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stand for retention elections and the only question to be pre-
sented to the voters is, shall justice so-and-so be elected to a 
twelve-year term on the Cali a Supreme Court? 
On the other hand, the tution also contains a provision 
for impeachment of justices; and in that respect the standard is 
defined. It says a judge may be removed by impeachment for mis-
conduct in office and essentially it applies what I refer to as 
the impeachment model. We also have within our Constitution a 
body known as the Commission on Judicial Performance which is 
empowered to recommend the removal of judges. And again, a stan-
dard is set forth in that provision which is roughly equivalent 
to what I have described as the competency model. 
Now, in light of that constitutional structure, wouldn't it 
be a redundancy to have retention elections and apply any stan-
dard other than a political model? I think to answer that ques-
tion, we have to look to the history; we have to look at the 
context and the intent with which the retention election was put 
in place. Now, suggesting we look to the historical intent of 
the framers, I am not advocating the position of Ed Meese, that 
we look no further. I simply suggest that this is a good place 
in start, and it's helpful to look simply beyond the mere silence 
of the Constitution to see what was intended. The silence cer-
tainly is not an explicit constitutional standard. 
Now, then we go back to 1934, what's especially interesting 
to me about the political ity that led to this initiative 
appearing on the ballot was the committee that was put together 
to promote this venture. It was really what you'd call a good 
government committee. But brought together some very 
interesting elements of California politics. It brought in the 
Chamber of Commerce. It brought in the League of Women Voters. 
The Chief of Police of San Francisco and Los Angeles were on the 
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committee. And a very politically ambitious young district 
attorney from Alameda County was on the committee -- Earl Warren. 
And that struck me as curious because I knew Earl Warren had 
always been an advocate of life tenure for judges. And I thought 
what was he doing on this committee that put together this pro-
posal for twelve-year terms and retention elections. And it 
turns out that Earl Warren was consistent. He had actually urged 
the committee to adopt a program of life tenure for judges. What 
dissuaded the Committee from taking that position was the fear 
that they would then "blanket in" all of the judges then sitting 
in California for life tenure. And that prospect frightened them 
a little bit, because the level of quality of the judiciary in 
California in 1934 was nothing like it is today. And again, that 
requires that we look at the context of the times in which this 
proposal was made. And that context is really at startling one. 
We were rocked in California by series of astounding judicial 
scandals, starting in 1929 when the California State Senate actu-
ally sat as a court and tried the impeachment of Judge Carlos 
Hardy, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge who was accused of 
using his influence to affect the investigation of Aimee Semple 
McPherson's disappearance during the twenties. 
Shortly thereafter, Los Angeles was shocked by the scandal of 
numerous superior court judges being accused of rewarding their 
political campaign managers by appointing them as receivers in 
bankruptcy or receivership cases. That actually led to an 
unprecedented effort by the L.A. County Bar to bring about the 
recall of three superior court judges which succeeded. 
And then a year later, the United States Senate ends up 
spending three months sitting in trial of the impeachment of 
Judge Harold C. Louderback, a federal district judge from San 
Francisco, who was accused of continuing the same practice he had 
engaged in as a superior court Judge. He came from the Superior 
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Court in San Francisco where, 
trial of Fatty Arbuckle dur 
appointed to the federal 




sided over the 
He was then 
same 
receiversh 
appointments. And after a month 1 by the United State 
Senate, he was acquitted by a vote of 45 gui to 37 not guilty. 
Now, 
in 1934. And it's clear, I think, from that context that at that 
time, the remedy of recall was seen as a very 
cumbersome, ineffic and ineffect to remove judges who 
were incompetent. So I don't think that there's re ly any 
redundancy in terms of putting in the retention election despite 
the existence of impeachment and recall at that time. Because 
the retention e was ly ived by its drafters as a 
kind of a safety va , a way to get r of the judge who isn't 
competent without having to go through all of the rigamarole of 
an impeachment. 
Now, when you at arguments that were presented pro 
and con for the ballot measures, not just ition 3, but 
Proposition 14 as well, because they both essential suggested 
the same pattern of terms th elections, 
's quite clear to me that what they thought were proposing 
was some sort of safety valve that would use the competency stan-
dard. They repeatedly referred to the need to get judges out of 
poli s, suggesting the 1 standard was not really 
they had in mind. 
Let me quote from a le of those that went back 
and forth that were published at the time of this debate in 1934. 
One of the leading proponents of both Proposition 3 and Proposi-
tion 14 argued as fol 
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... long experience has shown that life tenure is occasionally 
conducive to deterioration in some form. Can we nd a reme-
dy for this? The proposed al submission of the 
incumbent to a limited form of popular election is designed 
to correct this imperfection and it is indeed an ingenious 
adaptation of the life tenure system to a reasonable and 
almost entirely nonpolitical control . 
... (This) is a practical method of removing the bench from 
politics. It combines the best features of the federal 
appointive system and of the elective system and eliminates 
the undesirable elements of both. It will enable the people 
... to make the careful selection of judges ... It places a 
wise and very necessary check upon the appointing power. It 
will effectively control judicial arrogance and laziness 
which occasionally go with life tenure by periodical submis-
sion of the incumbent's record to the people. It will enable 
the judge to devote his entire time and energies to judicial 
work free from the fear of the political consequence of his 
decisions. 
Now that suggests to me that what they really had in mind was 
a competency model. And even two years later, after Proposition 
3 was enacted and they were still seeking to apply the same sys-
tem of retention elections to trial court judges, both the oppo-
nents and the proponents of that measure assumed that what they 
had accomplished in 1934 was to give roughly the equivalent to 
life tenure to judges in California. The 1934 initiative two 
years later was criticized as a hollow mockery and a mendacious 
pretense because the incumbent simply runs against his own shad-
ow. And at the same time, the measure was defended for virtually 
the same reasons because it does give the judge tenure during 
good behavior. This has always been deemed by the great weight 
of authority to be the chief safeguard to a politically 
independent bench. 
So these are the arguments being made in the context of the 
times, and I think they strongly suggest that this measure was 
indeed perceived as simply a safety valve in which incompetent 
judges could be removed. 
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The problem 
however was that 
presented 
valve was 
self in California, 
le 
twelve What if the 
ent when 
term 
tr court of 
11 s 
j 
1 judge in Los 
c led across street 
of sol a 
outcome of that 
refused to step down 
to f a case 
ing was he was 
the 





the name of Gavin 
court 
, but he 
ial proceedings had 
But there was no constitu-
tional provision for removal short of impeachment or recall. So 
what happened 1938 is the Cons ion was amended to allow 







, and it was made --
ssor 





s later that 




it was made by a per-
Nelson that 
s Commission on 
ial Performance: " .. a vote of the electorate is no longer 
to a on j With an 
ef and practical means to remove an incompetent or corrupt 
judge, an ideal tern of be cons that need 
not necess lve 'a vote the I II 
But the s has 
sal 
i now real nowhere. 
's a current fore the 
authored by Senator Lockyer that wou 
election and allow j s li tenure a 
cess But the 
6 
islature, SCA 23, 
the retention 
the appointment pro-
ss wou not 
only review by the Commission on Judicial Appointments, but con-
firmation by the Senate and then a vote of the people. But the 
vote of the people in that context wou be a prospective vote in 
terms of whether the judge has the ali ations and would elim-
inate the danger that judges would have to stand for election 
based on the results of the cases that they have decided. 
Now that leads me to the second perspective I wanted to offer 
with respect to these three competing models and that is the 
perspective of judicial ethics. I think the question is present-
ed for us of whether judges can conduct the kind of campaign 
which the political model demands. The canons of judicial ethics 
require that whatever model their opposition might use against 
them, judges are stuck. They are essentially limited to respond-
ing on the issues of competency or misconduct in office. And I 
think that poses not just the problem of fairness to judges in 
terms of what kind of campaign they can conduct, but it also 
imposes a serious question with respect to how judges actually 
perform the duty of judging. Are we creating the situation in 
which we inject considerations into the process of actually 
deciding cases that we don't want to be there. 
What I've done is look at the canons of judicials ethics and 
identify four particular constraints that we impose on judges 
that I think present a problem in this context. The first is the 
requirement that a judge be unswayed by partisan interests, pub-
lic clamor, or fear of criticism. I think that irement that 
we impose on judges is the quintessential difference between a 
judge and other politicians. And that is why criticism of judges 
for flouting the public will really betray a basic misapprehen-
sion of what the role of a judge is. In effect, we tell judges 
in the canons of ethics you must flout the publ will, you can-
not be swayed by what the public wants in terms of how you decide 
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Anderson was conv 
Death pena 
of murder and sen-
rsed. Reason: The 
not been proven. s to kill 
is the ury not." 
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Now, when I read that, I thought, my God, if they actually 
rendered a decision like that -- I don't with them. I 
think the Rose Bird court was wrong. So I went to 38 Cal 3d and 
lled out People v. Anderson to see if is actual what the 
court held. I discovered that indeed, was not. They made no 
finding whatsoever as to what Anderson's intent was. They simply 
held that the jury had not been properly tructed that they had 
to find intent to kill before they could return the verdict of 
death. Very different than the way the holding is characterized 
here. 
Another example: People v. Easley. Easily is a paid assas-
sin hired to kill Mr. Youngham in a corporate power struggle. 
The jury found Easley stabbed Youngham and his wife to death with 
an ice pick and sentenced him to death. Ruling: Death penalty 
reversed. Reason: The jury was told to, quote, "consider" vari-
ous aggravating and mitigating circumstances deciding what 
punishment to choose. They shou have been told to, quote, 
"weigh" the aggravating and mitigating factors. And when I read 
that, I was astounded. You mean the California Supreme Court 
actually reversed a death penalty because the judge used the word 
"consider" instead of the word "weigh" the jury tructions. 
That's an astounding result. I wouldn't agree with that. So I 
went to People v. Easley and found that's not what the court held 
at all. The issue in Easley was whether the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative should be applied or the 1977 death law. 
Indeed, one uses the word "weigh" and one uses word "cons 
er" but that had no effect on court's decision. The court 
decided that the trial judge had erroneously ied the 1978 law 
to a murder that was committed three weeks before the 1978 law 
was even adopted. 
ex post facto. 
So the problem was that it was being applied 
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Now ' 
to 38 Cal and 
the s 
ference and say, 










or we real held 
se both of those cases are s the 
courts as indeed case is s the 
courts. So the judges are ft of wear a 
zzle whi to 
The third c cons I has relevancy is 
that a judge cannot convey or others to the 
s that are in a fluence And 
calls to mind the 
Cali lar 
ular spec le 
source of funds. Yet we see in 
their 
nes can't to 
of are for 
or II that's not we 
want udges to , or to ze the 
j rnu avo of 
I terms of earn-
f j s. I 'rn not to have to 
that, and know our s is to 
address that much 1. 
But I 1 , when we constra 
under j st Cali 
6 -
of Judicial Conduct, we see two con s of us the politi-
cal model in retention elections. One, although I have very 
little use for avi ana s lS campa turns judges 
in sitt ducks. They real are s s in terms of 
kind of campaign that can conduct. But our even greater 
concern, I think is that it has to affect how perform their 
judicial function. Now, I know Gideon is going to say I'm an 
alarmist about this, that we can rely on the moral fiber of judg-
es. But I think the truth is that judges are human and human 
beings are more responsive to perceived consequences than they 
are to pious exhortations. And our sordid history of judicial 
scandals of fifty years ago suggests that it is not an unrealis-
tic possibility that using the political model is go to create 
an aura in which judges are going to take into consideration the 
political consequences of their decisions when 
And that I think is the greatest sk we face. 
render 
Now, the guest we're debating is not really a moot ques-
tion. It was debated between Thomas Jef son and Mar l. 
Thomas Jefferson thought that we should subject judges to the 
popular will of the people via the impeachment process. And that 
same debate, more recently was as Fred Graham reminded 
us, with the billboards "Impeach Earl Warren" refl the 
unpopularity of one of most famous decisions rendered by the 
Warren court, Brown v. Board of 
means of the political process, 
way to deal with decisions 
We create an aura 
sts to 
we don't 1 
judges. Then, in effect, what we're suggest 
is to remove 
s court 
What we're suggesting is se decis can be 
putting in a new of s to dec cases the 
simply 
r way. 
There is an alternative that alternat is 
in California. Many of the decisions we don't 1 




changed by the 
iative process. I've al 





own precedents. 's how we 
ef 
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's how we 
we start suggesting that 
j , then we are indeed 
Cal 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: I don't know whether Loyola Law 
School has the equivalent of Harvard's divis over tical 
issues in law, but I'm to a sion over 
equal time. Please go ahead Professor Kanner. 
PROFESSOR GIDEON KANNER: to nature I'll to 
be brief First of all, I 
of a speaker in c 
ly must utter what 
tances and the other to 
expected 
tell you how 
t not 




It so happens that 
ago, I trans from 
of California law 
School. One of my sors was indeed Dorothy Nelson. 
So is really a wonderful k 
me to be shar lectern 
udge and former dean of a 
s that, st 
judge, and it seems to me 
are being led here 
of some We not 
things, although Gerry and I have 
lie before. re real 
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of a homecoming and an honor 
her now, as a stinguished 
law school. 
be fu that is a 
that st of ant st 
la Law School, so I have to 
have a on these 
eros swords on issue in 
see here is understudy 
from a whose great came when the star broke a leg. 
Remember that line from show biz? It seems that Professor Preb 
Stolz, a f s and a member of the facul-
of Boalt is recover was le to attend. 
So, as the bl of ' I a here as 
his understudy, so please th me. That also accounts 
the sudden appearance of Loyola as the force here. 
I am indebted to Gerry for one 
cussed these matters before. s 
As I sa , we've dis-
, I see he has reformed, 
so it won't be necessary for me to address the of dis-
claiming or rejecting the notion that s should be com-
pared with the antics and excesses of a vari of clowns who are 
taking advantage of an emerging problem soc for political 
purposes. Let there be no mistake where I stand. is an 
effort by the political r to unseat some California j s. 
Having said that, I also must ze, and I do, that the 
political right is not a c 't create 
this problem. They didn't manufacture t. 
exploiting it. They re some s ly 
misperceptions that seems to be deal th. 
But, as I say in my , whe we want to be here or not, 
we are here. And so we have to address what seems to me as a 
remarkable notion. It is novel, 
cy; namely, that there is some r 




exercising the franchise people. There are some disturb-
ing consequences that flow from 
everybody agrees that the 
can't impose our not of 
ple. I think it's even dis 
ously advanced. People go 






not enforceable, that we 
s of governance on the peo-
s a is being seri-
lls, have the right, 
for anyone or not to vote for 
anyone for any reason or for no reason. And seems to me that 
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f we start in 
we are s some 
be sed. 
So, wi that out 
remarks. I 
the 
of stioning that concept, 
f icult ems 





I want to explore. Bes s I assume some of you have not read 
the paper, is all a 1 of fessors 
when the class doesn't read their ass 
I juxtaposed the we e poli-
ticians with the way we do s. Of course, we know, as 
you folks of the press know very well, poli campaigns are 
just awful. They're dirty, scurri s, full of assas-
sination, mud-slinging, and so on. And the courts have neverthe-
less ef 
the First Amendment. 
we to be cons 
ing for judges. But 
t 











e who would 
That's 
I agree that 
comes to vot-
is that we 
ss? Why is 
fine 
ing publ 
0 Wel , answer is clear, course. Because is a 

















extent is it now legitimate to turn around and to say, well, when 
comes to judges, you mustn't do any of even though --
even the judges may behave 
a way s lar to 1 ians terms of licymaking, 
~68-
soc 1 re I and so 
sure wouldn't want to 
let's at least z 
Well, I've also s 
read his paper, and f 
defenders of 
ically left of center, 
find themse 
that app 





s , and I 
c. But 
and e ewhere I ve 
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ate Const 
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the popular perception of the 1 
intent of s rs of ago. I f that amus-
ing. Beyond that there's no need to dwell on it, because the 
Cons t s doesn't that s fram-
ers supposed had in 
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s the extent deserve our 
de 
we 
tell the judges II out II No, that•s 
not we tell tel st the 
law even if it flouts 1. And st 
s a world of f those two 
And so, to the extent the courts , and 
to the extent they apply statutes, and to the extent they apply 
precedents -- and by of course I mean as under-
stood in common law, meaning that the 
es, the break of o 
of new ones , we have no 
But are we to s 
says: I'm out to re 
a court 
I a 
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courts. 
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States Supreme Court has cons 
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to mean a c en of 
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the sort of that 
be 
last dec is 
So 
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What if the court dec not to enforce some con t 






which aren't there? Such as the r 
or abortion. Again, I'm not 
soundness of all But what 




dealing with judges like that then sudden 
when we're 
social, 
ideological giants who take it upon themselves to dec bas 
ideas of right and wrong, and dec to be in the 
constitution or the laws rather than is, seems to me that 
their decisions may be for soc 
society. But surely that soci is 
make a judgement whether the judi ial 
And to the extent a of 
enshrined in s own Consti 
judges and a provis a re 
power by the publ , then it seems 
Constitution requ us to take that 
well. 
So, my point is real ite 
me, will have to thstand the some 
















of ideas. It is look to me like our 
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simple. 
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would cost a lot ess 
s throat." 293 
It seems 
j , that when i 
national takes 
that, maybe we to s 
the 
just applying the law? Is that rea 
and strikes? Well, we have to 
s 
And finally, of course, 
the federal model, let me 
the extent 
you all the 
for it. I mean, the s 
legendary; present 
point out that 
right here in Los 
es about 
les, 
t i he s 
a true 
harshness l 
a cou wh is 
ca 1 bal s 
so much 
that we 
j s are 
) . I hasten to 
lawyer and Dorothy was an to read 
passage from a transcri o 
Distr Court here 






Mr. Kanner: Yes, Your 
The Court: 
that knows it was 
It was passed 
to cover these 
ening and rewri 
me. 






here-~·- s a 
tretched 
The Court: As a matter of fact the 14th Amendment was never 
approved. Did you that? Never 
Mr Kanner: I make one statement 
The Court: The 
this proc 
states, New 
other state a 
They did not have 
14th Amendment so never 
matter of law But we 
over things. (Laughter) 
was, 
two northern 
, and one 
approval. 
of votes to approve 
effec 
s, of 
Well I have a f cigar here which I offer as a prize to 
anybody in the audience who can name the j who can tell 
me what happened when this transcript went up to the Ninth Cir-
cu Don't about if you don't ; I'll 
for ) . 
Well now, the 
ing with a wacko, right? Am I of 
ment never as a matter of 
z 
to 
s he was also a racist and a 
man. And we 
Well, let's think about 
such 
1 
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on the bench. 
that no s of 
t of our j i-
Ca by 
than we deserve. 
So I close on the 
larmists who defend 
my paper. I that the 
j s for e 
ly undere two ( 1) the ali and of 
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people who occupy the and ( 2) sdom of 
ple. I do not bel for a second the le are go to 
do be tossing out j wholesale 
so other poli 
the courts are 
Gallup Poll justice. 
The second 
to turn to 
is I do not bel 
is sometimes called 
I th that is a 
has no foundation in real 
And so, in conclusion, 
reforming society, of mak 
have set out on a course of 
the law. You have, to some extent, 
chosen to make publ pol and 
free society you are, therefore, ject to 
you are going to have to sell the sdom of your 
the public. I see no other way out. Thank you. 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: Now I ' s 
slat 
s 
JUDGE DOROTHY NELSON: You mean that wacko federal j 







same platform with you. And I 
I would like to have to re 
sh that I had the 19 hours that 
to you. I th are 
excellent. I think 've raised issues. 
I'd like to establi the fact that I was for life, 
was by President Carter, and I'm I I a lifer. 
appointed to the state court by now Pres a 
served as a deputy distr t 
lawyer and then went on the 
systems; and again, I repeat, I'm 
before he was an il and gas 
So I have experienced 
I'm a ifer. I can dec 
whether the Oakland Ra 
or settle Indian di 
s shal be pe tted to come down here, 
r the State of Wash or 
wherever, without fear or sal. 
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I guess, as you might tell Gerry c to me in his 
paper, I probably fall down on s of saying that the 
issue is how we select judges st place, and that a lot 
more effort to sue than we 
them. But if I had to make a se , on is we do have 
an election in Cali a we have to , let me 
rst say, that judge Gideon about now would be 
jected to a very s procedure our court. Com-
plaints cou t that j , be taken fore our 
Judicial Counsel, and a investigatory committee would be 
se And s students, as a matter of , when I was 
at USC, wrote the bill brought about commission that was 
f the Commission on Judicial Quali now called the 
Commission on Judie 
Senator DeConc 




I think with an 
ect for 
ld subject to 
we do e 
ld vote? I 
act as s 
Performance, and are now working with 
one of 
, I 
the same the federal 
s and state j should be held to 
now 
be held to account. 
, and that's a 
li tenure and 
ssions. However, 
is, do we dec how we 
our 
of s. And then 
should be held accountable 
that we have to understand if 
how the issues are that come be judges. In the f st 
place, if we a sion of or sion 
a statute that we s clear covers case before a judge, I 
think that would be a very simplistic statement. As Gideon 
recalls, in our course on legis , we s 
not acting, sense if an issue comes 
the j says not covered by 
-76-
judges can act by 
fore a judge 
Constitution, 
it's not thoroughly covered by a statue, therefore, I'm not 
to act, that judge has acted by not act In cases, I'd 
s all f lt cases come before a j there s 
u as to the of these words, the 
words of some. Take the 11 Amendment, for tance, that you 
cannot sue another state. If you look to the 1 slat history 
of that 11th Amendment, about what was meant it, you 11 find 
that there were legislators that said, of course, you can't sue 
your own state. So if the public looks at the plain words of the 
11th Amendment without looking to the background of the 11th 
Amendment or do what Gerry done terms of dec what the 
decision was in People v. Anderson, they can be sled. s 
leads me to the second problem that I have with election and how 
we should be judging the judges and how judges de themselves. 
lves from a 
is correct as 
If you say that judges should have to define 
're s political perspective, that what 
opposed to whether or not they are 
about that defense? 
, how do they go 
I think Gerry's point is 
judicial ethics. For instance, a g 
against capital shment. Now thout ment 
given judge is, and I'm not taking one s 
[as I say, my husband was 
Carter; I hope that places me 
judge has publicly stated on numerous occas 
would enforce a system of shment 
ly applied equally to t s and to all 
Who defends the judge? 
When my husband was f st to the and s 
election time came up, his bailiff brought $750 from an attor-
ney who had just appeared in s court. My hu sa 
is this?" He said, well, the know, wants to 
-77-
t it in whatever trust fund have elect Now, 
of course, he knows that you don' want to know who he is of 








$14,000 to have s 
booklet that s out to all 
problem when you're 
judiciary that is 
You to them 
for these j 
pay for 
that can be 
to s 
weeks over $3 800 
f his 
I was 
he was told strar 
he to 
the strar of Voters 
voters. This is a s 












2 cases or 173 cases? 
I Women Vot-
ers to come s j s on 
tr 1 1 I 
IS a can 
when we have 27 37, 47 s the 
tr and a use my re 
is than 
else at tab I as e 
each of se cases mean do we translate that to 
? How we it to the 
electronic , when come across s may 
well whether not an ? Well, 
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if you can't stand the heat, get out of 
response. 
kitchen is often the 
But I shall never Tr , former ef Just 
reten-of California. After he had been reelected, susta 
tion election, he met th the law students at the USC Law Center 
and said that he would never have accepted intment to the 
supreme court had he known what he would be subjected to in terms 
of this kind of retention election. You may say, well, if he 
doesn't want this kind of public exposure, then he shouldn't be a 
supreme court judge. I would want a Roger Traynor or a Donald 
Wright to want to be on the bench of what is viewed as one of the 
most prestigious supreme courts in the nation. 
I think I've probably touched on just two or three points 
here. I'd be happy now to turn to my colleagues, and perhaps we 
can engage in some discourse on some of these issues. 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: If the two presenters will 
hold their peace efly, I'll just go down the line order to 
let all the commentators make the commentsi then perhaps you 
will want to engage in an exchange; and then, hopefully, we will 
have time to permit questions or dissenting from the 
audience itself. Carl Pinkele, Professor of Poli al Sc at 
Ohio Wesleyan, is next. 
PROFESSOR CARL PINKELE: Allow me tial 
ium. 
to say that I am 
It is an honor happy to be a part of this 
to be a participant along with the host of dis ished 
uals the Institute of Practical Politics and Government at the 
University of Southern California and the California Senate 
Office of Research have assembled. Second, allow me to say that 
I am equally happy to be a political scientist and neither a 




, we 1 
are 
s 
cially to those who 
al pose no great 
one of legalism s 
designed, I'm a 
present in law 
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two I am 
s lf. In 
jargon and 
sts gener-




In that vein I'll start out by saying 3000 cheers times 3000 
cheers for the political tern and not too many for the 
system. Now, that statement is not neces an 
the legal system. It is designed to make record and 
set the 1 the tern 
be , my is an e of 
this last point. 
me one 1 
context 1986 a j elec-
1 Rose 
, if I could vote I would be a 
er of Ms. Bird. Being , I don't to worry 
d about that lar ; e I have own J 
unexciting, state court to be 
if I so 
be 
Supreme Court 
se For the most I 
the and doings of 
of my state's st court 
are wondering 
spied on which others. Many Ohio 
brethren" have 
find some relief 
s intramural se justices are 
so they 11 to us c izens well enough alone. 
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My d ss has a tel to I believe -- follow-
ing the old saw "if it a 't broke don't it" for the 
most an relax 
however, are 
Californians 
their state s 
ticular. The proper 
are 
st tr 
st quest for 
with an 
the 
s c a, 
i different Many 
adopted 
st 
states' c iz 
lectoral for what is: should ci zens be 
is perceived to be a jud 1 error? I bel that the answer 
is an al YES! 
Yesterday, Governor Pat Brown 
grant Associate Justice ist was a 
legal mind that he would neither 
person with Rehnquist's views to 
nor's statement sed a 1 
because assuming the of 
the difference between the stance he 
oppose Chief Jus ce Rose B ? There 
matters of values, 
one's political 
, and 
is what counts; 
Democracy must rest upon the 
ly 








and of those who 
fference, save for 
In other words 
that is 
of 
ate to measure, either 




some of us fear voters and are 
well make a stake. I 1 be 
shoot" dimension is a 
la stic not a theore d 
ever, we cannot take the 
fear; the fear of what once 
the govern s far f 





for a democ 
izens out of 
voter is ted from 
1 not the 
I'm zzled by our 
there is something so cruc 
ans (j s, 
arm's 
ing is 
cannot be the case 
le or 
cannot be the case that j 
reaching, carry more 
pol 1 actors. If we can vote about 
of war and 
judges? 
The problem is 
can not 
not unwashed, 
problem concerning judie elections, 
like to mys fy their 
outside. The of the 
u just 
fronted, as they now are 
to and confront 









stem and its 
ld kept at 
dec is mak-
sted c zens. It 
, no matter how far 
other 
will dec matters 
se 
voters. The relevant 
is that elites 
to outsiders on the 
been successful at manip-
are con-
ssures to open 
is unbounded and also 
, con-
is 
some, even on the s fewest votes. 
I cannot tell 
j s who must 
c zens care when 
to I , we should care 
t ) are not fear 1 and are not 




of j s 
same sort of 
better representatives by being brought 
constituents' ass. 
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I am to f out 
Good! Why 
s must be account-
senta-





focus through their 
I reject the 
of the jud 
the and 
does legitimiz 
Like all other 
cial commun 
judgement. 






those in the 
for 
different from senators, 
mayors, pres , or members of schoo boards? 
I also reject re the not s 1 
far from center s are st measured 
members of the extended j 
We don't want other members 
ial commun - especial 
measuring rod for senators, or 
stituency to assess "Star Wars 
more inclined to not a low 
being involved in the e ect 
closely associated th 
ate, uninvolved of 
It is 
belongs the context of 
doubt that no one would 
cial decision-mak we 
to measure the po 
the proper form of j 
ee". is, j 
law, the facts, and a 
do when looking at a case. 
of s 
before the le for rea 










step in the 
extent 
because 




In closing, and I am sure 
s moment, I want to 
than elections. Poli s 
interests, 
has to do with 




















kind; although like 
other things of noble virtue poli s can often have darker, 
down side. The act of the judie dec is commu-
contexts; so are set n all of these pol 
should we treat them 
vants? Other than 
else believes judie 
exempted from 
e running ree 
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f It 
wel In 1972, Jus 
su ) . As Leo F 
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cats and 









j box. At the f 
s declaring 
death uncon titu 
to j A woman the 
and knocked r 
sn quite as 
next to jury. 
In the interest of 
dent of the Cali 
immediate past pres 
association. If I say 
phrase Senator Sam I n, it 
country lawyer. 
There are two iples 
us from these discuss 
other. The f t is that f 
1y, these discuss 
stand and accept 
of ew 
Court's 





Boalt Hall says, are a 1 those 
1 to sm 
I think that the 
the '34 change is 
ing because there is 
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; useless, 
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justices in California have 
er influences: First, they serve 12-year terms. Twe 










to serve 12-year terms. can be no reduction in 
salary during the term of office. So, a Governor or a Legisla-
ture could not, through threat of financial sanctions, force a 
justice from the bench or affect decisions. And third, of 
course, justices don't run centes e 
Historically, these provisions have provided virtually life 
tenure for California's justices. It's also clear, with due 
deference to Judge Nelson, that the framers were mindful of the 
potential dangers of giving too much independence to judges, 
i.e., "life tenure." The framers gave the people of California 
the unqualified right not to reelect a justice. They put a great 
deal of people, a subject to wh too 1 atten-
tion has here been given. And, story bears out this confi-
dence. No sitting justice has ever been removed from the Bench. 
So the framers, at least, lieved that the peop would not vote 
against justices for the wrong reasons. 
It is "use 
Professor Uelmen. 
s" to the 
voters won't 
model suggested by 
at two rea-
sons. First, from the time we enter grade school, we are imbued 
with the idea that we have not only a constitutional right, but a 
iven right to vote our consc when we enter the polling 
place. No one may over our , e ly the State 
Bar of California. Under l, is precise-
ly what occurs. Lawyers try to tell the people how to vote. 
The public has a marked staste for lawyers. On the way 
here yesterday, I saw a bumper sticker that , "Save Califor-
a -- Outlaw the " (laughter). And you've all heard the 
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cocktail circuit jokes such as: II are we not us 
instead of white rats for scientif ex per nts?" 




get attached to them (l Certa but 
there's a point to the humor. And it is a The 




of the Since, by necessity, lawyers wou 
"educating" under this model, sounds its own death kne l. 
And second, the impeachment model won't work because of human 
nature. If you don't like a public off ial or aren't 
what you believe they should, then the ballot box is the place 
where you express that concern. This point has already been 
eloquently made by Governor Pat Brown, who said Justice ist 
Court Jus may be a well-qualified U.S. 
would vote against Rehnquist 
Brown doesn't like him. The 
if he were on the 
public 









I believe the public has a special sense about the respon-
sibility in electing judges. It is not some one can 
easily articulate, but tead of th the method of 
selecting and re ng j s or life tenure, I ieve 
we must rely on the public's sense of what's 
maintain the integrity of the system. 
Now for some crystal ball gaz ng. What's 
the justices are removed dur the 86 el 
judicial candidates no longer seek 
dramatically will this judicial affect 
future? Will the '86 elect in fact poli 
I believe that the answers are j ary 
vive but improve; and that no the j ciary 
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and fa to 
to 
? l the bes 
to Bench? 
Cali a's 
ize the j i ? 
11 not sur-














no one can 
He serves on 
are in fact 11 





























ia courts. So the st 
j 
the controversy 










Historical , the i 
has remained uninvolved 
concern over l 
it There was 
last reelec nor 
There was 
After 1 
Board of D 
discuss and a mee 
s voted to 
intment confi Interest 
the executive d tor nor an elected dis 
at those proceed 
delivered before the 
So even that venture 
to vo 
This, to some , sheds 
feelings about certa 
I don't at s 
for the posi of the Assoc 
our 
there has been a 
summarized as a belief 
concern 
overstepped 
result, towards the 
er or not the Assoc 
topic of discuss A fu 1 
a membership poll could taken. 
bers responded. The resu ts were 
the Chief Jus ce and to ess 
es that are for elect 
(the poll was taken 
I was President of 
The issues 










A statement was 
t 










poli ation, how voters ld cons a 
j election. we d not terms of models 
we scussed many the same concerns been scussed 
here In add we be ? 





term. Lucas was 
been on the court 
we 
is was 






sed, however, on the , and Grodin. 
understanding that the ro of the Association would be educa-
tional. We overwhelmingly rej 
t in a pol campaign 
D our is 
Possible. s concern noted ear 
of the Board, who is now a j 



















One news correspondent who is 
ect the court and the 
election told me that about 75 0 cases c 
proponents and opponents of the court do not for the avowed 
ition. That her own research to 
what those cases actual s me to my 
-9 -
remark, s 
take with us. 
c Cal 
i I 1 
k to the h 
the dust of 
dust from our 
arena 
We have 
integrity of the court 
sion as well. 
future 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: 
try now to do a couple of th 
few liberties with the 
later than 11:30 so 
members of the audience to re 
At this s 
an opportuni 
the cha 's 
cross-cutt 
all of you 
ever, for one 
m stern populist 
bestowed upon me 
a 
to 
s where I can 
that, let's down to some o 
What I m go 
contrad ct s 
have made. At the state 
the organization 
Court's record was so diametrica 













we can take a 










have if these issues 
over matters 
z take 
whose record from all f 
very s ? And how 
or s 
was 0 that Chief Just 
from the distingui courts headed the 






On a issue, same theme, I 1 m 
going to re to a couple of scholars who historically had done 
what we might call pre readings of the st llate 
















se the modern 
s up to 
se 




Court of Mas 
wh 
s courts 
Court at the But in 
c i had moved 
Now, was 








ls of New York, 







the criteria for eva prest ? Number one, a very care-
fully designed random sample the lead fessors 
major univers s and their eval of the ali of work 
of those courts. This was not an ssue oriented quest on. t 
was a quality of jud cial workmansh 
measure. 
or era k of 
The other measure, my est at least, I th is an 
even more decisive one, and that is, the extent to ich the 
highest appellate judges of brother or sister courts, r 
gender terminology you prefer to use, c 
sions of the highest appellate court st 
the dec 
Now, al 50 
state supreme courts or their equ ents were evaluated; all 48, 
in the 1930s, because obviously there were not 50. And what 
really came out of this is the fact that is is a able 
contradiction of the severe t ism of the so-called ird Court 
in California. I don't know whether 's a sal 
but in California certa is des to re 
of public attention; while at level, 
ly kinds of analyses seem to indicate the h st 
the last or Ch f Justices California u 
is very highly and is eva the 
rank. And I wonder if want to address this 







fornia that we with the state don t ce terms of wha s 
going on nationwide? And is the criteria for the B Court and 
its performance in these issue-sensit areas different the 
criteria applied against 
etc.? That's one set of cons 
at this point. 
Court of 
Pe 
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Well, I clear 
on that is quite unusual. And I'm sure we can 




i a lot of 
a that are caus-
to go on. But 
because it is going on 
to 
Cali 
should our concern, 
ifornia, we have 
all of the 
that we and 
subj judges to heat of k are magni-
fied. 
I don't agree 
dard we apply to j 
cost that we have to pay 
voters cou 't care stan-
the I voters 11 
once we start us an unrestrained 
political model in evaluating judges. True, we can't follow 
people into the voting booth. People can go into the voting 
booth and vote someone out of office because they're black or 
because they're female. Voters can behave as racists and sexists 
and there's nothing we can do about them. But I don't think the 
answer to that is to 
those sorts of things. I 
up our and voters to do 
there 
lity and much of that responsibility 
Bar to suggest that there are 1 that 
some sort of responsi-
going to fall on the 
are appropr to 
j contests not ate to other contests. 
I mentioned one of f rst tests of stem we had in 
c was case of I a of Court of 
was convicted of a br f case. It 
turns out that the in j 1 and 
great renown, who was to the federal 
bench large se of , was Carr, the judge that 
was re ing to. And as a result of Gav go to 
j l, the new judge who was appointed to fill his ace was Mar-
1 McComb. A couple 
But I think it gets 




Carr or 1 McComb, or whether we want 
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of story. 
In terms of 
or Charlie 
s on bench 
like Wri and Traynor and arl Warren the proces 
we subject them to has someth to what kind of J s 
we're going to on we 
to us see fewer 
u s of the cal of Wr and 
Now, I just can t relate to Professor Pinkele' s on of our 
governmental system. I'm sure t's very lar the v s 
that Thomas Jef But if Thomas Jefferson's vis 
prevailed, I don't nk we would have seen courts the ted 
States that take i l the ted States Court 
took in Brown v. Board of Education. wasn't a popular deci-
sion when it was rendered. If it had been put to a vote of the 
people, it would have been a very close ques and it 
have gone the other way. And if we had 
question, who were dec s 
majority of the people would 
holding, we probab would never 
think Professor Pinke 's vis 
that 
terms of a 
or 
decision. So I 
sys f 
really leaves out of role courts have 
to play today in terms of be 
against the majori 
And my final po is to 
do not think it would be appropr ate 
quist simply because I disagree wi 
cal philosophy. I think we 
all judges have a poli 
that ultimately that 
they dec cases. I th 
1 
Nature of the Judicial Proces 
losophy. We may to see s 
Nonetheless, we can never see them 

















phi and that phi 
decisions, that that judge is 
not When we ta 









di ition to 1 
predisposition could ly result the j 
f from sitting on a case. 
set forth when a judge should be disqualified 
dice. Can you court ' 11 I move 
to remove Justice X s case because Ju X is 
too liberal. 11 We've never even seen a motion made by the prose-
cution in any case decided by the Supreme Court of California 
where they've gone in and said, 11 Rose Bird, I don't think you 
should s on this case because I think you're biased against the 
a 
reason it's never been made is because we're not about 
on a case. And bias which would disqualify a j s 
I think that's kind of bias we should be talking if 
we're applying the competency 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: Any other comments? 




observation that I 




t, my of 
s lar to Jef 
argue Jefferson's 
Basing a political 
two 
s 
f rej to Professor 





Pro ssor Delman, I 
off eli st alterna-
jointly fears of popular 
sovereignty and reverence an entrenched 11 i nobil II 
judges -- is more frightening to me than suffering a bad 
dec is or two based upon a 
96-
Second I am now more certa 
that Professor Uelman i e 
ion between l 
wh is a e 
s and bravo 
do not? How are we to measure 




, or the 
------------------------~~~~~ 
The 
least most of us, prefer j s -- and 
for their legal e 
political spos 





makes "l sense" 
at we have not found the actual usage 
"conservat " utilized to remove 
fact mean that: a 
ideals chances f 
would be less hea 
to one and 
federal levels are 
closer to polit 





I do not 1 entrenched se 
aristocrac s. I do ike 
the ls and 
I do not l at 
us about what the 
and judges aga nst 












is that we a l or at 






PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER. Mr. Kanner. 
PROFESSOR KANNER: 
wants to to our 
rating of courts. 
Supreme Court, over a 
rising quality; and that was rightly 
country. Inso as the court recent 
, I have not conduc 
other on both s 














comments than I used to hear, say, ten years ago. That may be 
anecdotal and visceral. But I offer it whatever it is worth. 
I also suggest that poll 
li of the courts s a 
law pro 
s 
sors to determine the 
because 




and ideological And if you bel see me 
a this a 
campuses 
br to sell 
s are of course a 
s of all sorts. 
of dearly 
IS 




law schools wou be left center. 
So people 1 that would have a more admiring view of 
are 
advanc the of the 
d My concern that I 
are a number of areas 
here. Everybody in this 
As my friend Gerry 
i to, I don't know 
order to IS 
and the 
law and are 
the right 
has been that 
let me ss 
tends to talk about criminal law. 
charges me in publ , and I plead 
about law. I mean, in 
on 
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don't have to know any cr 




This is a 
tieing law in s 
about it. They just don't l 
's been 
people are su aroused on 
they won't. But that's a l there is to 
But it seems to me s 
little s ause I've 











Now if the 
1 lose .. 
a 
to be a 
to be a 
problem. Can you envision great pro s for defendant v 
in a controversy between an company ts sured, 
ca possibly the the 
Landlord-tenant? Land 
death penalty is not the 
where statistics have been 
lator and landowner? 
s o coverage. 
mean the 
e that. That's the f ld 
I commend to you, for 9 9 
my former partner, a man named the ar 
Journal, in he tracked f s 
Commission in the courts up to the aston-
ishing discovery -- T don t know f .L 
understand what I'm s ng, so l and embe l t --
he made the as toni dis cove Ca l as 
Commission up to that nt record appe ate 
courts of about 90 es as an 
as an a:e12ellant! about i . 
reversed the trial J who ruled aga t them. for the 
benefit of nonlawyers, is the ent of a 7-second 
mile. An appellate lawyer who has any k of a career record 
of, let's say, 30 s s cons red a an 
The great majority of cases are af , of cou 
- 9-
So, there are areas of concern. I one also to 
take a look at rate of that our mentioned. 
We 't 
You have to 
Now, a 









for the j 
the 




k of an 
, I really have 
raci sm in 
or not 
of one 
I'm is to com-
One is very unworthy; ject to social 
And the one is at most ject to a i-
Dorothy I m now no came to a 
remember that you crashing I 1 








hand, when a court 
cannot refuse to 
Court 
courts ast resort can re se to exercise 
j 
over case, 
cannot just not act, 1 










slature. So I 
se we have been 
't have 
the 
about that, and I th every si one of us 
private collection of votes which our J 
s , the people exercised 
is or r 
in retro-
And we 
ou to worry about 
ry. don't know of any 
bad j 
that comes 
system. I nk we can 
terr to-
I wil 
embrace Churchill's it is ab the 
worst system of government le; it s just that I can't 
think of a better one. And we're just go 
that. 
to have to l th 
Well, anything else that is to be added to the remarks? No, 
I don't think so. I'll stop here. 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: Anyone else on the 1? 
Nelson. 
JUDGE NELSON: I didn't remember I gave you 
tion. (Laughter.) Again, I just wanted to say the 
isla-
ss 
le would of judging is not as simplistic, I 
like it to be. It's not just a 
, as some 
of what is or what 
is wrong. We have lots of cases 
clear what we ought to be 
cases, for instance, 
where it s pre 
But we have a large number of 
have a statute that was 
passed in the early 1900s deal th motor vehicles, to 
automobiles, motor bikes, so forth. And we have a case 
involving an airplane. I don't think G is that 
we should wait until the - he is until slature 
gets back and updates all of the laws other k of 
motor vehicles which may have been invented since 900 
to 1985, but we do as j s--
PROFESSOR KANNER: For the record I' 
JUDGE NELSON: All ri ank We for 









s judge had 
boring job, to 
cases to dec and set out what 
was k of 
States Senate, a 




















he was very 






se are not 
to deal And when we talk 






se cases actual held. It 
to assist the 
, to or 
to a lar 
place; academics 
the sion was 
of court 




a , and I 
when 
1 be 
and I am that he 
not we 
s --
s But I 
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dif lt to dist i between 
m ities and the s r 
law r s 
a self how to 
the latest po l sa s and 
i ted endowments I have, to dec 
cumstances l of the 
whether be the ted States 
ordinance, or pr case law. And 
want the majori will to d 
that given endeavor. 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: Thank 
s point we should let this 
as they would. And let me J 
raise your hand .f' l~ 
cal to the or 






s what l 
rest under the cir-
fore 
Cons a statute, a c 
there cannot say that I 
to me vlhat my job should be 
very much I think at 
have at us aud 
address 
le 
bit at what nt you bel that an l 
l crosses the line and 
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Al r 
t n the compe 
ple, I think if the laim were 
just had a hidden 
death lty al 
substantiated, that would be 
the j I think that j 
judge would not be funct 
Where I have troub 







to substantiated to remove a j from actual hearing a 
case. The claim is simply made on the s of an infer-
ence being drawn from results. And just drew that infer-
ence. He said the , the for 
themselves as all we have to do is total it up. s 
judge voted 41 times against the death penal and 0 for 
it; therefore, this judge has a bias against the death penalty. 
I suggest that that process not appropr That is not an 
appropriate measure of a j is ial. 
What is appropriate is to look at the reasoning of by the 
judge in each case. That's why judges write opinions. They're 
not simply playing out the preconceived notion of how the case 
should come out. At least we hope they're not. 
I think if we demand with respect to a claim of bias or prej-
, that same would 
have to be 
require a judge to 







lose cool and utter 
you stand 
tis 
, etc. , etc. ? 
terms that would 
himself or herself from sitting on 
the nd of that's rele-
is 
to a rebuttal here. 
s. Let me 
II Court is 
", and then 
? -- 97% of 
you, 
the collar and 
on crime," 
sta-
Because the courts are not so 
are 
on a 
c , because the j on the what 're 
, the prosecutors the rules of evidence, the system is 
served, fair play is observed, and convictions are 
obtained. I thereupon how is it poss le to have 
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statistics only in the case of non-capital cases (I hasten to 
digress and point out to the nonlawyers, that when a case goes 
into trial, we don't know yet that it's going to be a capital 
case, right? Because it is only after the death penalty is 
imposed at the very end that it becomes a capital case). Why is 
it that only in capital cases the statistics are the other way 
around? 93 percent of trial judges don't know what the hell 
they're doing, they're making errors, prosecutors are offering 
tainted evidence, juries are misinstructed, etc., etc., etc. I'm 
sorry, folks. It won't wash. I am not a death penalty junkie, 
but there comes a point where the statistics become overwhelming. 
It's kind of like what I said about the Coastal Commission. When 
you start talking about nine out of ten trial judges being wrong 
in every case, I mean, then if those people, if those judges 
really are that bad, then they ought to be swept out of office, 
because they're incompetent. Doesn't that follow? Nine out of 
ten? 
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Come on, Gideon. 
PROFESSOR KANNER: No, it doesn't follow. (Laughter.) It 
doesn't follow because of what the California Supreme Court has 
done and has been doing, as I said, for thirty years. It is not 
only the present justices. That is, they have essentially been 
fighting a guerrilla warfare against the penalty. And they have 
been imposing rules of increasing complexity and refinement and 
exquisite ... whatever, you make up your own word; so that it 
becomes possible in virtually every case to decide it either way. 
And given the predisposition of the court historically (again I 
repeat, not the present court necessarily), given its predisposi-
tion against the death penalty, they are quite free therefore to 
overturn the penalty phases. It's as simple as that. 
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PROFESSOR UELMEN I'm but the issue presented to the 
California Supreme Court in a death penalty case i not, is Trial 
X an ? 
PROFESSOR Well, if 's out of ten times? 
PROFESSOR UELMEN: issue is, was law llowed? Okay? 
Now, we have a new initiat 
with respect to when the death 
which drastically changes the law 
can imposed. Every 
1 case must ewed California Supreme Court. 
They can't avoid deciding these cases. So the issue comes before 
them, was this initiative measure properly applied in this case? 
Now, most of the death penalty reversals have been because the 
court looked at that initiative and said it was not properly 
applied in this case, it was misinterpreted. As we read the 
initiative, the initiative requires showing an intent to kill 
before we can sentence someone to death. Therefore, every case 
So a 
jury was not so now has to be reversed. 
the reversals are simply because the court is follow-
s precedent and applying the same rule in every case. Now 
can't just look at the numbers and say, 20 reversals, that 
must mean Judge so-an-so is opposed to the death penalty. 
Up until last , we could have looked at Judge Lucas's 
and , "Judge Lucas must opposed to the death penal-
ty." Apparently, that's what led him to change his position from 
concurring reluctantly to dissenting, but his position is essen-
t same. The result is compelled by a prior precedent of 
s court. 
PROFESSOR KANNER: It's this kind of reasoning, folks, that 
causes people like Pinkele to want to go after lawyers with a 
(Laughter. ) 
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The point is that however you look at it, we simply have not 
had the death penalty for decades. And beyond a certain point, 
the arguments of why that is so cease to have meaning. Because 
beyond a certain point, the result becomes so overwhelming that 
it can't be justified. That's my point. 
PROFESSOR UELMEN: Let me say one thing. 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: We have another person with a ques-
tion ... 
PROFESSOR UELMAN: There are thirty other states where that 
statement can be made. They have not had an execution in ten 
years. Is anyone pointing the finger at the Supreme Court of 
Arizona or Maryland or any of these other states and saying 
there's where the blame lies. That's not happening in any other 
state. It's only happening in California. And that gets back to 
what we started with. What's going on in California is something 
other than simply frustration over the death penalty. 
PROFESSOR PINKELE: Most of the cases in those other states 
are tied up in federal courts, not their state courts. 
MR. PHILIP L. DUBOIS: I'm Phil Dubois. I'm a political 
scientist from the Flagship Campus of the University of Califor-
nia at Davis. (Laughter.) 
I have three comments; two directed to Gerry Uelmen and one 
to Judge Nelson. The first has to do with the history of the 
debate over the retention elections. I think Professor Flynn 
addressed this in part yesterday. This debate has been repeated 
in about 20 to 25 states that have adopted retention elections in 
one form or another since California adopted its retention sys-
tem. I think that history makes it clear that there is no clear 
agreement about why we have these elections. In fact, the lead-
-107-





the elect wou 
sts 
al 
voter rej re 
p 
voters, 
So 's a sense here the voters s 
wou have objected 
process. I 
of being taken out of 
Pro ssor P 
vote, but 
tion and for 
there is a 1 of a danger, as 
le , in telling voters they can 
have to vote a , name , for aff 
reason. 
The second one is your characterization, Gerry, of these 
judges as sitting ducks. The national experience of these judges 
is that they are sitting pretty. They enjoy about a 99 9 percent 
success rate. Even where they are opposed Bar Associations on 
of competence, about 
the elections themselves. The campaign almost the 
retirement funds of the judges. They build up a lot of service 
c these elec They are secure. 
And nally, Nelson, I oyed your comment about the 
difficulty lawyers have in ating judie 1 s 
me a new endorsements issued by 
the Los Ange Bar Assoc other bar assoc It's 
fficult and there's a sense, I 
, or will re , on the lawyer's 
of the cand s. 
JUDGE NELSON: Let me just 
, that the voters 
the quality 
and I there's bar polls 
sense they have become very political just as most elections 
become 
-108-
As past chairman of the Board of the American Judicature 
Society, I quite agree with you. The retention elections were 
thrown in as a compromise because it was a move in the right 
direction, but they were so opposed by people who did not want to 
take it directly away from the voters. There are all sorts of 
other kinds of proposals that have been made -- in Alaska, Puerto 
Rico, Hawaii. Other states now have adopted some very fine and 
new and different systems. 
It may be very true that judges win even when they are 
opposed by the Bar, but that doesn't say that the elections are 
necessarily good or that the polls are necessarily bad. It's 
estimated that to have a contested superior court election in 
this county, you need a minimum of $50,000 -- it's better to have 
$75,000. As for the supreme court justices, I was at a dinner 
with the supreme court justices at Hastings College and talking 
to some of them about their current campaigns. They estimate 
it's going to take $500,000 or more just to engage in a retention 
election. And the time expense is for TV time, media time of all 
kinds, which tends to me to indicate what it takes to win a kind 
of election now as opposed to 1934 when we had this retention 
elections system put in, or back to the time of Jefferson and 
Jackson who said that anybody is qualified to be a judge; there-
fore, all the people ought to be able to vote for a judge. Now 
that may be true. It may be that the trend should be back to the 
people's courts, neighborhood courts, where everybody in the 
community participates in the justice system. So I think that 
when we're talking about elections, we really should be talking 
about what kind of a judge do we want and what should be the 
qualifications for a judge. But as the qualifications are 
defined today, it is very difficult to have people who cannot 
analyze opinion trying to make the decision as to whether this 
person is qualified to be retained on the supreme court of this 
state or of any state in my opinion. 
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PROFESSOR UELMEN: Granted can I re to ? The 
retent elect are a se bu look at what 
c 
the 
se between. the one hand, conte 
are a 


















cases as an af that very 
means of the 
and that 1 s the func-
tioned up until now. But we're see a new dimension added to 
the picture. When we start izing the retention election, 






that's actually worse than con-
everybody's free to take at the 
be no other can-
to ible for 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: We have for one more ques-
t I've the s 11 have to 
be 
MR. SCHRAG: s I of 
the McCl I'd to 
Uelmen s statement st is 
d l You and the 
CDAA, the Di 
the 1 the of 
out o the dust, as so on are to 
do s the s You have one 
of your col f Gene I who announcing a set of com-
mere S 1 attack court for ndismantling Prop. 8 I It which I 
even believe isn t the case, s that if the just 
aren 1 t removed, there be some il sm Cali a and 
10-
so on. What are you and CDAA doing to counter that kind of 
inflammatory discussion, not to mention the inaccuracies of the 
commercials themselves? And beyond that, again to follow up I 
think with the panel as a whole, how -- at a time when we have a 
technology in place -- I'm not just talking about television, but 
the whole money raising machine that's represented by outfits 
like Butcher-Ford and so on which trade on perhaps very legiti-
mate public concerns about the court and its own excessives, by 
their very nature are going to create enormous misperceptions on 
the part of the public and are going to trade on those 
misperceptions so that the system itself is not attenuated by 
what I suppose lS an ancillary system in which the fundraising, 
direct-mail machinery almost defeats any kind of attempt of this 
sort of responsible discussion that you're talking about. Does 
anybody want to respond to that? 
MR. BRADBURY: Well, since part of that was directed to me, 
I'll try. I'm not familiar with comments by Mr. Tunney to which 
you referred. But accepting what you say at face value, I would 
liken it to the comments by Warren Berger who gave prepared 
remarks prepared by the Chief Justice's campaign director. 
Intemperate, and inappropriate for s kind of election. I 
would hope that my colleagues who are concerned about maintaining 
a high quality of debate will be able to discuss their concerns 
with those individuals, and that would have a salutary effect. 
Again, I can't field the speci cs because I'm not aware of 
the situation with the District Attorney of Sonoma County's com-
ments. But certainly, if that's case, I would personal 
discuss his remarks with h 
PROFESSOR SCHMIDHAUSER: Well, I want to thank all of the 
paper presenters, the panel members, and the audience for what 
has been a lively and I hope, generally, an formative discus-




Judicial Elections: Practical Realities 
MR. JAY MATHEWS: Ladies and gentlemen, I think we're ready 
to start. I apologize for our tardy opening. 
My name is Jay Mathews. I'm the Los Angeles Bureau Chief of 
the Washington Post. I'm here to chair this session. I want to 
start as quickly as we can. Our plan is to have each of our 
speakers here speak in turn on their subjects, then give our two 
discussants a chance to reflect some concerns and questions, and 
as quickly as we can, open it up to the floor for general discus-
sion. And I hope we'll all be as provocative as possible. 
To begin, I'm going to turn to Ben Bagdikian, to my right. 
Ben is the Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley. He is also in my view one of 
the most distinguished press critics this country has ever had. 
His reputation as a press critic is so great that some of us, I 
think, forget what a remarkable journalist he was before he 
assumed this academic mantle and began to tell reporters what 
they were doing wrong. 
With a brief personal note, I joined the Washington Post---I 
started work on one of the blackest days in the history of the 
Washington Post, June 13, 1971. There was this story on the 
front page of the New York Times about something called a Vietn~l 
Archive, later known as the Pentagon Papers. We had been beat to 
bloody hell by the competition and there was a great deal of 
moaning in the newsroom and I was learning things very quickly. 
And Ben became the hero that week by leaving Washington --
editors rarely did this, and Ben was a very important editor on 
the paper -- leaving Washington and corning back with the Pentagon 
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Papers just in time for us to do part of the court case, a part 
of history, etc., etc. That's something that those of us who 
love the Washington Post will always be grateful to Ben for. 
He later became, in my view, one of the best if not the best 
ombudsman our paper has ever had and has continued that role to 
my edification and delight---writing for several journals now in 
his position as head of the journalism school at Berkeley. 
Ben is going to talk today about "Journalism and the Califor-
nia Judiciary: Political Reporting or Court Reporting". And I'll 
just turn it over to him. Ben. 
MR. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN: Thank you, Jay. 
It is common knowledge that the Chief Justice has a dramatic 
hair style that shows evidence of a conscious coiffeur. Periodi-
cally, it provokes comment, especially among enemies of the Chief 
Justice. 
This describes, of course, Chief Justice Warren Berger of the 
United States Supreme Court. It also happens to apply to Chief 
Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court. But Justice 
Berger seldom has stories of his judicial philosophy and peison-
ality interrupted by stories about his hair style. But this is 
not the case with Justice Bird. And one is tempted to say that 
some California journalists have a hair fetish. But the more 
serious possibility is that many California journalists apply a 
different standard to their reporting on the California Court and 
its chief than they do to other serious subjects. 
I think this is more than just a journalistic oddity. 
Performance of the California news media in reporting on the 
state supreme court will, of course, help determine the outcome 
of the critical elections in November of 1986. It could estab-
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lish for years to come the basis on which judges in this state 
will be selected and retained, and it could have a wide national 
impact. 
My paper today is not based on a systematic or comprehensive 
study of the 119 daily papers and 450 weeklies and 500 broadcast 
stations. It is based instead on what I believe are the proper 
criteria for journalists covering the courts, especially this 
kind of highly politicized public issue. 
There are minimal standards of good journalism that apply to 
all public affairs reporting, including judicial controversy and 
elections. Responsible journalists owe the following obvious 
things to the public: 
First, a fair and balanced picture of the issues and of the 
candidates; 
Second, an accurate and fair picture of the significant 
claims and counterclaims during an important campaign; 
Third, competent and fair reporting of the relevant and 
undisputed facts when those are known to be significantly differ-
ent from the claims on either side; 
Fourth, an emphasis on the basic, relevant issues in the 
election, no matter what the rhetoric may be among the contes-
tants; and 
Fifth, application of these standards undistorted by personal 
opinion. 
Too often I think, in the claims and counterclaims about the 
California Supreme Court in the last several years, most of these 
standards have been violated by some of the important media in 
the state, and violated in a way that these same newspapers and 
broadcast stations would not do with other serious subjects. 
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In all fairness to the media of this state, the emergence of 
highly politicized and heavily financed campaigns against reten-
tion of judges has created a novel problem in coverage. Sudden-
ly, heated public controversy has surrounded the inner working of 
a subject --- and appellate court --- that is not only a largely 
unknown subject for the average reporter and editor, but a sub-
ject that law and legal canon forbid justices from discussing in 
public. 
It has been central to the American system of the judiciary 
that it not only have power separate from the executive and leg-
islative branches of government, but that it must be removed from 
political passions. We have assumed that money or access to 
money should have nothing to do with a judge achieving appoint-
ment or remaining on the bench. Suddenly in the fierce campaign-
ing to unseat judges, these traditions have been contravened. We 
have assumed that judges will be reserved in their public discus-
sion of issues before them or which they can reasonably expect to 
come before them. Now we are confronted with a growing practice 
of demanding precise this kind of a commitment before a judge 
or a nominee for judgeship has heard evidence in a case. The 
inner deliberations of individual trial judges and the collective 
arguments and counter arguments o£ appellate justices in their 
traditional weighing of cases are not treated as partisan politi-
c loyalties rather than the application of legal precedent and 
constitutionality. 
In brief, the public and the journalists, are suddenly con-
fronted with the collapsing into one politi transaction two 
formerly operate and deliberately insulated activities in our 
democracy. One of those activities, the judiciary, is supposed 
to be as removed from partisan politics as possible. 
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Nevertheless, this is hardly an insurmountable problem for 
journalists, even if it is a new one. Judges are constrained 
from speaking publicly about their cases. Yet for journalists, 
the opinions of these judges are a public record and so are the 
analyses of these opinions by informed legal scholars -- scholars 
on both sides of the current controversy. There is a wealth of 
information about the procedures, opinions, and precedents of the 
courts that apply to the present controversy. Far too often, 
uninformed journalists have felt no obligation to study the facts 
or to exercise normal care and study of a new and complex sub-
ject. 
As the state's newspapers and broadcast stations approach 
this new phenomenon of combining courts and electoral politics, 
they are not helped by some institutional weaknesses of all the 
mass media, weaknesses that predate the court controversies, but 
contribute to it. 
For example, imbedded in the current judicial elections is 
the relationship of courts to crime rates. Crime is still treat-
ed by most news operations as a series of isolated incidents 
without looking for best known causes, which they would do, for 
example, with a medical epidemic. It is seldom reported with 
recourse to the most reliable data. Crime does not have neatly 
defined causes, but some factors are clear, unindisputed, and 
available. One, for example, is the relative size of the age 
cohort within the population that has always been the age range 
of highest corr~ission of crimes. The post-World War II baby 
boom, for example, came into this crime-comrr.itting age range in 
the 1960s and thereafter. And in addition to whatever factors 
may have applied as well, this clearly was a major factor in the 
rapid increase in crimes per 100,000 in our society in the last 
fifteen years. 
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Though this factor is known and undisputed by the best 
authorities, the general public would have little way of knowing 
this from their news media. By ignor the best known causes, 
the news media have left the f ld open for specu and 
manipulation, including the notion that courts are somehow 
responsible for increased crime rates, a theory that has little 
reliable data to support it and much reliable data to refute it. 
A similar zone of silence in most news organizations, partic-
ularly e stress reporting, has been the best known 
data on the effect on crime rates of different kinds of punish-
ment. Much is known by reliable authorities. Yet, punishment by 
the courts and incarceration has been dealt with by most news 
organizations as though nothing were known on the subject except 
political rhetoric and conventional wisdoms. Ironically, the 
legislative research arm of the State of California, decades ago, 
including during the Administration of Governor Reagan, produced 
some of the most careful studies that raised doubts about the 
efficacy of lengthening prison sentences as a way of reducing 
crime. Another irony is the lack of basic perspective in report-
ing of the state's continuing controversies over the court and 
criminal ju California has among the longest prison sen-
tences in the Western world, and has for many years, while simul-
taneously there exists a widespread notion that California courts 
are soft on crime. No matter what opinions may exist and may 
justify news coverage, responsible news organizations are 
obligated to add undisputed neutral information that sheds light 
on controversies of this sort. Yet, news media treatment of the 
issue in this state and elsewhere has proceeded as though there 
is no history and there are no data on this urgent issue. As a 
result, the lack of solid information has helped create a vacuum 
filled with rhetoric and ineffective publ policy. 
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The California news media are not alone in this failure. But 
the California media have a special obligation because this issue 
has created profound controversies of public importance within 
the state, not only with the courts, but in taxes, crime, and 
p son building. 
Now the central process of the courts has become the subject 
of public controversy. Ordinarily, competent reporting of court 
decisions would be sufficient in the news. But when a whole 
segment of the judiciary and its working become and intense pub-
lic issue, that is no longer enough. At that point, any reason-
ably competent journalist who presumes to report on this issue 
has to understand the workings of courts. 
Perhaps there is a useful analogy here. If the court system 
is a clock, normally the only general public interest is in know-
ing what time it is, or in this analogy, what is the product of 
the court -- the decisions in trials and appeals. But now there 
have been accusat that the doctrinaire attitudes by some 
judges have led them to depart from normal procedures and prece-
dent, and have caused them to behave in improper ways; and these 
improper ways have caused a major increase in California's crime 
rate. So now the issue before C ifornians is not just decisions 
of the court, but the nature of the court workings themselves. 
It isn't just reporting what it is, but now it requires 
looking at the gears and levers ide the clock. Unfortunately, 
too many journalists have approached that clock as though blind-
folded and wearing mittens. 
The need to understand court procedures is hardly novel in 
American journalism. Major papers like the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and others have sent experienced reporters to 
law school and insisted that they be as competent in their field 
as science and business reporters are supposed to be in theirs. 
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on a governor 
or a mayor or a school 
of criticism. It is the 
The problem is not the existence 
beyond ing the 
criticism consc ous , there is also the need to report the 
rep to criticism. When replies by the court are forbidden by 
the canons of law, journalists are free to take initiative to 
examine the basic facts that are known and that may go beyond 
campaign rhetoric. And when they do this, should be with 
fairness and balance just as that should be true with any field. 
Perhaps the most damaging neglect in journalistic treatment 
of the judicial controversy has been the failure to emphasize the 
known undisputed and relevant facts as something apart from the 
claims and counterclaims campaign rhetoric. This, of course, 
should be no different from good political reporting in the elec-
toral process elsewhere. 
The same indifference to known information appears in another 
issue of the campaign, which is the accusation that when dealing 
with the death sentence, the court has been politically doctri-
naire instead of conforming to law. I think it would come as a 
surprise to even the most careful readers of the newspapers and 
viewers of television news to learn that a majority of the 
supreme court's reversals of death sentences have included the 
votes for reversal by one or more of the so-called conservatives 
on the court. Affirmations of sentences have also included 
some of the so-called liberals. Even when a so-called conserva-
tive writes the majority opinion revers a death sentence, it 
is not reported as the opinion of a conservat justice; but if 
a justice labeled a liberal writes a majority reversal, this is 
noted as the opinion of a liberal. 
It might also come as a surprise to the California voters 
that all the states in this country with populations comparable 
to California have a pattern of death penalty decisions similar 
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Five, since another issue is the status of an independent 
judiciary, what is the background and rationale for and against a 
judiciary that is above politics? s is not a simple subject 
in a state that g s the voters power over a retention of judg-
es. But precisely that reason the voters deserve the most 
careful information and reasoning if they are to exercise their 
franchise with intelligent self-interest. 
One does not have to be romantic to expect that responsible 
newspapers and broadcast news can deal with a serious issue of 
this kind as something more important than a shouting contest 
between angry opponents or a routine political cat-and-dog fight. 
In 1957, after the Soviets put Sputnik into space and science 
became a serious national issue, the better newspapers in the 
country stopped treating science stories as fun, games, and 
quackery and began treating it as a serious issue. They recently 
have begun to do the same with business and finance. The nature 
of the courts and criminal justice in this state deserve at least 
the same degree of competence, care and balance. Thank you. 
(Applause.) 
MR. MATHEWS: Ben, thank you very much. I hope we'll all 
make note of our thoughts and questions about each speech and hit 
everybody when we finish all three. 
We're going to move now to Larry Berg. Professor Berg, as 
most of us know, is the director of the Institute of Politics and 
Government at this university. He is a renowned expert on the 
question of judicial politics. His articles and books on this 
subject are legion. And I think it's clear that 's the princi-
pal reason why we're here at this university discussing this 
subject today. So I'll turn it over to Larry, who is going to 
talk about "Campaign Financing in California Judicial Elections: 
1972-1984". 
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we've got to be better formed. If the voters are going to make 
decisions, they've got to have some basis for making them. I 
ook at judicial elec I don't see the basis for making 
those kinds of decis 
If you look at the tables that I've handed out, there's been 
a steady increase in jud ial election costs. As a matter of 
fact, it goes up in multiples of $7,000 startig in 1974. But 
what of the judicial race in Los Angeles County where you spend 
$50,000, $60,000, or even $100,000? In a county of nearly 8 
n1illion people that doesn't get you alot of public information. 
That doesn't get a lot of facts out to the voters. How does a 
voter in this county make a decision on the number of superior 
court judges and perhaps an even greater number of municipal 
court judges. 
Some years ago, Professor Flynn and I a study of voter 
turnout in municipal elections and, not surprisingly, we found 
that the smaller municipal distr the greater the turnout. 
I suspect we probably could have ferred from that that a 
greater amount of information was available about that municipal 
court judge. 
So I have been thinking, I don't know whether we ought to 
have judicial elections at all. As a practical political fact, I 
don't see anyway to change that at the present time. Something 
that Phil wrote some years ago made a very dis net impression on 
me. If we're going to have judicial e and cannot raise 
enough money to finance them in a way to provide adequate 
information to the electorate, on other factor that has 
some value to the electorate is a partisan label. My inherant 
suspicion is that a voter who looks at one of those candidates 
whom they do not know and he sees Democrat or she sees Republican 
down the person's name, will know much more about that particular 
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We're cost are c sturbed 
1 s s clear that cost 
's as ant 
We we have s that we to 1 the size 
the contribution, to $100, $200, $400, $500. Where does that 
cut-off line come? Does a $500 contribution have more of a 
of 
negative impact than 00? Or is the fact that it's money at 
2 -
all? Or is it the fact that the judicial person has to use 
people to raise money for it? Is that where the issue is? If we 
l t the amount down to $100 or less, we're going to have 
t le raising the amount of money is necess to f e 
a competitive judicial election and, therefore, the voter will be 
denied that kind of information. There have been suggestions 
that we put a ceiling on the amount that could be spent. I 
suspect that would have the same negative effect that does 
when you put it on to legislative campaigns and in congressional 
races. 
On the other hand, we could perhaps require something in the 
way of mailings to voters. Who's going to pay for it? How are 
we going to finance that? I can't imagine that the voters would 
be amenable to raiding the public treasury to finance judicial 
elections. My old and late dear friend Ed Koupal from the 
People's Lobby used to call that the "politic welfare 
program." Well, I don't know whether Ed was right or not, but I 
suspect a majority of the voters wou agree th it. 
So, when you look at all these numbers and I sit here and 
tell you that the costs are going up every year, rnost judges 
aren't defeated no matter what cost is, voters don't under-
stand judicial elections, they don't know enough about the candi-
dates, what in the world do we do? It seems to me we could spend 
a little time this afternoon as we end, to try and out 
some way of dealing with what my op ion is a very undesirable 
situation today. Not only at the court level, but 
perhaps even more , at the al court level. That's 
where most of the legal bus ss takes ace at the trial 
court level, not at the supreme court level. I would suggest 
that we ought to focus a lot more of our attention on how to have 
the best possible selection system at that level. There are 
enough checks and balances that come into effect at the supreme 
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court 1, and Phil might want to 
know he's written extensive at that 
wrong somewhere. 
more on that se I 
1. But 
The final comment I wou make is I 's ly 
correlated with the skeptical and sometimes negat attitude 
that voters have toward the entire judicial tern. I think it's 
kind of a bum rap. But nevertheless, voters have their way of 
expressing themselves. 
So I apologize not the And Judge Weil, 
though I'm a slower learner, perhaps I'm coming around to the 
position that you and I talked about many years ago. I have more 
comments, but I'll leave those until after Phil talks about his 
paper. Thank you. (Applause.) 
MR. MATHEWS: Thanks much, and last, Phil 
Dubois. Phil is Associate Professor of Pol Sc and 
also Assistant Vice Chancellor Academic Programs at UC Davis. 
His research has also been detailed and extens on the tion 
of judicial pol s this state. I his work is one of 
several examples of what is s and turning that 
in a ity, far fferent 
from one that all of us have an image of. And I'll turn it 
over to Phil. 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: Thank you very much. I'm very glad to be 
here. I noticed everybody is lar attentive given that 
we had the dif lt in a when 
had had It's a lly advantaged 
tion. I'm not unmindful of fact that I'm the last formal 
speaker in the program, and I'm reminded of Sergeant Preston's 
Law of the Yukon which is that the scenery changes only for the 
lead .) S I'm the last dog, I'll try to make 
it interesting. 
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The paper I prepared is a third in a series that I've been 
working on in a major research effort to look at California's 
superior court elections. Specifically, I was looking at the 
contested primaries and runoffs for the superior court in Cali-
fornia from 1976 to 1982, a little bit narrower research window 
than Larry's work, but stimulated originally by his early work on 
this topic. My data consists of 153 contested races involving 
over 400 candidates statewide, not just in any particular county. 
I'd like to say a word about those two earlier studies 
because they set the context for the paper I've prepared for this 
symposium. And I brought some copies if anyone's available. I'd 
even be willing to make a music video if there was a lot of 
demand for it. 
The first paper was an attempt to understand the role of 
various factors that are thought to be important in influencing 
the results of superior court elections. I looked at things like 
candidate ballot labels, that is, whether the candidate was an 
incumbent of a municipal court judge seeking elevation to the 
superior court or just an attorney seeking to be elected. I 
looked at campaign spending. I looked at the role of newspaper 
and bar endorsements. And I looked at appearance in the voter 
information pamphlet. That research relied on a pretty complex 
statistical analysis which was required because these elections 
typically involve anywhere from two to nine candidates and also 
primary and then subsequent runoffs. I don't need to go into the 
details here and I'd be happy to discuss it with anybody who is 
interested. But that research tended to show, as you might 
expect, that the ballot labels were the most fluential factors; 
that is, whether the person was an incumbent or a municipal court 
judge, they were very much advantaged over other kinds of candi-
dates. 
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initial 
side of the aisle. and I've gathered many of the same statistics 
that Larry has. I was su sed, I th what I found. 
First, the cost per contest and cost per cand d ase 
over that 1976 to 1982 per I don't have the 1984 data and 
I'm too tired of this stuff to go collect In real dollar 
terms, the cost had increased per candidate in 1976 about $6200; 
by 1982, it had climbed to $17,000 statewide. But the bulk of 
that increase came between 1976 and 1978 which prompted Professor 
Berg to write a paper shortly thereafter called, I think, "1978: 
Year of the Big Money" because it really was by comparison of 
what we had always seen before. S that time though, since 
1978, there's been a very marginal increase, at least up through 
1982. And 1984 may be another matter. 
The second thing I found was that costs had not increased 
when you control for inflation. In fact, costs 
below the 1978 levels. This may be only of 
decreased 
st to political 
scientists because the cand s still have to raise real dol-
lars. It's not any comfort to tell them 
spending less than you would have 1978. 
reflection about the intensity of the elec 
dollars had not increased. 
you're really 
But, as sort of a 
, generally, the 
Also, costs were not great per vote terms. If measure 
it in per vote or per capita terms or however you want to measure 
it, only about a dime per vote is being most j ial 
elections. And that's compared to over $2 per vote being spent 
in legislative and gubernatorial elections. I couldn't nd any 
comparative data for other races 1 sheriff or 
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district attorney, but I'm sure they're higher than a dime per 
vote. So, judicial elections are, on the whole, very low by 
comparison. In so many p me wonder 
about whether was at all. The aver-
age race Los Angeles (about $17,000 for apr still 
amounts to well less than a penny per vote You wonder in an 
electorate of 5 million potential voters in Los Angeles if you're 
much good at all trying to throw $17,000 at 5 million vot-
ers. 
I did find an relationship between county populations 
and spending effort, if you want to def it that way. In the 
smallest counties of California, those less than 50,000 
voters, their spending was up to a shock 20 cents a vote; and 
then it gradually went all the way down to less than a penny per 
vote L.A. This to me to suggest that Los les 
County one of the reasons I found that campaign had no 
effect was that it had no effect. They're not spending enough 
to have an ef And I guess people who are actual-
in poli 
effective ways might 
campaigns could speak to what the most 
to spend the money. 
So the paper I this focused on cam-
specifically in the questions 
of gives to these campa and lawyers are 
primary givers, kinds of contributions are made, and how 
do they tend to be. Can these data any way contribute 
to analyzing some of the proposals that have been put forth about 
campaign contributions judie elections? 
Early this year, Assemblyman Stirl introduced a bill, 
AB 2565, which would have limited attorneys, judges, bail bonds-
men, court reporters, and court report 
than $250 in a calendar year to any 
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firms from giving more 
for a superior or a 
municipal court posi And I was interested whether or not 
that was really a problem the first ace. 
I decided to one cu ar , 1980, to do this. I 
p 1980 because thad the largest number of races that we've 
had in a recent number of years. The superior court had 36 
primary races with 100 
total raw number of dollars s 
s, and then 1 fs. And the 
was very large 
compared to other years -- $2.2 million. I examined campaign 
finance reports and I looked at monetary contribut , nonmone-
tary contributions, loans, and other sources to these campaigns. 
This is one of the most painful scholarly exercises I think any-
one could possibly imagine. 
tion in filling out the forms. 
le ffer in the sophistica-
There were lots of errors. I 
might point out that one-third of the candidates I looked at 
1980 were violating the law because they led to le the cam-
paign finance reports in Sacramento. led them only in 
their counties and t superior court cand s are required to 
file them in Sacramento as well. I 't go chasing them down, 
but I did have to get on phone a lot and call county clerks. 
I had a couple county clerks who re sed to send me the reports 
at all because of their Xerox charges, even when I was lling to 
reimburse them. So it's not some I want to repeat, and I 
certainly don't recommend it as a hobby. 
But I did examine these reports, and I .; 1 wanted to -'-
make a computerized data file of all the gave g 
money; namely, the contributions are i the 
of over $100 in a calendar ar. I recorded the 
and put them into my computer file, and there were 3100 of those 
people when all was said and done. I run across the people at 
cocktail parties now and then and I can say, oh, you gave in the 
1980 superior court race. (Laughter.) 're really thrilled 
-- pleased to know that I know that. 
sure has its benefits. 
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(Laughter.) Publ disclo-
f th I to do was to understand role of 




a 1 the resources that 
to these e ec 
, and so 
ted abou 
into these 
There are the 
I also that small contr I un-i 
t of less $100 cumu in a calendar 
about 40 percent of the monetary contribut s. In 
1 I found that about 30 
came from the candidates themselves or members 
family. I used a ve crude of of f 
cally to match up last names. If Joe Cerrell 
contr from 











fami I don t know are family Joe? 
I a so out that 20 of the c 
and loans were ent from the 
c the members of fami-
1 s that 
some nt to tell what 
Did it 
? you just ? commuted 
Most of those on. 
a somewhere. r.) 
In all, cons the total a 
of the total resources available to c s to running 
their came of of 
$ 00 or more. So two- from other 
source , and the famil s, 
wh I ink is a cons 
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Then I looked at those large contr As you 
ct, I found that 1 s and law firms were most 
g s but on gave 40 t of the dollars, II if 
want to call A al to be sure, 
but 60 percent of the dol are still from k 
of people -- business persons, s, even some i al 
groups. Surpris I little of the came from ice 
groups, law enforcement groups, 
court reporters (less than 5 
sitting j s, bail bondsmen, 
of the tota ) . And 
little from political st g 
that legislative candidates may take extra funds that have 
and dish them over to the judicial candidates but I could 
tify no more than 4 of the total coming from all those 
what you might call polit al sources. 
I then looked at the 1 s and were and 
contributions gene from all k of contr s. The 
largest average contributions come from the 
frequently, and the smallest contr 
Over all, 
e who give least 
come from 
people who give most average 
tion was about $176; that's cumulat the calendar 
Eighty percent of the fts, cumul , were less $ 50; 
15 percent of the fts were in amounts from $250 to $499; and 
only 5 percent of the fts were over $500. s, just way 
of comparison, made average contr of 1 0. s a 
mean, an arithmetic average, effect pu led the 
large contribu median contr t i s $ 0. 
5 percent of the lawyer contr were over sc: ·-' 0. 
The final part of my paper s to look a 
cular way of whether or not there are any all of 
this giving to judicial c s. And I thought it would be 
important to see whether or not re were any se 
this would have implications for reform. Reforms are 
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neutral wi to how af t 
dates. And I simply divided my 
candidates: 
to 
And as you might 
es rely most third-party 
two-thirds of their money comes in the 
two-thirds of their resources 
of lars contr 
k 






The kinds of candidates have trouble rais 
and 40 
of $100 or more. 
money. Less 
than half of their campaign support came in the form of monetary 
contributions, and only 20 percent carne in large contributions of 
more than $100 heavy reliance on loans, he rel 
ance on and re at to them 
about half of the 
I also looked at f sources As you 
about half of 
1 s. Munic court j s the other kinds i-
dates got just about a rd of contr from lawyers. 
So when all was 





In the case of 
lar I 
a lot of If 
amounts of $250 or 
on of all large 
come 
bail bondsmen, you can 
contributions, and 
cand need to run 
to 1 contr from 
I'm not sure would make a heck of 
1 contr to 
more, ing 
contr And if the 
sf j 1 court s, 
reach 10 percent of the large 
of all the resources that 
camp a 
35 
So I guess I can close ust += and I guess I mean to be .L f 
a little provoc The actual on this ing as 
it 1 s sent t is that t of st prob 
amounts basi cal to $ 76. I wonder 
whether that's a rea serious , real or perce 
the problem, as campaigns as we now 
know them is that it's not too much is being 
who want to run but too little. And that for 
office, particularly for open slots, 
ed. (Applause.) 
IS hard to start-
MR. MATHEWS: Before we unle 
comment. 
our discussants, Larry had a 
PROFESSOR BERG: I want to one comment the 984. One 
of the values of look 
us have, but the 1980 









of the twe elec ars I looked at. s --- once 
before and after '78, led me to suggest that ll con-
tinue. I don't know. But there is a large JUmp 
in the last elec No I haven't control ed for the cost, the 
increase, or the devaluation, I gue s we want to s , of the 
actual dollars, but 
any I saw during that 
know. But '84 
s 
le per 
made a b 
MR. MATHEWS: Thanks v 
panelists brevi We now have pl 
discussants. I'm go to start with 
of you know, is one of the most 
And t's the largest of 
What '86 11 , I don't 
appreciate our 
of our two 
Joe Cerrel . Joe as most 
nent i c~1 CL.I- consultants 
in this state and, my v , the most mu ti-ta of the 
bunch. He's played key roles pres ial campaigns back to 
that of JFK. He's pres of both the can Assoc of 
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Pol al Consultants and the soc for Con-
of Po i-su He's also a ecturer at the Inst 
Government at 
MR. JOE CERRELL: much. The 
be loaded rem or One of 
d cussant was to be 1 
comments. I've read Professor 
was told as a 
and answers and 
an's remark ahead of time. 





down some notes, 






t s 8 
84 
the of Los 
campaign in the 
const tuents 
of the wor 's 
average cost was 
court, for 
That's a const 





le It's an 
















talk about tho ballot 
1 tatement f 200 
of 
out to 
So i one 
les 






a math major to 
of Senator 
a 11 
the State of 
dollars 






a. You don't 
d one-
a, that's a 00,000 constituen-
1 
That one elec , a is a Ilion dol And yes, 
there's a lot of noise made 
the 8 mill 
ud ial ave 
t it; but I come back to 
re of Los 
7,000. It is 
les where 
an ss 
ta , even ally. The s from Gorman in 
le 
northwest, for those of you who are not familiar our geogra-
phy, to maybe down the southeastern part of county. 
you'll have a request to to the Bar Associat Long 
Beach and the Chamber of Corr~erce the Ante Val and 
trying to figure out how you're going to do those things because, 
in fact, direct one-on-one contact is absolute and utter 
useless in the county. You can start today, the 22nd day of 
November, trying to shake hands with voters not for the 1986 
election but for the 1988 election and still not come 





The point is that we have 
because it's an absurd si 
se 1 
to 
e minor horror stories 
to scuss. I heard that 
we're supposed to hop around and talk about the group, out 
little items about eliminating and talk about limiting 
where the money comes from. Can ne they can't 
raise enough money right now to to cate voters, 
and that's what the whole poli al campaign process is about is 
communicating. They can't se enough r now. They say we l 
they're taking in too much money from the s and 
shouldn't take any money Well, f it weren't the 
attorneys, I can't imagine who else would want to 
the campaigns other than the families, and they're the ones, by 
the way, who come up wi talk the loans. When 
away the attorneys and the famil s the poss le 
of the neighbors, I can't th of anybody else interested a 





Wei doesn't have to go 




interesting remarks. else particu to 
comment on because was so wel done. But we have 
sting situation. talks about now where the 
supreme court is going. We're really talk about the chief 
ju and those remarks I about the 
style of the f ju weren't enough s down 
there in about Warren Burger's ha They all talked 
about the ch f just , the supreme court election being up and 
down, yea nay, s and no. Occas ly somebody will talk 
about her colleagues. I they're amending the to 
acknowledge the fact that Justice Panelli will now fall to that. 
So now that scussing, 
add , the one new and Jus Panelli, so now 
you're real 
in 1986, at 
ta six people who 11 be on ballot 
ast a minimum s 
But now that the court, court f 
, the que is vot no 
on 11 they between the 
court appeals? about 
is that if scuss this a group of le who are 
ne fessors, nor itical sc st, and 
themselves don t know what 're 
I learned a the courts 
and the llate courts, don't to draw 
1 So for those who worr about Just 
then other two --- and Reynoso --- and get 
down to Mosk and then to the current appointments. The 
ques is, will 




no? I recall in 
s where the vote 
was the ve low 50s, not much ove 5 I won t men-
tion the judge's name, but 's a 1 an and a conse 
but the le didn t s re no 
ate courts. 
What does that have to do th what we re 
we now going to have jus ces on the court 0 
campaigns simply to say, "Vote s on me and all 
stuff? It's very f lt to to educate the 
what this is all about. We do have a very dramat 




s sort of 
lie as to 
person at the 
can vote 
yes on and how many no to. don't even understand what whole 
procedure. It's going to be a real donnybrook come November. I 
was late coming to this posi because I've 
Weil, going back in the late fi ies. You just have to take 
off the ballot. Else the other You go the other 
r, and make is extreme, Senator 
other parts of the 
s on televi 
beholden to li al 
You can't 
t can' 
san the way 
the J 
t the 
s and absolute s 
s, and I 
s to be 
them bare 
of everything. At least in other s of the can 
fall back on the political Here fal back on some 
attorney friends and some re atives, and I know some that are 
still in hock. I know some that are hock from 1978 because we 
want to make so we take out normal i s, and 
there's no organiz to fal back Weil and I 
before about a mutual a soc j st low and 
s out there. That's not the r to do even other j 
So either make san or J take t out f the realm of 
polit s. These poor bastards, and that s the on way I can 
::les them, are really stand str so ly in 
the world of poli s because we don't allow them to be is an 
and yet there's no place to fall back upon. Therefore, I say, 
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just take the whole j i out of the poli arena and make 
it like the federal 're now 
using, or even or no. 
MR. MATHEWS: much, Joe. se.) Our second 
discussant is Robert Weil. As Joe indicat-
Weil not had to this question although he has 
some concerns issue because he's not been 
opposed and not had to on the has not had to 
a dime, he us. 
s experience is extraordinary for a judge, any judge I've 
ever encountered. Very few, in fact, no judge I've ever encoun-
tered is a graduate of the Columbia 1 of Journalism, which 
is probably one of reasons why no one wants to him for 
his seat. My wi once dabbled law and then went on to 
journalism. Judge Weil s with journalism and went on to 
the law; and I that's probably the better course. He is 
lso s of As soc and 
w 11 
JUDGE ROBERT I. WEIL: I didn't come 
a j down some notes as I've 
I a li 
have s 






You have been de 
a 1 comment, 
of the 
and 
t s, but haven't thought about Ann Ramirez. Who was Ann 
Ramirez? Ann Ramirez is a fictitious munic court judge who 
got appointed to a ipal court somewhere up in the San 





rson of c or who had been appo to that 
reason that she a 1 to be 
cons red that she had ten 
a ob in the 
was 
fender s of ce that cou very ear 
on because that was 
Hispanics and the 
a chance to 
first ace where 
rst ace where minori 
public Ce 
getting a chance to do in the large law f 
gets appointed to the bench 1976. In 1978 
nent; and for the f t time since she res 
public defender's office, she has no place to 
women 
e were getting 
weren't 
And Ann Ramirez 
she has an oppo-
her job in 
back to if she 
loses. It's going to cost her $25,000 or $30,000 to run for 
office. She was never in pr practice. She didn't have a 
law firm that she can go back to. She d 't have cl that 
she could go back and get money from. And if does get 
defeated, she doesn't go back to a ic service 
Why should Ann Ramirez want to a j ? And that was in 1978. 
Joe says, poor bastard. Yes, that's true. And s it's 
ti even worse because among other s, there a Gann 
that's out being c lated, ful not to come on the bal 
which will reduce all the sal s of j s c l 
MR. MATHEWS: And pens s. 
JUDGE WElL: And pensions. And lso f 
neys in California. 
district attar-
Today I had lunch th to s 
morn and whose sal s the ird is 
attorney in California --- $85,0 0. 
by approximately $21,000 if the Gann 
suppose he takes the honor of le 
H s sa be reduced 
tiative is 
his job and ing on the 
bench and taking a salary cut of about $8,000 or $9,000 to 




're going to be an 
I 
fence around 
how are the 
maybe the pol 
the 
lit a 
that you have to find if 





j are doing 
Let me tell you 





that the is , where _........__ court he 
state committees of the re s the 
right, even though the Constitution says that judicial positions 
are nonpartisan, to endorse for judie contests. And the 
supreme court opinion s 
of the Legislature and the 
a 11. 
Let me tell IS 
endors j I'll 
was a 1 ttle 
sa two 
i fi 




perhaps s can be 




when have l 
of eastern states. 
a ago 
s New York City 
O'Br and 
by Democrat 
the fact that there had 
The stated reason for 
Democrat decided 
was now to a Black and a or a Puerto on 
courts, and so 
Well that's one 
thing 











the political s 
and j are 
to attend all d s 
to a 
polit ies 
course, none of the 
f s want access author, 
.know is that one of our people has 
and talk to the j it, that the 
the problem of his cons Well, j 
s are 
to al of the 
them. And of 
accord to 
Al we want to 
le we can come 
understand 
s don't have constit-
ents; that is, 
that's what you 
tuent. 
is the 's cons ituents. But 
If you 
model. 
look at , the 
Now, whatever else you've heard 
you've heard s that 
cal 
answer s the federal 
here I I don't nk 
court system i a 
poor or a bad 
probably the one th 
As far as I pe sonal am concerned, s 
that's go ng 
s sa of 
to that. We have a federal court 
appo s with the and consent 
are appointed life, the us 
anything short of that is 
be justi ed. can le 
c pamphlets, lie 
have a bad brand of justice 
there anyone who s we 
cal scientists say to us 
know, once the e 
from them. And that's the 
have to think about the real 
going to get who actual 
decide on your future, 
want to 
one 
traffic court, if you end s 
ces 
what kind of le do you want to 
ul 
is if ever comes 
stem where the Pres 
0 the Senate the s 
for ife; and 
can rea 
can, say, send out 





fe. But you 
.(:: people 're L , s are to ..) 
end up a 
s 
? 
Now, those are just a le o random in that area. 
of other Let me just a note I had here on a 
that , Joe Cerrell, used my num-
He t ber 
if run for --- well, I'm not sure if 
means is 
understand the sys-
tern. If 're a tr court udge, whether IS or 
superior, you have to stand for election once every six years 
beginning with t election fol the year 
o your If no one f les aga 
then name does not on the lot If someone does 
file oppos t you, then name and 
name appear on the bal and there's an el 
opponent's 
Fortunately, 
no one has ever 
the ballot; and 
aga t me. 
kind 
My name has never on 
, I have one more election 
and that's the end of that. But to the extent that name 
does on then go out and start 
ra k that 's been talk 
here, 
the of te AB 2 65 
testif at that And someone on the 1 I 't 
if was Mr. 11 1 j 
shou out themselves. You 
we've to do. We're As we ve out and sell 
ourselves You should and se 1 self. I was 
to , "How much should we sell ourselves for?" 
ter. But he s that. It wasn' statementi that was 
statement. And I have a ; the j stand 
and a 1 le Sa kettle outside 
the se 11 He a j the 
II Is that le real want the j s to be ? 








MR. CERRELL: But 
JUDGE WEIL: Joe 
tell 
sa , 
Con 0 nteres Dr. 




MR. CERRELL: I said, how about $200 then. 
JUDGE WEIL: $200. . ) 
MR. CERRELL: I said I'd $200. 
JUDGE WEIL: I said I'd about that. The federal judi-
ciary, I've talked about that as And you , peo-
ple talk about autocratic s, but I if talk to 
know, I average lawyer and you talk to the 
always look at 
judiciary and other heroes 
phasize that the future of 
citizen, 
a and other heroes the 
court. I have to reem-
1 s , as far as I m 
concerned. The one reason is that those le don't to 
stand up against the 
a good idea, well, I 
And if 
don t agree wi 
is not 
Interest statist 
appellate elections as we 1 to 
do the mis ne of 
matic 33 percent no vote bu lt 
That means, now, the one 
a filing and the fil fee 
salary and the superior court j 
and one percent is $770. Your 
another penny and he's to 
I assume this appl s to the 
trial court elect f you 
lot, an auto-
1 one. 
have to pay have to 
to one of the 
present makes about $77,000 
pays $770, doesn't 
one-third of the vote. f he 
(or she) can only pick up that remaining 17 or 18 percent, you're 
already starting, you being the incumbent, are starting with 
one-third of the voters against you. I don't know if that's true 
statistically for the appellate courts; but maybe from the num-
bers that Joe was talking about; it is. I know it's true in the 
trial courts and that's a disaster. 
Now, let me move back finally to the gentleman on my left for 
whom I have the greatest of admiration, professor Bagdikian from 
Stanford. He began with a coiffeur. 
PROFESSOR BAGDIKIAN: Stanford? 
JUDGE WEIL: Berkeley, excuse me. (Laughter.) He began with 
the wonderful quote about the coiffeur and that reminded me of 
the marvelous story that Bob Musel wrote in the United Press many 
years ago. And he started his story by saying, "Winston 
Churchill stood up before a group of London businessmen today and 
said, "You Norman bastards.'" He was quoting Shakespeare. 
As far as how the California courts are reported on, I share 
all your comments. And as judges, we are concerned more than 
anyone else with the accuracy of media reporting, and I'm not 
talking solely about this with the 22-year-old rock-and-roll 
radio station reporter that I had the pleasure of sharing a room 
with up at Manville Hall at UC. Let me tell you what I'm talking 
about and then I'll stop. 
Every two years the California Judges Association has spon-
sored a media workshop on the California courts. If any of you 
have never heard about it or want to talk to me about it after 
the program, come up and take a look. What we do, and we do it 
now thanks to a grant that we received from the Gannett Founda-
tion, is we have a two-day workshop session actually I think 
it's a little longer, it starts on a Thursday evening and it runs 
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u l s noon ---




appellate courts work. We 
n us and we go 
are ted at very low 
from newspapers, 
si-
t the state to 
will you sentence th of j 
take into account n dete s sentence? We them 
the c 1 courts work. We them how llate decisions are 
reached. And when I talk about the 22 ld reporter from the 
radio stat ---we room the dorms up there. It's sort of 
1 going back to uncomfortable. We all 
the same bathroom facili s. I roomed th a 2 ld 
man. He was Stockton. He sa "I came because I cover the 
courts for the local Stockton rock-and-roll rad I 
said, "That's s Te 1 me about 
experience have 
one semester of 
had understand 
at 
learned how to turn the 
turntables and how to cornmerc 
this job. it's better than 
because there 
the bowling scores. now u 
hall and I also do the dee ay shot 
ou to something about the 
here." (Laughter.) 
Well, it's marvelous to 
or 
resources, 
CBS has just cut out Fred Graham, 
go 
law reporters. But believe me, I don' 























that in the vast 
se. You've a 
general news reporter who covers the beauty contest, the dog 
show, the Lions luncheon, and the local murder trial; and they do 
them all in the same day and they get all the copy in and you've 
got a desk editor who then puts some heads on and away it 
goes. Maybe I'm being unduly pessimistic, but in the smaller 
communities, I feel that's the case. And that's why the judges 
of the state are trying as best we can to help educate the people 
who help the public understand what the courts are doing. And 
the only people we can do that with is the media. And we're 
trying and we hope you help us. 
So, those are all my comments and I'll get into questions 
too. (Applause.) One last comment ---we have a book that was 
edited, thankfully, by the Professor Bagdikian's predecessor at 
Berkeley called The Courts and the News Media, which has been 
published by the California Judges Association. I think, I'll 
say very modestly, it's the best thing in the field. Professor 
Bagdikian says he requires all the students to buy it. At least 
it gives some insight into things that they really ought to know. 
MR. MATHEWS: Thanks very much, Judge. I have some ques-
tions, but I think we're going to open it up first and I might 
just have time in as the occasion permits. Do we have any ques-
tions right off the bat, or perhaps I should address a few? 
Anyone at all? Ah, the gentleman right there. 
UNIDENTIFIED: I wanted to share an insight I gained from 
getting into the judicial canons of ethics that I was previously 
unaware of. When the American Bar Association prepondered the 
Canons of Judicial Ethics, they put in a specific provision that 
while judges were allowed to accept contributions from lawyers, 
they had to do it through some sort of a trust arrangement where 
they were not informed of the identity of the lawyers who were 
contributing to their campaign. This was actually adopted in 
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Cal fornia and then 










s because I 
court 




icular cases these 




wa contr to 
a rna or fea-
86 is go to 
to tices' 
le \vere campaigns and what 
were before court. I don't see any way to avo that. 
th. I think that's a reali 
But the question I want to 
that judicial el are 
any way to treat contr 
we're 
se is s 
to have to 1 
everyone seems to agree 
fferent than other ec 
c 








PROFESSOR BERG: I d 
to know who contr s 
that. Once aga , what 
supporting this j or that 
That s me a bit f a 
who are 
whose position or ews I 
But more important 1 when 
s 
th whom I dis on a var 













that ve se 
and see those 
g me a b 
I don't see how we can treat judges any differently if we're 
going to have them in election. I think part of the problem 
we've got with the whole process is trying to devise ways to 
treat them differently, so we have half of this and a third of 
that; and it doesn't work. I would be opposed to that. I think 
that we need more information about them, not less; and I don't 
believe that the size of the contributions that Phil was talking 
about have that much of an impact. 
MR. MATHEWS: Joe. 
MR. CERRELL: Do they have an impact? If you see that some-
body's given $176 to Candidate A, is that going to tell you that 
he's your kind of person? 
UNIDENTIFIED: Well, if I see a whole bunch of 176s and they 
all tend to be in political parlance on the other side of the 
spectrum from me, I might. 
MR. CERRELL: I have two quick comments. First, I believe if 
we want to isolate the judge from knowing about the contributor, 
why don't we isolate Senator Lockyer from knowing about his con-
tributors? What difference is it with regard to these people ---
the judges knowing where the contributions came from, and then 
the congressman, the state senators, the state assemblymen, the 
state's constitutional officers, etc.? 
Second, I am very concerned, not as a manager, because if we 
never have another judicial election, I'd personally be very 
happy, I am very concerned that the judges don't have enough 
funds as it is now. Wednesday I met with a member of the Los 
Angeles Superior Court who was concerned that he's going to be 
challenged. When I said, "What do you intend to do about financ-
ing, are you going to have a fundraiser?" Are you going to do 
direct mail? How do you plan to raise the money then?" His 
-151-
answer was, ''I'm selling my apartment building after the first of 
the year to finance the campaign." I mean, I felt awfu about 
it. I don't think that's r 
Now, final item, of the of Los Angeles, the City 
of Los Angeles, without sounding too boastful, in a small con-
stituency, you give me enough money, and I'm not talk about an 
outrageous sum of money, you give me enough money with an attor-
ney, let's say, a personal jury attorney, a PI who's 
made a big killing somewhere, or some corporate attorneys got a 
lot of money behind him, and I'll knock off a superior court 
judge in a medium to small size county. I'll knock off a i-
pal judge in just about any city in this state. You know why? 
Because the judge has no money and I know how to do a couple of 
direct mail hits, a little b of newspaper advertis re 
in the State of Californ And if that's the kind of system 
you want where money is going to buy the judiciary, why that's a 
bad one. 
JUDGE WElL: Let me add just one comment. There 
possible reasons why you might want to know how much 
received from whom. One, of course, is the one that 
about which is so you know who you want to vote for at 
time. The other, of course, is concept that a 1 
goes to court wants to know how much the judge 
received from his or her opponent. But remember, 
Legislature, if you've got a matter that's go to 
before a certain corrmtittee, that matter is going to 
before that committee regardless of who contr ted 
members of that committee. If you've got a case that 










money from someone that you just don't like there is a marvelous 
thing called a 170.6. Every 1 has r to f an 
automatic disquali cation for imagined prej e. There doesn't 
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have to be any affidavits 
right to kick the case out of j 
You've the absolute 
's court. So it seems to 
me that 
it. 
's half lem or more and that's a solution for 
MR. MATHEWS: I saw a way in the back row. Come on up. 
UNIDENTIFIED: I want to direct my quest to Ben Bagdikian. 
To become more in therefore provide more accurate and 
balanced of courts, e at llate 
level, you have sugges that news zations reporters 
to law school, example, they're more experienced reporters. 
And further, that they avail themselves of some of the state and 
national studies and attendant statistics that may be available 
on the judiciary system. 
I was 
cles or 
ing if there 
sms that 
be more i 
you would recommend for improving reportage in s 
e apropos the •s comments s conclud 
remarks. And also, regard to 
as out , for 
ju lves are 
court at 
PROFESSOR BAGDIKIAN: Well, I 
reporter can whether 





on the L.A. 
that we're 
that s 
reporters the small We have a 
much better generation of reporters. As Judge Weil said, not 
is ing to send a legal to law school, nor 
do need to. But they can go to things like that conscien-
s disk jockey, as Judge Weil described it. Even without 
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that, a good havi to le the court issue ln his or 
her jurisdiction, who works for a broadcast station or newspa-
pcrrnits a half a dozen state long-distance calls can 
call the deans of a e of law schools to ask, "Turn me over 
to someone who can tell me some background." And if the reporter 
can make four long-distance phone calls, he can talk to four 
deans so that in case that begets a particular per from 
one, he has a chance to compare it to others. So I don t think 
it's an impossible task to reach an acceptable level of care and 
prudence. I think the big problem is that a lot of 
the don't take pains to discover that they don't have to re 
wheel. There are authoritative people who know general 
ed undisputed facts. 
accept-
What can be done on a general level? things that the 
Judges Association does. The good journalism schools 
teaching enough law so that a person isn't totally lost in a 
legal situation. I think there's an enormous respons ility on 
editors and news directors to recognize that this is a se s 
subject. You don't assign someone six hours to a def tive 
story on all the judicial races and the pros and cons a whole 
metropolitan area. 
Every competent reporter should be able to cover court deci-
sions, of course. Then when you get into the conflicts over 
whether the courts are run ly, at the very least ze 
that you approach this subject th a amount of li 
because it's a complex subject. We've learned 
write about the universe or the nature of nuclear 
't 
off 
of your head. You respect the need to find who 
really knows something about All I'm saying is, any minimal-
ly competent reporter can acqu basic data about courts. I 
think it's quite plausible, and I don't on an 
experienced reporter who has been to law , but it does 
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depend on the news organiz 
and approaching it with care. 
taking this as a serious subject 
MR. MATHEWS: I saw a 
ais here. 
form bearded on the 
MR. SCHRAG: Like Professor Dubois, I 
campaign spending reports Sacramento, 
haven't been through the 
but rather than looking 
at the current race at ior court judges, I've been looki 
for the California Court, and on that numbers are 
very fferent. And my question---the numbers on the---and 
they're very different in character between the two campaigns as 
you might imagine. But on the side of the Chief Justice, the 
contributions come primarily in large amounts, meaning amounts 
over $100, and almost entirely from lawyers and, in some cases, 
in amounts as large as $5,000 to $10,000 for a lawyer or law 
firm. Now, I have a feeling that's a rather unique situation. I 
think this whole race may be a unique situation, but does that 
concern you and does that create a somewhat different--generate a 
somewhat fferent light on the situation from the one that 
re talking about with respect to superior court judges? 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: Well, wouldn't concern me because I'll 




some , I guess, in the notion of public disclo-
those things will be disclosed at the appropriate times 
are attentive to them. I'm not icularly concerned 
I guess, again, you're right, it may be a unique situ-
because these lar llate and court races is so 
unusual and the amounts of being are so unusual 
be a once in a generation problem. I'm not sure that we 
to be concerned over the long term about 
see whether it's a trend. 
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We'll have to 
finance s for I think you could 1 at the campa 
almost all the other appellate court j 
find big goose eggs as to what 
s California and 
, or rai 
matter, because they don t need to. 
MR. CERRELL: I'll te 1 what concerns me. I 
cerned about the integri 
the municipal court or the 
of the court. I 
court or 
t c 
between. If decisions are to be handed down bas 
political considerations, not just all contr 








is saying, "Oh my God, that's the law firm that made a 5 000 
contribution to my campaign. Wow!" That's the reason d like 
to take the whole thing out of politics. You'd say, what's the 
difference in the partisan races? We to the j 
it all in that whole thing. Maybe it'd be l you 
whole problem away from of s. 
MR. MATTHEWS: Ben, had a quest ? 
PROFESSOR BAGDIKIAN: I'd like the of Pro 
Dubois. Looking at your numbers, '76-82, s 
spending it's relatively at and it's a period of 





years. Just from looking at the s months' statements in this 
year's campaign, it's going to more than double 
you think means that we may have a relative 
modest increase in the s 
whether we are now see 
up to 82? Do 
a s 
contributions to judicial elect 
short period of time? 





at or a 
a 
t from 
the appellate court race. I don't know. But I'm not even sure 
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that t s a real , because I would have look at 
str 
average race is, 
of races across the tate to be sure whether the 
fact more. When break se 
down s where see 
the f atness f ll of the race occurr 
L.A , overall the to But if 
al race 
of course, the 






s one of do 
won t 
So even it's a 
where races 
s k of 
A part , I guess, is that I see super court 
races different than these 




















llate court races. 







You'd think the 
would and 
't. Now, I 1 t know 
the 
so can't read 
to me 
I'd 98 of 
There just aren't a lot 
are g to ten or f fteen dif 
out ust 
19 the way 
races 
We're talking now I 86 • I an i went 
back you of and 978 
Brown trat ntees and being 
- 5 -
rce as being vulnerable by a sizeable part of the Bar in 
many cases because vvere a of intees, as 
Weil, who had not been on the before. I nk there 
so was some thou some elements at Bar goes: 
the only way I m ever go to on court, I've go to run 
because Jerry will never appo 
that. 
me." I think there was some of 
We're now in the end of the first term of the Deukmejian 
Administration. I haven't fol s j appointments as 
closely as I did the ous two Governors. I just wonder if 
there might be a rel to a change of parties or Governors 
and move into a different type of appointee. I think most Demo-
cratic Governors appoint Democratic 
Governors appoint Republican 
fact. I think you may get some 
like to be judges. You go e 
and then eight years with another. 
attorneys and most Republican 
s; and 's an cal 
among people who would 
th one of judge, 
I don't know, I'm just 
tossing it out 
this works. 
se I 't seen any good reason as to why 
JUDGE WEIL: I think that if at the 
defeated schedule that 've to paper or the data 
for your paper, you'll see a ittle t of Ann z in here 
1978. Because if you look at the one, two, three, four, five, 
six, seven names that were defeated, and I'm not necessari 
talking about the ones who 
es, you'll notice that we had 
Judge Lucero. Now that means 
defeated were Hispanic. 
PROFESSOR BERG: I th 
I'm not sure. 
th the skin of ir nos-
Gonzales, Sanchez, and 
three out f seven who were 
re also may be one Black 
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JUDGE WEIL: There were at least two B So remember, 
Brown a new to the bench in California 















s great wave 
to recede, 
ac to st s But that wa reason 
MR. MATHEWS: A 0 Phil or 
Weil. It strikes me if one is annoyed at the courts, one 
is usually coming from the right. You've the third 
automatic no vote If are listed as a prosecutor, 
are you tending to more votes chall a s judge 
than some ? 
JUDGE WEIL I think Joe Cerre 1 can answer than 
I can. Or weren't you ng Joe? 
MR. CERRELL: No, I s I 't the 
JUDGE WEIL: 've fu of course, 
when the i b 
s It's true that 
was either '78 or '80 the 
sort of to l oppo-
nents k to new 
breed of j i at f 
was a r of doing 
now 
One reason is 
are than j s. So you s the 
59 
tor's of You s the secutor's office. You 
stay in the prosecutor's of ce and not only does r salary get 
better, but you don't have to run for election every s years. 
PROFESSOR BAGDIKIAN: I have a quest for Joe Cerrell. 
Joe, you said that you think that the state ought to discontinue 
jud ial elections. You know as much as anybody about the prac-
ticalities of California politics. Do you see that as a possi-
bility in the near future or in the distant future? 
MR. CERRELL: Judge Weil would tell you all it takes is an 
act of the board of supervisors. 
PROFESSOR BAGDIKIAN: But that's ducking the issue. 
MR. CERRELL: No, it's not going to-- I don't see t as 
happening. There'd be a big outcry on it. 
JUDGE WEIL: Let --- you quoted me, let me make it accurate. 
There is a provision the Canst tion as it stands r now 
which says that to any court that has county wide juri on, 
and that means, for example, Los Angeles County would be the Los 
Angeles Superior Court -- there are some counties I like 
ventura where c l court also has county-wide j sd 
tion -- but in any county where there is county-wide jurisdic-
tion, either by a vote of the board of sors or 
ition, there can be aced on the 
will say that all elections of judges 
will be on a retention basis. Shall 
in office? Yes or no. And there 
elections. And it's always been bel 
s 
in that thereafter 
so and so be reta 
would be no contested 
up at least il this 
time, until the supreme court race, that a re on election, 
nobody would give money to a retention election. You might give 
money to a candidate if you know that cand was going to beat 
someone else. But leaving as the unique supreme court that we 
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have s time who's to to a campaign to say 
that judge X shall not be the local l court? 
The answer is no one. And that sion i in the 
right now. There hasn't been a around that's 
had the ts to I S 
MR. MATHEWS: We a of the bench a 
UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, were a about the year 1978. 
that's when the DAs put together a slate a tear-out for all 
the judges that are up for election, vote against these judges 
and the assoc And that's what made '78 a banner year. 
We don't see s coming 
about 
despite the retention elec I 
dl 
't There 
of e Prosecutors are 
MR. DUBOIS: I looked a 1 
that research I was 
at the 
Of course, 
's been a dwin-
s 
1 of prosecutor 
'78 races, espe-
cial the ones a DAs 
to off 
re. But el 
as be an 
court j So 
at or the 
to be a 
s, were ci 
the state, 




it's not as he ful 
a i-
a p "attor-
s can come up 
descr themselves 1 consumer advocate, cr law 
c ist, and to make 
themselves appear 
MR. MATHEWS Yes, the 1 r there. It s a 
1 e more f minutes to go. 
UNIDENTIFIED: One que someone would like to 
comment on is whether 's been an the amount of 
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time judges have had to ded ate to campai year-round or 
around election time, and whe there is an impact upon their 
ability to out their j cia funct to devote 
their s to campa ? 
JUDGE WEIL: Well, Joe, what do you advise your clients to do 
when they come to you and say "I'm in the c 
cial clients? 
" j 
MR. CERRELL: One of the few concerns we would have is that 
they'd get caught out of the courtroom. And so, as I said, in 
Los Angels County, or even the City, we tell them it's not neces-
sary to go door to door. There's just too many people, so don't 
worry about it. 
JUDGE WEIL: In a small county, we tell them to take a vaca-
tion and even a leave of absence. 
MR. CERRELL: But what I was lead up to, we say at the 
very end, build up some vacation time toward the and if you 
feel the necessity to be doing a few more things. Do things at 
lunchtime, do things in the evening, do things at breakfast. I 
don't think it's serious. 
But if you get into that situat of an being 
challenged, it is. Those phone calls coming in and 
It's not healthy, but there's no choice about that. And 
it's no different than any other litical office. 
MR. MATHEWS: Yes sir. 
PROFESSOR LEVI: Julian I find this discuss much 
more alarming than I think the panel even acknowledges. First of 
all, generally, nothing, despite whatever the good intentions 
are, is available to the press to control the content of televi-
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s mail, or advertisements are to be used. 
content will be , consultants, or to be 
more accurate, 1 be what 11 sell, 
not ate the so 
ssor H costs as a matter 
s 
enumerated 
act insure result. If you've a 1 amount of dol-
lars, you're to want the maximum bang. Whether what is 
s 
sell. 
s accurate or 
There's a que 
, it s just a what will 
I'd 1 to ask about I'm 
a know the answer to it, ause it's the kind of thing 
that turns live poli ians into dead statesmen. I'm wondering 
what would be the value of the ivalent of a con~ission 
under the ju of islative j iary committees 
now? s commission if organized need not endorse one 
v or another, would meet the need for the information 
enumerated by Professor Bagd 
were to occur, t 
to on 
t of all 1 
ss le. But I 
And f I don't 






our last que 





s s probab 





as place of last refuge. If 
and 1 1 m afr 11, 
mot j can 
ll next. 
s 
here. s may be close 
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Unidentified: Yeah, I was wondering in reference to 
Assemblyman Stirling's proposed bill, Assembly Bill, I was won-
dering first to Professor Dubois, whether g the distribution 
of large third-pa contr ions to incumbent judges, incumbent 
superior court judges, incumbent municipal court judges, if you 
interpreted that pattern of giving to indicate that in fact these 
people who are contributing expect some benefit. I mean, there's 
a pattern that does correspond to the pattern one would expect, 
if some benefit were to be derived from the giving of campaign 
contributions. 
And what I want to ask the whole panel is whether think 
that it would be valuable to offer judges free space on the voter 
pamphlet if they would voluntarily restrict self-contributing 
contributions of their family to their campaigns to some set 
amount, let's say, $5,000; $10,000. If they would volunteer the 
limit of self contributions and free space on the voter pam-
phlet, that in coordination with something like Assemblyman 
Stirling's bill wh would limit the contributions third 
parties, would result in low cost judicial campaigns that through 
the voter pamphlet would have larger exposure than judicial cam-
paigns do now and whether the people on the 1 .... 
MR. MATHEWS: Larry, why don't you try that? Oh, Phil, you 
want to try it? 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: I'm not sure I understand the f st 
of your question. I guess my point was if you bil lS 
restrict contribution s from specif 
amounts of over $250, there isn't 
tor 
those 
is, there's nobody those groups giving--or y 
giving money--that much money to these campaigns and that 





UNIDENTIFIED: I was looking at Table 5. 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: What is it on? 
MR MATHEWS: I the j has an answer on No. 2 while 
l's checking the table. 
JUDGE WElL: Well, on No. 2 the idea of giving free pamphlet 
to the incumbent j prov ing that that judge will 
re s or her fund s 
UNIDENTIFIED: I meant all candidates. 
JUDGE WElL: You meant all candidates. If you mean all can-
didates, that means 
everybody who files 
1 fil for 
have anybody worth 
anybody who files gets 
gets free space, you're 
every open position and 
his or her salt 
free space; and if 
going to have 35 
re not going to 
to be appointed 
to bench. If that's the bench you want, God bless you, 
that's what you're going to get. 
UNIDENTIFIED: No, I was--the impression that most of the 
los candidates--most of the current s are 
primari sel funded candidates 
candidates could sel fund, 
the number of candidates 
So by res ing the amount 
that would counteract and 
JUDGE WEIL: Well, once you start giv away the ballot 
, there will be no reason 
needs the job tomorrow shouldn' 
shot at winning. 
anybody--any lawyer who 
$770 run and take a 
SENATOR LOCKYER: I might add another 
is our State Constitution. It would requ 
tical problem which 
that the state 
appropriate all the funds necess as a state mandate for all 
those ballot mater ls--it won't happen. 
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MR. MATHEWS: Phil. 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: I guess your questions is, are the attor-
neys who are contributing to superior court judges expecting 
something in return. I mean, that's why they're giving to incurn-
bents and not giving to other people. 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: Well, that's kind of the classic question 
about campaign finance. Are people giving to candidates because 
they expect something or are they giving to candidates because 
they know them and are easily contacted or are they merely giving 
to people who share their ideological and political beliefs? And 
I don't have the answer from this perspective. My guess is that 
judges know more attorneys. 
MR. MATHEWS: Thank you very much. That ends our discussion. 
Before we turn it over to Senator Lockyer, I think we ought to 
give the panel a hand. (Applause). Senator, it's all yours. 
SENATOR LOCKYER: This is a one-minute close, so don't move. 
I want to thank Professor Bagdikian for not recommending licensed 
politicians. (Laughter). Secondly, I'm grateful that Professor 
Dubois did not look at the 1984 speci c reports because you'll 
find that in my particular district that I was a donor of a 
$5,000 contribution to a mu cipal court candidate who happened 
to be the first woman ever elected to the municipal ccurt in 
Southern Alameda County. And I'm kind of proud of that; that's 
why I did it, frankly. But I'm a it would distort all of 
the statistics if you were to look at that. 
PROFESSOR DUBOIS: Well, it's out 
ter) . 
the open now. (Laugh-
SENATOR LOCKYER: In closing, I want to--well, one other 
thought. Earlier people have mentioned my Senate Constitutional 
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Amendment 23, which was an attempt to blend the ral and Cali-
fornia system that is -- of appointment of judges; that is, we 
would have a Senate confirmation of requ ite before an appoint-
ment took effect. And then there would be at the next election 
the yes/no kind of election on the appellate appointments and 
then there would be life tenure thereafter. Well, I found just 
proposing that and then seeing three editorials in my local news-
papers that described it as the Rose Bird protection act even 
though it was going to be taking effect prospectively and have 
nothing to do with Rose, I decided that perhaps that amendment 
should be reconsidered a different day. And it's now gone. I 
think that's the latest effort by anyone to propose in the Legis-
lature at least something approaching the lifetime tenure. 
I hope that you all feel that this has been informative and 
thought provoking. I certainly do. And I did want to thank 
Larry Berg and USC, the Senate Office of Research, and all of our 
marvelous participants who contributed to this effort. Thank you 
very much. (Applause). 
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DINNER -- KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
DINNER -- KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
PROFESSOR LARRY BERG: Senator Roberti asked me to say two 
sentences on the introduction. But first, I want to thank all of 
you for coming. I think what we're doing here is very 
interesting and something that has been talked about since 
before the Constitution was signed. As Professor John 
Schmidhauser tells me, Is that right, John? 
The debate that we started today in the context of 
independence and accountability is one that will carry throughly 
to the election. Now, I've used up my two sentences. I am very 
pleased to introduce Senator David Roberti, who is the Senate pro 
Tern and the leader of the California Senate; and Senator Lockyer, 
I would like to thank you for being involved in setting this up. 
SENATOR DAVID ROBERTI: You've done it very well. 
(Applause.) 
PROFESSOR BERG: I'm going to add a third sentence, Senator. 
I live in the Senator's district. Senator Roberti has the 
distinction of living in and representing a district very close 
to where he frew up. All of us who live in that area really do 
appreciate it. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: You're welcome. Thank you. 
PROFESSOR BERG: Thank you. (Applause.) 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Representing the most transient district 
the State of California, my main claim to fame is I've probably 
lived there longer than anybody else. (Laughter.) But we're 
very happy, and I want to thank the Institute of Politics and 
Government at the University of Southern California for sponsor-
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ing, with the Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Lockyer, 
and the Senate Office of Research, many of the staff of which are 
here, this really very excellent conference. 
We have a real treat tonight. We are very fortunate in hav-
ing with us Fred Graham, a man whose education, experience, and 
judgment makes him uniquely qualified to address the question 
which we're studying -- that of judging judges. As the corre-
spondent of The New York Times, Fred wrote extensively on the 
battles over the Haynsworth and Carswell appointments to the 
United States Supreme Court . As the law correspondent for CBS 
News, he covered the judicial aspects of the abuses of presiden-
tial power, collectively known as Watergate, and in the process 
won three Ernrny Awards. He also won the George Foster Peabody 
Broadcasting Award. As a Yale graduate and a holder of law 
degrees from both Vanderbilt and Oxford Universities, Fred is 
more than a journalist. He is a scholar, which is evidenced by 
his books, including a study of the Miranda decision, The Self-
Inflicted Wound, which won the Gavel Award from the American Bar 
Association. 
I'd like to also note, considering the co-sponsors of the 
symposium, that Fred has served as a consultant to the Judiciary 
Committee of the United States Senate. And so it's our pleasure 
to have you with us this evening, and we would like to hear a 
little bit of your experiences in this area that we're discussing 
this afternoon and tomorrow. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Fred 
Graham. (Applause.) 
MR. FRED GRAHAM: Well, thank you very much, Senator Roberti, 
and thanks to all of you. I want to start off by assuring you 
all that in the grand tradition of television and show biz as it 
really is in these days, Tim Hodson has a long hook. And at nine 
o'clock, I get it. So you can be reassured that my remarks will, 
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I hope, be relevant and interesting as David said, but long-
winded they will not be. 
If you look on your programs, you will see that the person 
who's supposed to be standing here is former Senator Birch Bayh, 
who for reasons unexplained, was unable to make it. It happened 
that I was going to be here and Tim called me, and I was so 
pleased because I've been following the Rose Bird controversy and 
the upcoming election. I was fascinated that the opportunity 
presented itself for me to talk a little bit about some of the 
things that have come to my attention as a professional observer 
of the legal scene, but also in a bit broader sense that really 
does key into what you're discussing. When you think about it, 
the roots of the election that will come up here next year go 
back at least as far as Plato in the ideas that he expounded in 
The Republic, and they're as modern as a modern television tech-
nology and the power that that creates in elections and what some 
people might call the over-lawyered society; the litigious age 
that affects all of us so much. 
It seems to me that it is only natural that those factors and 
others, which I'll mention in a minute, would be finally re-
flected in the thing that brought you here. It seems almost 
unthinkable, seeing President Reagan briefly on the screen 
tonight giving his report from the summit, but it was really only 
a year ago that he was in his reelection. If you'll recall, one 
of the dominant issues at that time was very relevant to what has 
brought you all here. You'll recall that Walter Mondale was 
saying that if Ronald Reagan gets four more years, the far Right 
is going to get five justices. It was reasonable at that time to 
believe that if Ronald Reagan did win a second term that a con-
comitant of that would be that he would have the opportunity to 
remake the supreme court of the United States in his own conser-
vative image. After all, five of the nine justices were then 75 
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years old or older. They're now 76 s or older. You didn't 
have to count very far to realize that at the end of Ronald 
Reagan's second term, if indeed he was to be elected to a second 
term, a majori f the justices o the supreme court 
would be in their 80s, and a sixth, White, would be in his 
70s -- by far thJ oldest Court ever in the history of our coun-
try. We only had thirteen justices who ever served into their 
80s. To have at once was obviously something, human mortal-
ity being what it is. There was an assumption that if President 
Reagan was reelected that, indeed, would have this opportunity. 
A kind of ghoulish death watch developed in which you'll recall 
Jerry Falwell said that if Ronald Reagan is reelected, we, he 
said, will get two more justices. "We" was not defined; but 
apparently, it meant the Moral Majority. 
What happened was a curious thing. Although those of us who 
were professional observers of the supreme court pretty much 
accepted the mathematics of the claim that a reelection of Ronald 
Reagan would mean a remaking of the supreme court, very shortly 
after that campa , four of those five -- Brennan, Blackmun, 
Marshall, and then later, Powell -- began to put out signals, 
some subtle and some not very subtle at all that they were going 
to Rona (Laughter.) They were pretty old, but 
he was no spring chicken either. {Laughter.) It was in a sense 
of reflection, which I'll discuss in a minute more, of the forces 
are in play this State today with regard to your supreme 
court. It was interesting to see what happened. 
Brennan, who no statement, who is 79, is the 
only newlywed on the supreme court. He eloped with his secre-
tary. She was a young thing of about 65, and they eloped to 
Bermuda. You'll recall, they left little notes on the other 
justices' desks saying that they had done this romantic thing. 
He has come back with just a glow of youth and vitality. (Laugh-
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ter.) There is a lot of life in the old boy now, let me tell 
you, you can really see that he's in there for the long haul. 
(Laughter.) 
Thurgood Marshall made a statement. He said, "I was elected 
for life, and I intend to serve my full term." (Laughter.) That 
means that they're going to have to carry him out feet irst as 
long as that man is in the White House. I read last month that 
Thurgood Marshall has instructed his clerks that if he dies, 
they're to have him stuffed and to continue to cast his vote. 
(Laughter.) 
Harry Blackmun has been a little more subtle in that. In his 
private conversations, he loves to hold forth about the almost 
legendary longevity of the Blackman family in that part of Minne-
sota. he claims the males lived vigorously well into their 90s. 
He's obviously dug his heels in too. 
Louis Powell, I thought was going to retire. He had always 
talked about in terms of being a justice for ten years. He was 
ill, as you know, and had a prostate operation, cancer f the 
prostate, back last January. He is the key really to what 
happened in the light of this all of the talk during the cam-
paign of a year ago last summer about replacing these doddering 
old fellows once the President gets four more years. Somehow it 
rubbed him the wrong way, the idea that these e ld admit 
their mortality, passing the scene and have some young ght-wing 
professor appointed in their place. (Laughter.} In 
conversations, he has been heard to talk about how ssors 
don't necessarily make good judges, that an ideological cast is 
not necessarily the best for being a judge and for even-handed 
decision making. He now says, not publicly, but he tel s people 
who pass it along, that he is going to stay indefi tel . 
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will not be decided as everyone has more or less assumed by the 
last election, but by the next election, because those four sep-
tuagenarian justices, then in their 80s, will surely any case 
then be ready to go. The next President will have a house-
cleaning to make and recast the Court for decades. It will be 
important if the person who does that is someone who really 
inherits the mantle of Ronald Reagan, say, a Jack Kemp; we then 
would see the judicial revolution that's been predicted. I would 
say any Democrat would continue pretty much in the mainstream 
that we've seen, and I consider the Berger Court generally in the 
mainstream of our constitutional traditions. The real question 
would be George Bush. I cannot take him seriously as a real 
right-wing, right-winger. He insists he is, but it's hard 
he's too preppy to me to get it in. (Laughter.) But w th a 
second term ahead, maybe he really would, and that's one of the 
interesting things of the future to see. 
What's fascinating about this is to see the supreme court as 
the light has dawned that the court is not going to be trans-
formed in the ideological image of the President, to see this odd 
phenomenon really that has taken place in Washington the last 
three or four months that is really a parallel to what brought 
you here. The almost infantile, I think, public quarre between 
Attorney General Meese and some elements on the court which 
the Attorney General has apparently had nothing better to flail 
at the court about than two really irrelevant theories: one, as 
you know, the question of incorporation of the various sions 
of the Bill of Rights through the 14th Amendment and make binding 
upon the State something that most of us thought was really set-
tled if not in about the mid-1920s, surely by the 1950s and the 
other being, as the Attorney General calls it, the ques ion of 
original intent, interpretation of the Constitution on , as he 
puts it, according to the original intent. Of course, the origi-
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ary in this country. It simply is a dilerr~a which we have to 
admit, that in the greatest democracy in the world, the final 
decisions of many issues are laid down by nonelected, sometimes 
inted for life, generally appointed, but tenured members of 
the judiciary. That is a tension with the democratic system that 
can't be ignored. 
With its ancient roots, it seems to me that in more recent 
times, at least two factors that I confront daily in my work as 
an observer of the legal scene are now corning down with almost 
crushing force on the other side of that equation. One is the 
increasing legalization of American society through the liti-
giousness that is rampant in this state far beyond any other 
state. It's one of those cases whe~e this state, as one of the 
bellwether states -- the bellwether state in a country is not 
setting a very hopeful example. I think the public resents it 
and is fearful of it and that the criticism of judges the 
concern about the role of the judiciary is in many ways key to 
this question, this matter of litigiousness. 
Those of you who have visited Washington, say ten ars ago, 
may remember that there's a building in Washington near the cen-
ter -- half a mile from the White House, one of those narrow 
buildings that comes to a point and it's very reminiscent of 
Times Square. About ten years ago, an environmentalis group had 
put up one of those digital clocks, big sign, and s , "World 
population." There was a clock that turned, and it upward 
and upward to try and show how the world populat was 
to instill some sort of public concern about populat growth 
and the ecology. It didn't take; the sign disappeared. But I've 
always thought that it would have been a lot scarier if, instead 
of listing people, they had listed lawyers. If they had, it 
would have shown, according to the American Bar Association, that 
it would spin upward in every 16 minutes, a new lawyer, night and 
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say "Impeach Earl Warren.'" The John Birch Socie was 
doing that in those days. It was 1966. And his eyes like 
that, and he had a way -- I never knew if it was true naivete or 
if we was one of the biggest country slickers I've ever seen in 
my life. He says, "You mean they're doing that?" And I said, 
''Yeah, they're doing that." Either he was putting me on with his 
naivete or they really hadn't made enough impression to get to 
him, but the fact was that he knew that the billboards were not 
going to really affect the position of the supreme court and the 
Chief Justice and the Judiciary. But television is different, 
and I think the consensus in this room would be that Rose Bird is 
in trouble. Television is going to carry the message, it's going 
to be a simple messagei it's going to play on the kind of resent-
ments, the tension that I think is inherent in the issue of the 
platonic guardians, and on the tensions about litigiousness and 
the fact that this is not the Berger Court. 
Rose Bird, at least in her early times where my perception as 
a non-Californian, got a rocky start as doing injudic s things. 
I think that the death penalty issue, that the United States 
Supreme Court backed away from quick enough, came down hard 
against the death penalty, but seven or eight years ago that one 
was too tough for them. They backed off. And the fact that this 
is a woman. And an unmarried woman, for Christ's sake. Can you 
believe that? The nerve of her. And I think that there are 
currents there that might cut both ways. She might say wait a 
minute, they're picking on a woman here. 
But the broad forces that have produced the ra insignifi-
cant standoff between the Attorney General and the court 
of the Unites States are going to play out clearly in a different 
way in this State with a different Chief Justice with different 
issues in a way to bring the issue before the people which, of 
course, the supreme court of the United States doesn't have. 
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that as we go into the middle years of the 1980s, we're going to 
have an occasion to recall that the ancient Chinese did in fact 
sometimes use it as a curse when they said, "May you live in 
interesting times." 
Thank you very much. I've enjoyed this ... (Applause.) 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Fred. And may we have 
an interesting conference. It starts at nine o'clock tomorrow 
morning. Good evening. 
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APPENDICES 
PoLITICS, INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
THE ORIGINS OF THE 
jUDICAIAL RETENTION ELECTION IN (ALIFOIRNIA 
LEIJ. flVNN 
PIMINI [ILUifE 
In 1986 California 
upon to uote '"yes'" or "no" on the question of whether or 
Justice Bird Justices Most, Reynoso, Grodin and Lucas retain 
their seats on the State Supreme Court . t Hence, fiue of the seuen 
members of the Court wm face the uoters on their record. practice 
of hautng the electorate uote on the retention of appellate judges; 
rather than the uoten selecting among competing candidates, was 
euthorized a Amendment adopted in Nouember of 
1934.2 Because these forthcoming judicial contests promise be uery 
heated3, the question electorate should determine an 
appellate judge is to be retained important. The following 
discussion eHamines retention in 
Califomh'i. It also the uoters were eHpected 
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Donald R. Wright -- the Culmination of a Half Century of Excellence" 
Donald R. Wright served as Chief Justice of California from 1970 
to 1977. As successor to Chief Justices Roger Traynor and Phil Gibson 
he was the third Chief Justice leading and maintaining the California 
Supreme Court as the preeminent State Supreme Court in th~ nation for 
more than a half century. Such a heritage should not only be 
cherished but it should be analyzed to determine how such leadership 
came about. 
At h set we must acknowledge that in Dona~d Wright we did not 
have a jurist with the unparalleled judicial craftsmanship or literary 
skills of Benjamin Cardoza. Learned Hand, or our own Roger Traynor. 
Among Judge Wright s opinions we do not find a Meinhard v. Salomon. 
What we do find is a Justice who in fact was Chief by force of 
character, intellect, and personality, and who at the same time would 
be referred to repeatedly by his colleagues as a "warm, compassionate, 
and caring human being". 
1 
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Hence Chief Justice Wright came o the Chief Justiceship after 
twen years of experience as pr e practit oner of the law, after 
fourteen years of experience as a trial judge in a metropolitan 
court of general jurisdiction, two years of full experience as an 
Appellate Judge. His opinions demonstrate that he understood the 
difficulties and frustrations of pfivate practice; that he knew at 
first hand the responsibilities and problems of the trial judge made 
evident by his practice of laboriously reading trial Court records 
time after time; that he understood both the limitations and 
opportuni ies of appellate and supreme court service. 
Mo e significant bench and bar as well as the general public 
understood that here was a Chief Justice who had earned that title. 
As one of his col remarked from the very beginning of his term; 
"the Chief fit in well". 
Chief Justice Wright in accordance with the Constitution and 
Statutes of California hac m3jor responsib lities in the 
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administration of the judicial system of the SLate. His skill as ar. 
adm nistrator was a bri t point of his tenure. The Chief has been 
described as a political moderate justice with hi intellectual 
abilities, but with even greater administrative skills. He was a 
judge 1 s judge. Professional, quiet and undramatic in demeanor, Wri t 
seemed to exude d~gnity, open-mindedness, fairness and compassion. 
The Chief understood that he administered best by persuasion, 
rather than by force of will or the powers of his office. He was an 
experienced and tactful administrator who maintained the traditions 
established by Chief Justices Phil Gibson and r Traynor. Retired 
Associate Supreme Court Justice Sullivan has described 
Wri t's administration of the judicial branch as "masterf 1 . 
According to Justice Sullivan, the Chief's leadersh was unique 
effective because of his warmth in with his col s and 
with those outside the judiciary. Of course, the fact of years of 
prior service and experience was all important. In most cases the 
Chief was working with Judges whom he knew in prior years, and who 
themselves knew that the "Ch ef had been there himself and understood 
their problems". 
During Judge Wright's tenure, the courts of appeals were in 
trouble as their workload had increased greatly. The traditional 
means of dealing with a growing backlog is to add judges. With the 
appointment of more appellate judges, however, it is difficult to 
maintain the quality of appointments and uniformity among decisions. 
To avoid appointing numerous appellate judges, Judge Wright instituted 
seve al administrative reforms. For example. he created a ce~·ral 
staff which could relieve the justices of some routine work. In 
addition, Judge Wright introduced the use of memorandum dispositions 
for routine cases. The criteria for publication of opinions from the 
Courts of Appeals also was that less opinions would qualify 
for publication. The success of these reforms is demonstrated by the 
increased productivity of the justices and consequent eli~ination of 
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the need to add authorized positions to the Courts of Appeals for ten 
years. "While the number of dispositions per judge in the Courts of 
Appeals increased by approximately three percent during Judge Wright's 
tenure, the percentage of published opinions dropped steadily: 39 
percent were published for the 1969-70 term, and only 16 percent were 
published for each of the last two terms during Judge Wright's tenure. 
Judge Wright instituted this structural reform by quiet persuasion and 
coaxing his fellow judges into acceptance. 
During the tenures of Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor and Wri t, 
the power to select the judges for the appellate department of the 
superior court, for all practical purposes, had been transferred from 
the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court to the presiding 
judge of the superior court in the larger counties. Judge Wri 
reformed the existing process of assignment to the appellate 
department by meeting periodically with the presiding judges and 
suggesting to them that assignments to the appellate department be 
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rotated with a new judge added each year who would serve for a total 
of three years and then return to other assi s. Before Judge 
Wright's tenure the assignment to the appellate rtment had, 
through the seniority system, become more or less permanent. Judge 
Wright got this reform ed by discussing it ly with the 
presiding judges, deferring to their judgment, and soft persuasion. 
Removing Associate Justice Marshall McComb was one of Judge 
Wright's most sensitive administrative accomplishments. In light of 
the fact that Judge McComb was conservative and the court was liberal 
at tha time, Judge ~ri t did not want his removal to appear to be 
politically inspired. Therefore, Wright helped engineer a 
constitutional amendme t through the legislature that provided an 
avenue whereby Judge McComb's removal would not appear political. The 
amendment provided that if a justice of the Supreme Court was 
involved, the recoaaendations of the Commission on Judicial 
Performance would be referred to seven randomly selected court of 
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appeals justices. As a result of the creation of this special 
tribunal, Justice McComb's removal did not appear to be politically 
inspired. 
Judge Wright is remembered for being accessible and thoughtful. He 
returned phone calls from other judges and from the press. He put out 
a press release on every case in order to establish a public 
information office. Judge Wright also made special efforts to ensure 
that the research attorneys were treated fairly. He made their pay 
comparable to civil service lawyers of equal seniority. As it has 
become evident, Justice Wright's administrative reforms were 
successful as he instituted them after consultation and in a way that 
was acceptable to the majority of judges. 
With the petition for hearing system, the California Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Wright retained control over its docket. 
From 1970 to 1977, to total number of filings increased by less than 
two percent. The percentage of petitions for hearing granted of cases 
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previously decided by the Courts of Appeals steadily decreased during 
that time: 9.3 percent of the petitions for hearing filed were 
granted during the 1970-71 term, while only 7.9 percent of the 
petitions for hearing filed were granted during the 1976-77 term. The 
quality and depth of the opinions written by the justices of the 
California Supreme Court are especially remarkable in light of the 
number of cases per justice on the merits. For example, during the 
terms of 1974-75 and 1975-76, each justice of the California Supreme 
Court wrote 27 opinions for cases decided on the merits. This ratio 
becomes more meaningful when contrasted to the fact that, during those 
terms, each United States Supreme Court justice wrote only 17 opinions 
for cases decided on the merits. 
During his eight years of service Chief Justice Wright wrote the 
opinion for the majority of Court in 196 cases. These opinions 
throughout are remarkably consistent. There is always the meticulous 
even methodical exposition of fact so carefully done that while 
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policies or statements of law might be questioned in dissent, the 
accuracy of fact summaries were largely unchallenged. There is always 
the careful exposition of law and prior case authority plainly and 
clearly stated. Throughout there is the insistence on judicial duty 
and function expressed by the Chief Justice himself in his landmark 
opinion in People v. Anderson dealing with the constitutionality of 
the death penalty under the California Constitution: 
"(5) Our duty to confront and resolve 
constitutional questions, regardless of their 
difficulty or magnitude, is at the very core of our 
judicial responsibility. It is a mandate of the 
most imperative nature. Called upon to decide 
whether the death penalty constitutes cruel or 
unusual punishment under the Constitution of this 
state, we face not merely a crucial and vexing 
issue but an awesome problem involving the lives of 
104 persons under sentence of death in California, 
soae for as long as eight years. There can be no 
final disposition of the judicial proceedings in 
these cases unless and until this court has decided 
the state constitutional question, a question which 
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cannot be avoided by deferr to any other court 
or to other of " 
Anderson 6 C.3d 628 at 640; 100 Cal 
People v. 
tr. 152; 493 
P.2d 880, (1972) 
I suspect the subsequent comment by then Governor Ronald Reagan 
who had appointed the Chief Justice that this was his ''worst 
appointment" came as no surprise to the Chief. Whether a particular 
decision would be popular decision would be popular or not was 
irrelevant when measured against the core of judicial responsibility. 
Analysis of those decisions of Chief Justice most widely cited 
reinforce these observations. 
In Vesely v. r 5 C.3rd 153 (1971) Chief Justice Wright 
speak for a unanimous court permitt third persons to sue vendors 
of alcoho ic al 1 to an obviously intoxicated 
customer who, as a result of intoxication, injured the third person. 
That ~uling overturned pr California judicial precedents based upon 
s of proximate cause. The defendant in Vesely argued that in 
1 
Q 
light of these precedents changes in legal doctrine should be left to 
the legislature. The Chief responded that the precedents re 
judicially created and were patently unsound and totally inconsistent 
with the principles of proximate cause established in areas of 
negligence law. Vesely was controversial and was eventual 
over-turned by the California Legislature after a wave of public 
protest. 
Similar is the opinion in People v. Beagle 6 C.3d 441 (1972) where 
Chief Justice Wright again speaking for a unanimous Court imposed 
severe restrictions on the ability of prosecutors to discredit a 
defendant by referring to prior felony convictions. Before Beagle, 
the majority view in California was that a trial judge had no 
discretion under the California Evidence Code to exclude evidence of a 
lawfulness of the conviction was established or uncontested. In a 
methodically written opinion, the Chief rejected the majority view and 
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held that by reading several sections of the California Evidence Code 
ther, the tria j had discretion to exclude evidence of prior 
felony convictions where the probative value of the evidence is 
outweighed by risk of undue influence. This year Beagle was 
overturned the California Supreme Court in a decision holding the 
1982 Victim 1 s Bill of Rights had introduced an easier0 rule for the 
admission of such evidence. 
In 1973, in Legislature v. Reinecke 10'C.3rd 396 the Chief Justice 
led a unanimous Court in laying down a blueprint for reappointment 
after then Governor Ronald Reagan and the Legislature could not agree 
on a single plan. The Court inted several Special Masters to 
devise and recommend a reapportionment plan which recommendations were 
the Court. recommendations avoided preserving the 
status quo and gave nonincumbant candidates a fair chance at election. 
Finally, the Chief ~ustice in Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 
C.3rd 129 (1976) wrote opinion again for an unanimous court 
upholding the legality of residential rent controls. 
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During his eight years of service the Chief Justice wrote the 
opinion for the majority of the Court in 196 cases. Of these 196 
opinions dissents were filed in only 54 cases. In these 54 cases, 16 
of the dissents were filed by lone dissenters. Thus in only 38 cases 
was there significant disagreement among the Justices. 
0 
On this data alone, it is thus clear that here was a Chief Justice 
who lead his Court. 
Closer examination reinforces this conclusion. Of Wright's 196 
opinions, 126 were criminal cases and 70 were in other areas of the 
Law. The later figure may be subject to some adjustment in that some 
matters such as juvenile criminal issues or Habeas Corpus proceedings 
are classified as non criminal. Of the 54 dissents 46 were in 
criminal cases and only eight were in civil cases. 
During Nright's tenure as Chief Justice, eight justices served 
with him. The ~issenting activity among these Justices can be broken 
down into categories. 
14 
Justices Clark, McComb and Peters dissented along lines of 
ideo and broad policy. 
Justices Mosk, Richardson, Sullivan and Burke when they disagreed 
did so on specific factual determinations or on narrow technical 
grounds. 
Most remarkably, Justice Tobriner, who served throughout Wright's 
tenure, never wrote a dissent to an opinion authored by his Chief 
Justice. This record from a Justice of Tobriner's competence and 
ly felt convictions is a strong indication of how the Chief 
Justice time after time found a basis upon which he could unify the 
Court. 
During these years Justice Clark was unique in the vehemence of 
the language of his dissents. Clark evidently believed that the 
California Supreme Court was too liberal and too favorable to 
defendants. He believed that the California Supreme Court not only 
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was not following the United States Supreme Court precedents as to 
defendant's rights, but on occasion intentionally attempted to avoid 
review by shifting the ground of its decision to provisions of the 
California State Constitution rather than the Federal Bill of Rights. 
Justice Clark during his years on the Wright Court (1974 to 1977) 
v 
wrote sixteen dissents to the seventy five opinions of Chief Justice 
Wright on behalf of the majority of the Court. In these dissents 
Justice Clark charged his colleagues with incompetence, being 
"altogether unreasonable", their rulings "completely unrealistic", 
their conclusions "inexplicable" and "(un)supported by reason or 
authority". On one occasion he charged that "the judiciary is 
developing a messianic image of itself". 
In contrast to Justice Clark, Justice Peters was more liberal than 
the Wright Court. He wrote six dissenting opinions; one of these 
dissents opposed extension of the felony-murder rule; two dissents 
concerned procedural rules of the Court regarding acceptance of guilty 
pleas; the other three dissents turned on search and seizure issues. 
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Justice Richardson wrote dissents in four cases. Two of the cases 
reflect disagreements on narrow, technical points of law; in the other 
two cases he felt the majori was limiting unnecessarily the 
discretion of the trial court. In all four dissents Justice 
Richardson was joined by Justices Clark and McComb. Additional 
0 Richardson concurred without opinion in the dissents in four other 
cases. 
Justice Sullivan wrote only four dissenting opinions all involving 
criminal law issues. Two of the cases concerned his disagreement with 
the majority's application of the exception to the hearsay rule in 
cases of co-conspirators with pre-meditated murders of 
spouses; in the third case Justice Sullivan was outraged by police 
conduct which he saw as an at to circumvent rules of criminal 
procedure requiring presence of defendant 1 s attorney at a line up; 
in the fourth case Justice Sullivan felt the majority had 
unnecessarily addressed a constitutional issue. Additionally Justice 
Sullivan concurred without opinion in dissents in six other cases . 
.. l 
With exception of the opinions of Justice Clark, the dissents 
throughout were characterized by civility and respect among the 
Justices. These Justices were strong men with deeply held convictions 
but their Chief held them together in mutual respect for one another 
and the institution of the law which they served. 
In the final analysis the Chief Justice's colleague, Justice 
Stanley Mosk best summarized; 
"Perhaps his aost noteworthy characteristic was a 
fierce independence. Don Wright bowed before no 
master: not the bench, the bar, the Governor, the 
press, or public opinion. He marched to the beat 
of no drummer, only to an ethical and compassionate 
conscience". 
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It is most appropriate that this conference has been 
convened in memory of Chief Justice Donald Wr Nc better 
role model for the virtue of judicial independence could be 
found. As we reflect on the appropriate standards to apply 
judicial retention elections, and ask whether California voters 
are capable of separating their strong feelings on polit l 
issues from their assessment of Supreme Court Justices, Do~ 
Wright's record gives cause for hope. Chief J~stice Wright faced 
the voters to be confirmed for a 12 year term in 1974.1 Just two 
years before, in 1972, Wright had authored a very controversial 
opinion declaring that the death penal was both crue and 
unusual under our state const ion.2 As a result, 1 J 
prisoners were released from death row, luding Char es Manson 
and Sirhan Sirhan. The decision was not a popular one. Governor 
Reagan declared that the appo 
"biggest mistake." A const 
enacted to restore the death 
of Donald Wright was his 
ional amendme~t was quickly 
lty, by 67% of the 
voters.3 Nonetheless, 1974, 70% of California's voters 
elected Chief Justice Wright to a 12 year term on the Supreme 
Court. In an era when Just are being evaluated by reducing 
their opinions on complex issues to a box score of results, one 
sobering comparison is worth noting. The record of Chief Justice 
1 
Donald death penalty cases was 172 reversal , 0 
affirmances. Those numbers really tell us very 1 about the 
kind of Supreme Court Justice Donald Wright was, just as box 
scores offer little illumination for the task of evaluation we 
face today. 
Three Models for an Evaluation Standard 
In the first part of his three-part analysis appeared 
in the Los Angeles Times in July of 1985,4 Professor Michael 
Moore posited two "models" which might be utilized to evaluate a 
judge facing a retention election. The "political" model would 
apply the same standard to judges which we apply to legislators, 
governors and presidents: if we disagree with the positions they 
espouse, we vote against them. Their survival in office becomes 
simply a question of the public popularity of their isions or 
the charm of their personalities. As an alternative, he 
describes what he calls the "impeachment" model, in which we vote 
against a judge only for improper conduct in office. If we were 
to apply a true impeachment standard, however, we require a 
showing of actual "misconduct in office,"5 which means a 
misfeasance (doing something a judge is not supposed do) or 
nonfeasance (not doing something a judge should do . Doing what 
a judge should do but doing it slowly, sloppily or idly does 
not ordinarily qualify one for impeachment. Professor Moore 
fudges a bit by expanding his "impeachment" model to include a 
judge who "acts outside the proper role of a judge" "taking 
the law in her own hands."6 Under this recipe, a j who 

















have with that it obscures the 
difference between one regards a judge's 








sitting Judge of 
decl of 
or outcome of 
to 1 
a 
impeachment model to 
model, which we can call 
as 
, we evaluate a judge 
measures to 
if in the 
a of three 
11 model can 
itution. It provides 
ectorate if a 
Appeal files a 
1 be 
ected.nll It no standards to be appl the 
electorate. By contrast, standards ~ specified the 
impeachment of Judgesl2 the removal of Judges 
California Commission of Judicial Performance.l3 
for impeachment is, of course, the "impeachment" 
"misconduct in office." The standard for removal 
standard 
of 
Commission is roughly comparable to my formulation of the 
"competency" model. In light of this logical constitutional 
structure, would not the application of an "impeachment" model or 
a "competency" model to retention elections be a redundancy? The 
answer to that question can largely be found in the h story of 
the initiative measure which added the current confirmation 
procedure to the California constitution in 1934. 
The 1934 initiative was drafted and sponsored a statewide 
"good government" committee which included leaders of the 
California Federation of Women's Clubs, the League of Women 
Voters, the State Chamber of Commerce, the American Legion, the 
Chiefs of Police of Los Angeles and San Francisco, 
who was then serving as District Attorney of Al 
Earl Warren.l4 What motivated them was concern 





depended on the honesty and competence of persons istering 
the law, and argued that abolition of contested elections would 
ensure that more qualified persons would stay on the bench. 
Although most of the Committee members agreed with Warren 
that executive appointment with lifetime tenure was ideal 






















for and very 
check upon It will 
control judicial arrogance and laziness which 
occasionally life tenure by periodical 
submission of the incumbent's record to the e. It 
will enable judge to devote his entire t 
energies to judicial wqrk free from the fear of 
political consequence of his decisions. It 
constantly supply properly selected judicial 
to fill vacancies caused by removal, death or 
resignation and, lastly, it will make the off 
attractive to the right type of lawyer.l6 
Thus, the authors and advocates of the present retention election 
system clearly contemplated application of a "competency" 
standard, allowing removal of judges who have "deteriorated," or 
become arrogant and lazy, but not subjecting them to 
political fray to defend their decisions. 
Obviously, proponents of this measure did 




though the remedies of and recall were already 
available. In this connection, it is important the 1934 
measure in the context of the times. In 1929, a Los Angeles 
Superior court Judge named Carlos Hardy was actually impeached 
and tried by the state Senate. Accused of to 
improperly influence 
surrounding the mysterious disappearance of e 
MacPherson, (he was an active member of her church), Judge Hardy 
was acquitted by a narrow vote.17 A subsequent effort by the 
State Bar to discipline Judge Hardy was dismissed for lack of 
State Bar jurisdiction over judges.18 In 1932, the Los Angeles 
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county to make 
that county's 
convince 
take that step at 
of selection applicable 
23 An effort was 
election in 1936. The 
that 1936 measure also illuminates the original 
the initiative adopted 1934. The 1934 








election was perceived as a "hollow mockery and a mendacious 
pretense," with no means of comparison: "The runs 
against his own shadow.n24 At the same time, the measure was 
defended for virtually the same reasons: 
"The amendment gives to the judge substantial 
tenure during good behavior. This has always 
deemed by the great weight of authority to be 
safeguard to a politically independent bench • 
conclusion, would seem that the adoption of 
26 [now section 16] article VI of the Canst 
practical method of removing the bench from 
politics.n25 
The 1936 ballot measures were defeated, as every 
effort to convince any county to adapt the system 
judges to the trial courts has been. 
During most of its subsequent fifty year 
Proposition No. 3 operated as it was intended to 
safety valve which never had to be activated. No 






Judges were removed from politics, and no Appellate Judge was 
ever removed from office in a retention election. 
The ineffectiveness of impeachment or recall to remove 








-:.o allow remove a j is conv cted 





once. an te::-nat. 
lSSUe 
ice i 2 
It s on 
Judicial retent el 
Since retention were perceived as a " 11 for 
the removal of j 34, the ion of 
a more efficient means monitoring the competency f sitting 
judges on a continuing basis eliminated the need the safety 
valve. As then Professor Dorothy Nelson concluded 1962: 
The claim that a vote to 
provide a check on j appointments made 
no longer. With an effective and practical means to 
remove an incompetent or corrupt judge, an system 
of appointment may be considered that need not 
necessarily involve a "vote by the people" . . . Tenure 
of judges should be during good behavior. An adequate 
check on appointing power is now provided by 
existence of a Commission on Judicial Qualif 
in addition to the traditional remedies of 
recall, and concurrent legislative resolution. 
Suggestions to eliminate retention elections have engendered 
little action, however. One measure currently the 
legislature which would the situation S.C .• No. 
23.34 This resolution would require Supreme Court Court of 
Appeal nominees to confirmed by the Senate as as the 
their appointment to be approved by the electorate 
general election, but once approved, a judge would 
for life. While not totally removing judges from 





called to political account for the decisions they rendered. The 
electoral confirmation would focus on the judge's prospective 
qualifications, rather than retrospective performance. 
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of role of a udge in our 
judgment. 
will" betrays a 
system. The 
judges must eschew loyalty to the governor who them where 
ion appears they are. No designation of political affil 
on the ballot. Although ifornia law currently allows 
political parties to endorse judges,36 a judge can do little to 
seek such endorsements. A judge must "avoid pol activity 
which may give rise to a suspicion of political bias or 
impropriety.n37 
By subj 
model of retention 
finger up to the wind be 
labels on them, 
may even subject j 
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to 
they are required to renounce. 
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38 
se a icular 
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to be different. 
American Bar Association report concluded: 
"There 
He may become a 
system is that it 
politician.n48 
A Practical Perspective 
Having concluded that our retention election 
originally designed with a "competency" model in 
the "political" model will produce disastrous 
an ethical perspective, I must approach the most 
questions of all. Assuming we are an 
process, how do we agree on what competency 
agree on what competency means, how do we a 
standard? 
The search for an 
detain us long. Formal 
existed for more than 1969, a 
of the American Bar Assoc 
Chief Justice Roger to revise 
those standards. The was 
ABA House of Delegates on 
Conduct. The Conference 
Code and promulgated as ifornia Code 




































charge that a j 
proceeding 
deciding the case 
One must careful 
however, and a 
of bias should be 
















It is not 
liberal" or "too 
personal 













































consistency of record, ignoring 
of the cases, was one 
other 8% she was one of or three 
has responded to this charge the only way 
could, by publicly stating she is absolutely 
affirm a death penalty j which passes 
muster.61 Thus, although the charge falls 
"competency" standard, 
inference from the 
the range of " 
position is taken based on 
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the same way as other pol i 
for it. If we measure our judges by a 
standard of contemporary popularity, however, we can 
their performances as judges to meet that 
Wrights and Warrens will grace the bench of Cali 
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Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J. 
J. dissenting). Cf. 
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attacks upon those in or seeking political office. In 
America, one who seeks or holds publ office may not 
be thin of skin. One planning to engage polit , 
American style, should remember the words credited to 
Harry s. Truman -- "If you can't stand the heat, get 
out of the kitchen." 
All such rough and tumble of a free people, contesting for 
their governmental leadership, may be well and good for ordinary 
politicians--the price of freedom--but when it comes to electing 
or judging judges most of us will agree that a greater degree of 
fastidiousness is called for. This apparently where agreement 
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California journalists apply a different standard to their 
reporting on the California court and its Chief than they do to 
other serious subjects. 
This is more than a journalistic oddity Performance of the 
California news media in reporting on the state Supreme Court 
will help determine the outcome of the critical elections 
November 1986 when the Chief and a number of justices are before 
the voters for retention. Results of the election could 
significantly alter the court for decades. Furthermore, it could 
establish in the public mind the basis on which all judges in the 
future will be appointed and continue to serve in this state. 
And, finally, it could have an impact on the courts throughout 
the United States since a major group in the judicial campaign 
has said that they regard this as a prelude for extending the 
campaign to the country at large. Regardless of which s is 
correct, both s of this issue deserve ser s news treatment 
by careful journalism. 
today is not based on a systematic or comprehensive 
study of the state's 119 dai newspapers, 450 weeklies and 500 
broadcast stations. It is based on what I bel are the proper 
criteria for journalists covering the courts, especially, this 
k of highly politicized public issue. 
-2-
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In all fairness to the media of the state, the emergence in 
this state of highly iticized and heavy financ of campaigns 
aga t of j s has created nove lems 
coverage. Suddenly, heated publ campa have surrounded a 
ect -- the inner of an appellate court -- that is 
not only a largely unknown subject the average 
editor, a subject law and legal canon 
and 
justices 
from discussing in publ 
It has been central to the American system of the judiciary 
that it not only have power separate from the executive and 
legislative branches of government, but that it must explic ly 
be removed from poli al passions. We have assumed that 
or access to money should have nothing to do with a judge 
ing appointment or on the bench. Suddenly the 
fierce campaigning to unseat j s, this 
We have assumed j s ll be reserved 






reasonably expect to come before them. Now we are confronted 
with a growing of demanding precisely this kind of 
nt be a j or a for a judgeship has heard 
evidence in a case. We ask judges to unemot l and 
impersonal in their application of constitutio11al principles to 
the cases before , but now we make public demands, often from 
-4-
aces, a j or ss l 
entence and The 
a s and the co lee er 
of llate jus s tr of 
cases are now treated as san political 
appl on of law, precedent and cons i 
In brief, the public and with them journalists, are 
confronted with the collapsing into one trad 
two formerly separate and deliberate lated act s 
our democracy. 
Nevertheless, s is hardly an 
if it is a new one. And to be s 
news organizations have approached s new 
it were a public joke rather a central 




covering the court controver to have felt no 
to study the facts or to exercise normal care and 
and lex subject. 
As the state's s and t 
s new phenomenon of courts and electoral 




mass media, weaknesses that 
contribute to it. 
the court controvers s, but 
For the current ial ele s is 
the relation of courts to rates. News operations in 
the States have 
tacle. C 
a tradi 
s sti 1 treated 
of report crime 
as most news 
as a ser s of isolated inc s t ng at the best 
known causes, which they would do th, for example, a medical 
epidemic. It is seldom with recourse to the most 
rel le format Cr does not def causes, 
but some factors are clear, and avai le. One, 
example, is the re s e of the age cohort the 
populat that has a been the age range of h 
c ssion of cr ld War II boom 
, came 
s. The 
s age range in the 1960s 
and in addi to actors have l 1 this 
clear was major factor in the rap s 
100,000 our soci It is also clear, that soc 
status of major soc is a s of 
what 11 most ften be found tt crimes, 
that i fer as and soc 1 status differ, from the 
lish, Germans, Irish and Italians mak up most of our prison 
lat in the 18th and 19th centu es, and a di 
number of black and brown groups in the 20th. 
-6-
Though these factors are known and undisputed by st 
authorities, the general public would have little way o knowing 
is from their news media, even though crime is a constant 
presence in the news, and in the last 20 years has been a major 
American social and political issue. It is a genuinely 
frightening public issue, yet by ignoring the best known causes, 
the news media have left the field open for speculation and 
manipulation, including the notion that courts are somehow 
responsible for increased crime rates, a theory that no 
reliable data to support it and much reliable data to refute it. 
A similar zone of silence in most news organizations, 
particularly those that stress crime reporting, has been on the 
best known data on the effect on crime rates of different kinds 
of punishment. This, too, like the causes of crime, are not 
simple factors, and have a large number of individual and social 
variables. But much is known by the most reliable au s. 
Yet, punishment by the courts and incarceration has been dealt 
with by most news organizations as though nothing were known on 
the subject except political rhetoric and convent 
This, too, has become an impassioned subject of publ 




ironies of this is the fact that in the state of California, two 
decades ago, including during the Administration of Governor 
-7-
Reagan, careful legislative studies were made with some clear and 
s~riking conclusions that raise doubts abou~ the efficacy c>f a 
le lengthening of sentences and incarceration rates. Another 
irony is the existence in California of the longest prison 
sentences in the Western world while simultaneously there exists 
a notion that California courts are soft on crime. News media 
treatment of the issue has proceeded as though there is no 
history and there are no data on this urgent issue. And as a 
result it has created false impressions in the public mind. 
These two factors, the known influences on crime rates, and 
the best known data on the impact of criminal justice on crime 
rates, obviously underlie the political dynamics of the present 
campaign of the courts. And despite the existence of this as an 
electoral, judicial and political issue of dominance in this 
state for several years, few news organizations have bothered to 
look at the basic information, or informed the public of the best 
known information about the relationship of the courts to the 
rate of crime and the relationship of the sentencing to the rate 
of crime. 
Now the central process of the courts is strident lie 
controversy. Ordinarily, competent reporting of court decisions 
would be sufficient in the news. But when individua J s and 
-8-
when a whole segment of the judiciary and its workings an 
intense public issue, that is not enough. At that point, any 
reasonably competent journalist who presume to report on this 
issue has to understand the workings of courts. 
Perhaps there is a useful analogy here. If the court system 
is a clock, normally the only general public interest is in 
knowing what time it is, or in this analogy, what is the product 
of the court its decisions in trials and appeals. But now 
there have been accusations that doctrinaire attitudes by some 
judges have led them to depart from normal procedures and 
precedent, and have caused them to behave in an uncons tutional 
or at least an improper way and that this has been a rna or factor 
in the crime rate in California and elsewhere. The issue before 
Californians now is not just decisions of the court, but the 
nature of the court workings themselves. It isn't just reporting 
on what time it is, but now it requires looking at the gears and 
levers inside the clock. Unfortunately, too many journalists 
have approached that enterprise as though blindfolded and wearing 
mittens. 
The need to understand court procedures is hardly novel in 
American journalism. Major newspapers like The New York Times, 
The Washington Post and others have sent experienced reporters to 
-9-
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And because initial careless and partisan 
by influential journals, it seems to have created a 
followed by other news organizations. In 1978, short 
Chief Justice Bird faced voters, a seriously flawed s 





of the state press, even though that story has been shown to have 
been based on an ignorance of the procedures of the court. 
It is impossible not to conclude, on reading and hearing some 
of the news treatment of the Chief Justice that she has been 
placed in a category not requiring standard journalis fairness 
and balance and that this has been done by some of the more 
important news organizations in the state. I do not mean by this 
that criticism of the Chief Justice is bad journalism. When 
figures of significant criticize the court, that criticism 
obviously needs to be reported. When there is controversy about 
decisions of the court or of its organization and performance, 
that, too, must be reported as a public service. But s is no 
different from reporting on a governor, or mayor, or 
system. The problem is not the existence of ism is the 
requirement that beyond reporting the criticism, is the 
requirement that beyond reporting the criticism, there s also 
the need to report conscientiously and fairly the reply to 
criticism and -- and perhaps this is the most obvious void in the 
-11-
-- when journalists take i to the 
basic facts that go c rhetor , that do it 
w th rness and thout j 
The lack of 
court anc its ju 
sness and fairness in some reporting on the 
s appears also in the much-too-familiar 
phenomenon that people tend to find what are for. 
For example, the Chief Justice on September 29 gave the annual 
State of the Judiciary speech at the annual meeting of the state 
bar. It was a notab convention because it was inevitable that 
the attitude of the bar would be an important indication of the 
egal profession's toward issues in the 
judicial el A story in a major state r, hostile to 
the Chief Justice, the day before the state bar vot 
s normal the state bar has stood 
added the second 
its lead 
state's j 
"she is only lukewarm from s at 
State Bar uf Cali a's annual conve n 
The next day most of the s the state reported that 
de s ove lmingly voted for an independent judiciary and 
the Ch f Justice was given a ing ovation. A leader of the 
campaign against the Chief Justice termed the voted for an 
i judiciary 11 close to an endorsement." If one 
-12-
ignores for the moment the irony of that statement, s at 
least clear that the attitude of the state bar, long considered a 
major credential in judicial appointments, has been under 
reported as a factor in the campaign. My point is not so much 
that a prediction by a reporter was wrong, but that when there is 
prejudgment, one tends to find what he is looking for. 
Perhaps the most damaging neglect in journalistic treatment 
of the judicial controversy has been the failure to emphasize the 
known undisputed and relevant facts as something apart from the 
claims and counterclaims in campaign rhetoric. 
The same indifference to known information appears another 
issue of the campaign, which is the accusation that some liberal 
members of the court have personal repugnance with the death 
sentence and therefore reach appellate decisions that ignore the 
law. I think it would come as a surprise to even the most 
careful readers of the newspapers of the state and viewers of 
television news to learn that a majority of the Supreme Court's 
reversals of one or more of the so-called conservative on the 
court. Even when a conservative writes the majority op on 
reversing a death sentence it is not reported as the of a 
conservative justice. If a liberal, of the Chief writes the 
majority reversal, this is noted as the opinion of a liberal. 
-13-
The judicial elections s state have become heated and 
often b There have been and there will to be 
emot s s the ing c It is 
quite that these be ted. But the c gn 
charges and countercharges, the news med have an obligation to 
address the basic issues 
1. What are the proper criteria for removing judges from the 
bench? There is law, precedent and legal canons readily 
available to the media. 
2. What are the most significant cl and countercla 
the sent court election? 
3. What are most reliable facts about the strat 
and decision-mak act s of the ef Just ? 
4. s the death penalty is a major ssue 
what is the best 
lty in other ju t 
on the 
and the ana 
f issues in the California law? 
the e 
of the death 
is of the 
5. Since another issue is the status of an independent 
judiciary, what is the background rat for and 
against a judici that is above pol s? 
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One does not have to be romantic to expect that responsible 
newspapers and broadcast news can deal with a serious i sue of 
this kind as something more important than a shouting contest 
between angry opponents, or a routine political cat-and-dog 
fight. In 1957 after the Soviets put Sputnik into space, and 
science became a serious national issue, the better newspapers in 
the country stopped treating science stories as 
fun-games-and-quackery and began treating it as a serious issue. 
They have recently begun to do the same with business and 
finance. The nature of the courts and criminal justice in this 
state deserve at least the same degree of competence, care and 
balance. 
-15-
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I. Introduction 
california Is court by uv•Jc.L._U 
election since the state was admitted to the Union. Yet only been 
within the last ten candidates to 
raising ooney to conduct election can:paigns./1/ Prior to that tine, oost 
the state's judges, appointed by the to mid-term 
vacancies on the bench, ran for election unopposed with little or no need to 
VK>rry about having to stock a carrp;lign war chest. 
Since 1976, however, there has been a marked upswing in the nurrber of 
contested elections for the trial court bench. In the case of the Superior 
Court, for instance, nurrber of 
races per year from 1976 to 1982 was 38.5 compared to 17.4 from 1958 to 
1974 (see Dubois, 1986: 7; see also Stolz, 1978; and Bell Price, 
1982) • Similar have observable Court races. 
The specific reasons the increased competition do not require 
discussion here, arguably they include such as growth in 
the number of judicial positions to be filled public and 
professional discontent with courts 1981; Scootland, 1985: 
75-79). why it happened, however, there seems to be no 
disagreement that the increased also been accompanied by 
changes in of races are increasingly 
intense and more frequently acrimonious and have brought heightened 
involverrent by a variety of citizens' groups, bar associations, and even 
partisan organizations (see Schotland, 1985: 67-72, 79-80; Turney, 1981). 
This changed has brought reports of 
dramatic increases in candidates seeking to win or 
retai...-1 C\X1rt Berg, l.~OU; 
Cochran, SctK'Jtland • Ari'J. tht::se reports have 
corre a variet:y c0ncems express;::d abOut the hign of running a 
judicial campaign Gorre have judicial campaign costs have 
becorre so high chat promising candidates are discouraged from secl<ing the 
bench by the prospect ttat the~" will substantial personal financial 
debt in doing so. Indeed, sorre prospect1 ve a:ppointees to the bench might be 
quite reluctant to assurre a judgeship after having observed lawyer 
colleagues who have suffered not just the loss of personal incorre that goes 
with judicial salaries but the financial hardship of maintaining that 
position in a competitive judicial campaign (Schotland, 1985: 114, 120). 
Other observers have expressed the view that the entry of large a.rrounts 
of money into judicial election campaigns may irreparably do damage to the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary. IncUITbent judges have larrented 
the difficulty of reconciling the need to raise funds with the need to 
maintain the dignity of their positions (see, e.g. Scootland, 1985: 
155-161). Concern has also been registered about the potential for real or 
perceived conflicts of interest when judicial candidates accept 
contributions from those individuals who are the prilrer:y users of the 
courts-lawyers. As one judge so pointedly put it: "What wouJ.c you think if 
you were a litigant in my court and you knew the oppos:~n.g counsel had 
contributed to my campaign? • Wouldn't you worry about tne fairness of 
my decision if I had ruled in his favor?" (Cochran, 1981: 220;. 
California's experience with respect to judicial campaign finance is 
not unique. A number of other states have experienced an apparent increase 
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picture energes. A recently~ompleted examination of the all of 
the candidates in all of the contested Superior Court elections in 
California from 1976-1982, for instance, has demonstrated that total 
ca.rrpaign spending and average spending by individual candidates not in 
fact increased since 1978 once the effects of inflation have been held 
constant (Dubois, 1986: 8-10). 
Similarly, the average campaign cost for a Superior Court c~1didate has 
been soown to be quite IOOdest, rarticularly when considered in a comparative 
context (Dubois, 1986: 10-11). Altoough there have been reports of 
candidates spending rrore than $75,000 or even $100,000 for a Superior Court 
position (see, e.g. Cochran, 1981: 220), these campaigns are much the 
exception and not the rule. The average race in 1982 cost each candidate 
just over $17,000, with a similar amount required in the unlikely event of a 
run-off. Even in the largest counties where 500,000 or rrore voters nust be 
reached, Superior Court campaigns typically involve only from $17,000 to 
$25,000./4/ As Table 1 demonstrates, on a per vote basis, total expenditures 
for all judicial campaigns have been dwarfed by expenditures made in 
connection with the state's major executive and legislative races. Even if 
comparable data were available for other countywide , such as 
district attorney or sheriff, it is doubtful that the reported costs would 
be as low as those associated with judicial contests./5/ 
Despite this evidence on judicial spending, some of the concerns many 
observers have with respect to judicial campaign financing cannot be 
addressed with data pertaining to expenditures. Rather, when dealing with 
fears of real or potential conflicts of interest, the focus rust be upon the 
sources of the fuoos that candidates .dQ speoo. Wh::> are the individuals and 
~ Governor State Senate State Asserrbly Su,perior Court 
1970 $0.42 (0.31) $0.35 (0.26) $0. (0.26) Not available 
1972 $0.28 $0.38 (0. N:::>t available 
1974 $0.92 (0.55) $0.42 (0 .25) $0. (0.43) Not available 
1976 $0.66 (0.33) $0.69 (0.35) $0.04 (0.02) 
1978 $0.97 (0.42) $0.79 (0 .35) • 07 (0 • $0.12 (0.05) 
1980 $1.00 (0 (0. (0 .05) 
1982 $1.83 (0 .52) $1.75 (0. $2.55 (0.74) .11 (0 .03) 
a. The figures for gubernatorial and legislative speooing the years 
from 1970 to 1978 were taken from the California Fair Political Practices 
Commission Report (1980: 27), updated 1980 and 1982 by author using 
annual FPPC reports of campaign speooing. 
b. Data on the California Consum?r Price Iooex 
Cal. FPPC Report (1980: B) which utilized the 
California State Department Figures 
were obtained directly from the of 
(CPI) were taken from the 
CPI as corrputed by the 
CPI 1980 and 1982 
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groups that donate rroney to judicial candidates? Are lawyers, finns, 
bail bondsrren, court reporters and other regular users of courts the 
primary benefactors of judicial candidates? How large are the contributions 
made? Do the patterns of contributions suggest the need 
rreasures? The purpose of this paper is to attempt to address 
II • Data and Method 




of the contributions to all of the candidates in contested elections held in 
1980 for positions on the california Superior Court. This particular year 
was coosen because the nunber of candidates (100) was large and because the 
total arrount of money expended in the 36 primary and 11 run-off contests was 
the rrost in recent years, approaching $2.2 million (Dubois, • The d:l.ta 
were gathered from the campaign statements filed by candidates and campaign 
committees under the provisions of california's Political Refonn Act. The 
analysis required an examination of the si..ID1IT6.ry data provided candidates 
on contributions received {including ronetary, noruronetary loans, and 
pledges) and the creation of a computerized data file all of the 
contributors listed as having made monetary contributions than $100 
to each candidate. For the purposes of this paper, analysis was limited to 
reports filed in connection with the primary elections in June, 
although a preliminary examination of the 11 run-off elections held in 
Noverrber suggests no major differences in the rat terns of ca.mpa.ign financing 
between the primary and _un-off contests. 
The task was not c.>.Il easy one. One-third of the candidates failed to 
file one or rore of tl-:~?i · required reports wit_h the Secretary of State in 
as 
zrost common 
oV1n.a.rVi itu re one 
to 
to 














The corrputerized data file of ronetary contributors to all and 
run-off elections consisted initially of nearly 4800 individual 
contributions. Because some candidates' reports included an itemized listing 
of individual contributors of less than $100 while others did not, it was 
decided to purge the file of these contributors unless they also had made 
other contributions to the sane candidate that cumulatively am::>unted to rrore 
than $100. Although these itemized "small contributors" accounted for about 
10% of all contributors, they accounted for but 2% of dollars 
contributed. 
Additionally, regardless of the number of separate contributions made by 
any one individual, each contributor's donations to each carrlidate were 
corrbined into a cUITl.llative total for the calendar year. Although candidates 
are supposed to report cumulative arounts received, this nethod was judged 
to be more complete and accurate. Finally, in limiting this analysis to the 
primary races only, those contributions associated with the run-off election 
were excluded. The resulting data base consisted of 3,172 ind "large 
contributors" donating a total of $760,962 to the 91 candidates. These 
dollars represent 85.4% of those collected in the primary run-off 
elections corrbined. 
For the purpose of understanding the sources of judicial money, 
each contributor was assigned to one of sixteen occur:atior.al categories 
depending upon the occupation listed on the schedule of contributions 
contained in the carrp:iign finance statement. Contributions made by the 
candidates themselves, by members of their immediate families,/6/ or 
transfers made between a candidate and a separate campaign committee (if 
any) were segregated and are dealt with in a separate section this paper. 
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What rerrained, then, was a 
contributors" to 's 
of what we nay call "third-party 
campaigns. The sixteen 
occupational are: 
1. IncU vidual 
2. Law Finns 
3. Active Judges 
4. Individual Law Enforcement Officers (police, sheriffs, etc.) 
5. Police and Other Law Enforcerrent Organizations 
6. Individual Merrbers of the Business Comnunity (including those 
in bank , insurance, sales, ma.nufactur ing, estate, etc.) 
7. 
8. Labor Unions and Einployee Organizations (not including #5) 
9 Professionals (architects, physicians, dentists, etc.) 
Political Party or campaign Organizations 
11. Political (e • Law & Order Camp:lign Ccrnmittee) 
• Court Regulars bondsrren, court reporters, court 
• Horrema.kers 
14. Retired Persons (including retired judges) 
self-errployed) 
• Occupation 
III. Tbe Context of campaign Contributions 
Before the role of large contributors to 
examined, the larger context of 
understood. Just how to the 
these large contributions? 
judicial camp:iigns can be 
support must first be 
judicial campaign effort are 
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First, it must be :recognized that ronetary contribtutions are only one 
of the reportable sources of campaign support. Non-monetary contributions 
of services and goods donated to the campaign must also be reported at their 
estirrated fair market value (Cal. Gov't Code, SS. , 82015). 
Non-monetary contributions typically include donated printing or graphic 
arts services, the provision of secretarial support, or donated supplies 
such as envelopes, staJTq?s, and paper. For the 91 campaigns exarr.ined here, 
non-ronetary contributions were reported by just about half of the 
candidates (47.2%), ranging in total value from just $30 to $13,157 and 
constituting on average 8.2% of these candidates' reported campaign 
receipts. For all 91 candidates, the total non-monetary contributions 
am::>unted to $79,132 or 4. 7% of all reported receipts. 
Second, small contributions also play an important part 
of judicial campaigns. Altoough every carrlidate rrust report 
the furrling 
sum of all 
dollars received, only contributors donating more than $100 cumulatively to 
a candidate's campaign during the calendar yea.r rrust be specifically 
identified by naire and occupation. However, of the $1,209,983 in reported 
monetary contributions, more than one-third (37.1%) came from contributors 
who donated currulati ve am::>unts of less than $100. Large , then, 
provide a majority of the monetary contributions received 
candidates, but their importance is hardly overwhelming. 
judicial 
Third, the extent of candidates' personal support their own 
campaigns must be recognized. Indeed, of the $760,962 in itemized 
contributions exceeding $100, 25.2% ($192,101) came from carrlidates 
contributing money to their own campaigns. Another $13,979 could be 
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14 of the 91 candidates reported expenditures excess of ranging 
from a low of $79 to a high of $9,250. Additionally, as noted earlier, four 
other candidates were excluded from this analysis because they reported 
expenditures with no reported receipts whatever. Sorre of these candidates 
undoubtedly covered these debts from their own pockets but not list 
themselves as campaign contributors; in other cases, these debts may have 
remained unresolved within the calendar year covered by this study or may 
have never been repaid. Whatever the explanation, for these 14 carrlidates 
the total amount of campaign expenditures not matched by receipts was 
$47,799 or approximately 22% of their total expenditures. These are dollars 
for which no accounting is possible. 
This entire discussion points to the fact that large, third-party 
contributions are only one part of the financial structure of a judicial 
campaign. Table 2 makes the point oost clearly. Large third-party 
contributions constitute the single largest source of funds to support 
judicial election campaigns, but amount to only 32.5% of the total receipts 
which include non-monetary contributions, small contributions less than 
$100, and candidates' contributions and loans to their own campaigns./?/ 
IV. Tbe Contributors to Judicial Carrp3igns 
With this more complete understanding of the many sources judicial 
campaign support, it is possible to look more closely at the "large 
contributors"--those individuals who contributed cumulative amounts of more 
than $100 to a Superior Court campaign. Table 3 displays the total amounts 
of these contributions according to the occupations of the donors, excluding 
Table 2 
The Sources of Judicial campaign SUpport 
in Contested california Superior Court PrimaiY Elections. 1980 
Source of funds or Syppott Total Contributed Percent of Total 
Large Third Party Contributions $546,405 32.5% 
(More than $100 cumulatively) 
Small Third Party Contributions $448,821 26.7% 
(Less than $100 cumulatively) 
Contributions from candidates or $207,080 12.3% 
Members of Immediate Family 
Outstanding or Forgiven Loans $299,791 17.8% 
Non-Monetary Contributions $ 79,132 4.7% 
Other Sources (pledges, unaccounted $ 98, 5. 
furrls, etc.) 
Total Receipts: All Sources $1,680,146 99.9%* 
*Does not sum to 100.0% to rounding. 
those contributions from the candidates themselves and 
immediate families. 
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As might have been expected, lawyers and law firms were found to have 
supplied a substantial proportion (39.2%) of the dollars contributed in 
larger arrounts. Aside from lawyers, the other large group 
consisted of individuals and companies in the business community who 
together donated 31.0% of the dollars contributed in larger amounts. A wide 
variety of other types of individuals, ranging from professionals to retired 
persons, contributed about a fifth of the dollars received but no one group 
accounted for rruch oore than 5% of the total. When combined, mwever, 
individual contributors from the "non-legal" community account for just 
about half of the dollars received from large third-party contributors. 
The most surprising part of Table 3 is the relatively amount of 
ooney contributed by trose individuals and groups that might be supposed to 
have a particular interest in the outcome of judicial elections. 
Individuals employed in law enforcement, police organizations, various court 
regulars, and sitting judges together accounted for only 5. the large 
contributions. Similarly, various political interest groups, 
organizations, candidate campaign committees, 
contributed just 3.6% of the total. 
In su1TI, when speaking about dollars 
itical party 
amounts, 
it is fair to say that lawyers are the single largest source campaign 
funds. However, the contributor base for judicial elections is actually 
quite varied, with oore than half of all the dollars contributed in larger 
amounts originating with groups and individuals who are outside the legal 
comrrunity. 
Contributions of More than $100 to Contested 
California Superior Court Prinar:y Elections. 1.980 
~Occupation of Contributor 
Occupation Dollars Contributed 
Individual Lawyers $171,534 
Individ. Businesspersons ,260 
Business Companies $ 65,149 
Law Firms $ 42,731 
other Occupations $ 29,502 
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V. Contributions in Judicial Elections 
Table 4 contains information on the cumulative amounts contributed by 
mch of the rrajor occup3tional groups. These data show , although 
lawyers rray be the largest donor group in terns of the total rs given, 
they do not make particularly large contributions. The mean contribution 
from individual lawyers was just $160 while the average law firm 
contribution was $176. Moreover, approximately 80% of these lawyer 
contributions totalled less than $250, while less than 5% amounted to $500 
or more. 
The largest individual contributor amounts came from those roups which 
contributed relatively little to judicial campaign treasuries. Police and 
law enforcement organizations made average contributions of $389 with about 
70% of their contributions being in amounts of $250 or rore with rore 
than 40% of their gifts in amounts of $500 or rore. Similarly, political 
interest groups averaged $355 in their contributions, nearly half (47.8%) of 
which totalled $250 or rore and rore than one-quarter (26. of which 
equalled $500 or more. 
Despite the occasional large givers, one must be struck 
amounts given by most contributors. For all 91 candidates 
contributor gave just $176, with about eight of every ten 
making cumulative gifts in amounts of less than $250. Only a 
rrodest 
of the 
contributors made contributions of $250 or more, and just 5.9% gave as much 
as $500 or more. 
Of course, it remains true that sorne judicial contests are not decided 
in June but rrust be resolved through a Noverrber run-off election. These 
campaigns also require financial support and candidates may naturally look 
Percent of Contr ibs. in Range: 
No. $100- $250- $500 & 
Contribs. More 
Law Enforce. Organ. 14 $389 .6% .9% 
Pol. Interest Grps. 23 $355 21.7% 26.1% 
Party & cand. Corrms. 28 $288 64.3% 21.4% 14.3% 
Unions & Employee Org. 12 $271 41.7% 41.7% 16.7% 
Individual Police Off. 12 $231 75. 8. 16.7% 
Business Companies 305 $214 65 24.6% 9.5% 
Court Regulars 18 $193 72.2% 11.1% 16.7% 
Occupation Not 114 78. 11.4% 9.6% 
Ret 148 81. 4.7% 
588 $177 13.6% 5.3% 
Law 243 77.8% 16.0% 6.2% 
Other Occupation 10.7% 3.4% 
100 86.0% 8.0% 6.0% 
069 .2% 14.0% 4.6% 
140 15 2.9% 
Professionals 114 $145 86.8% 10.5% 2.6% 
3,105 $176 .2% 14.8% 5.9% 
14 
again to some of the contributors who supported their prima By 
the end of the run-off campaign, perhaps some candidates have come to rely 
for substantial arrounts of ooney upon particular contributors. 
Actual analysis of the contributor data, however, show that these fears 
are largely unfotm:led. Of the 3,664 third-party contributors to the 1980 
Superior Court elections, only 102 (or 2.8%) gave to the same candidate's 
primary and run-off campaigns. Put another way, of the 590 third-party 
contributors to run-offs, only 17.3% had also supported the same caooidate 
in the primary. And the cunu1ative arrounts contributed by these "double 
givers" are alarming in only rare instances, with just one contributor 
giving as much as $2,000 and only five others donating more than ,000. On 
average, these "double givers" gave $430 cumulatively to both campaigns. 
VI. Variations in Contributor Patterns 
To this point, the analysis of California's judicial finance 
has been based upon the contributions made to all of the candidates seeking 
a Superior Court post in 1980 without regard to possible differences among 
candidates that might be supposed to affect their ability to successfully 
solicit campaign support. Nevertheless, such differences 
instance, it might be expected that incumbent judges 




third-party sources and would therefore be less dependent upon funds from 
their own pockets or those of family merrbers. Similarly, given their 
greater visibility and more frequent contact with lawyers in the community, 
incurrbent Superior Court judges and even those lower trial court judges 
seeking elevation to the should be more successful than 
other kioos in the 
Table 5 the differences am::mg inctmbent judges, mmicipal or 
justice court judges seeking elevation to the Superior Court, arrl other 
kinds of carrlidates in their reliance upon different forms of financial 
support. 'As hypothesized, incunbent relied roost heavily upon 
monetary contributions, receiving three-fourths of their total carrq;:aign 
support from third-party contributors. Contributions to their own 
campaigns, contributions from family members, and loans accounted for but 
14.8% of their reported campaign receipts. 
Municipal and justice court judges seeking election to Superior 
Court enjoyed a similar funding profile dominated by monetary contributions. 
Nevertheless, 
slightly less 
compared to inctmbents, these judges were able to rely 
money (67 .9%) and were forced to look more 
to loaned dollars } . 
Major differences are seen in the carrq;:aign funding of other kinds of 
candidates These candidates, not enjoying the fund-raising advantages of 
incurrbency or of sone position, drew less than half (44.4%) 
campaign from contributions and had a particularly small 
proportion .1%) of amounts over $100. 
Without ability to secure these candidates 
were apparently forced to rely upon personal or family contributions and 
loans, and actually received as ruch money 
contributors. 
these sources as from 
Table 6 displays differences arnong inctmbent judges, other judges, and 
other kinds of in sources the large third-party 
Table 5 
The Sources of Judicial campai~n Syppott 
in Contested california Superior Court PrimarY Elections. 1980 
By 'J.Ype of Candidate 
XYPe of Judicial ~1didate 
Sources of Funds or Sypport 
Large Third Party Contri-
butions (More than $100) 
Small Third Party Contri-
butions (Less than $100) 
Contributions from Candi-
dates or Family Members 
Outstand. or Forgiven Loans 
Non-~\onetary Contributions 
Other Sources (pledges, un-
accounted funds, etc.} 







































Differences in the Sources of Contributions 
in Contested california Superior Court Primary Elections. 1980 
By 'JYpe of candidate 
type of Judicial Candidate 
Sources of Funds or Support 
Lawyers and Law Firms 
Business Individuals and-
Companies 
Other Individual Contribs. 
(Professionals, Retired 
Persons, Homemakers, etc.) 
Court Regulars, Sitting 
Judges and Law Enforce. 
Unions, Party and Candidate 
Comms., Pol. Interest Grps. 







































contributions received. Incllltbent Superior Court judges are seen to have 
relied most heavily upon lawyers and law firms for these contributions; 
nearly half (49 .3%) of the large contributions received by incurrbents cane 
from the legal profession. In comparison to the other kinds of candidates, 
incumbents were also more likely to receive contributions from those who 
work in and around the courthouse {i.e. court regulars, law enforcerrent, 
and sitting judges) and from various politically-active groups and 
organizations. 
In contrast, non-incunbent municipal or justice court judges seeking 
election to the Superior Court relied for lawyers for only about a third of 
the large contributions and placed much greater reliance than incumbents 
upon members of the business community and other individual contributors. 
Other kinds of non-incumbent candidates were similarly situated as they were 
able to obtain less than a third of their large contributions from the legal 
corrm..mity. 
In sum, candidates are differently situated when it comes to raising 
campaign funds. Incumbent judges are best able to tap the largess of the 
lawyer conm.mity, but the am::>unts solicited are quite modest. Non-incurrbent 
judges also can successfully obtain substantial financial from the 
legal profession, but must also rely upon personal sources loans to put 
together a suitable carnp::1ign treasury. Other kirrls of carrlidates are 
severely disadvantaged by the need to solicit financial support and are just 
as likely to match every solicited dollar with one from their own pockets or 
those of family members. 
VII. Conclusions and Implications 
Caution must to 
from data one state one particular year 
Schotland, 1985: 135-149). This the campaign contributors to 
California's Super Court elections 1980 necessar must observe 
caution. the collected for study are probably the 
most complete yet assembled and there is every indication that 1980 was a 
typical year in California for the corrluct of these major trial court 
contests./9/ 
One must also be careful attempting to use these data to support 
particular prescriptions of the calls for have been 
stimulated by who hold the subjective perception that the amount of 
rroney being spent in elections is "too much" and that judicial 
candidates are "too deperrlent" campaign contributors. As Professor 
Schotland (1985: recognized, however, data alone cannot answer the 
questions 
low," or " 




One of major concerns 
costs of these races have been going 
candidates upon In 
seen as increasing candidates' 
the potential conflict 
are "too high," "too 
such can be a 
collected, what amounts, from whom, 
practices compare to the financing of 
to 
reform efforts. 
recent judicial elections is that that 
thereby increasing the reliance by 
, increased campaign costs are 
upon lawyers, thereby exacerbating 
problem judges seek financial 
18 
assistance from those who appear before the bench. The data on 
spending and on the sources of judicial campaign funds, however tend to 
suggest that these problems may not be as serious as many have supposed. 
The amount of spending by judicial candidates was not directly addressed 
by this paper. Prior related research has soown, trough, judicial 
carrpaign spending is, by all coll'rf8rative rreasures, very low. In the state's 
largest counties containing populations of more than 500, eligible 
voters, the amounts spent have been less than $0.03 per capita. fureover, 
the increases in spending since 1976 have not been great and, in large 
measure, can be attributed to the effects of inflation 1986: 
12-13). 
It must be conceded that the amounts spent by judicial candidates have 
increased in real dollar terms over the last decade. An irrportant question, 
then, is whether candidates rely to a significant extent upon contributors 
in general and lawyers in particular for campaign support. 
The data analyzed here show that the sources of campaign support are 
quite varied, including monetary contributions from third parties and the 
candidates themselves, non-monetary contributions, loans, and sources. 
Perhaps surprisingly, only a third of all campaign resources carne in the 
form of large contributions from third parties, including Lawyers 
constituted the single largest contributor group, but more of the 
dollars contributed in larger amounts originated with non-lawyer groups and 
individuals. 
This research has also shown that the amounts contributed in larger 
amounts are not particularly large. Of course, this requires a subjective 
judgment about when a contribution may be consjdered "large," but one may 
wonder whether there 




problem when the 
of are under 
have different bases of financial support. judges have relied 
most heavily upon , While relied most heavily 
upon loans and personal family resources. judges were also 
most successful in attracting contributions from lawyers. Indeed, it may be 
inct.l1lt:>ents' superior ability to attract contributions that explains why 
incurrt:>ents far outspend their challengers. In 1980, incumbents outspent 
challengers by an 
incurrbent was two 
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bail borrlsrren, and other 
contributions 
resources. In sum, 
20 
limiting campaign contributions from these specific categories of 
contributors would have a very limited impact. 
The limited impact that such a proposal might have would a~r to be 
with respect to ~incumbent judges who rely to the greatest extent upon 
monetary contributions from these particular kinds of contributors. 
Assuming that these are dollars that incumbents cannot afford to lose from 
their campaign treasuries, they would be forced to rely more upon a larger 
nurrber of srrall contributions and other sources of fums, such as 
contributions or loans from themselves or members of their immediate family. 
It is difficult to see how forcing candidates to go nore into debt to defend 
their judicial positions could be considered a net benefit of such a reform. 
As Scootland has so correctly noted, "nuch of the canlp'3.ign funding problem 
may lie not in abusively large sums occasionally contributed by individuals, 
but rather in the fact that serious candidates, including worthy incumbents 
engaged in the defense of their seats, have too little money with which to 
mount viable campaigns" {1985: 95) • 
1. 
elections. The state ....... ,_. ....... =... in 
1904. See Martini ( 
3. Professor Larry Berg (1980) attempt to look at the 
level of spending in California's trial elections. Nevertheless, his 
analysis relies upon raw spending figures and little is done to account for 
some of the factors known to affect spending, as inflation and 
variations in the populations of the counties in which the elections are held. 
Scootland (1985) also spending data from a var states with 
little or no attention to that justify 
differences in spending 
4. In counties 
judicial candidates' 
5. Campaign finance 
with the county 
Without a centralized 
possible to offer a wv•ca-u. 
with that in 
6. The 
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8. These 
134-135) , but 




voting age populations of less than 500,000, 
averaged about $12,000 (Dubois, 1986: Table 4). 
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TABLE EIGHT 
Average Campaign Expenditure by Superior Court 
Candidates According to Occupation 
Contested ions 1974-1984 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
J of 
Sup Ct $7542 $14139 $21862 $28862 $33375 $46011 
J of 
Hun Ct 12966 7123 36365 28974 26768 86564 
D.A. & 
Dep.D.A. 7679 16837 9935 12846 13577 44544 
Attorney 6717 11481 11680 19661 15460 20076 
other 
occup. 5704 5246 12582 13539 16042 14447 


























These correlations measure the relat , control 
individual contest, between the proportion of money 
the proportion of the votes received. In other words a 
correlation would include a race where the candidate 
percent of the money received 50 percent of the vote, a 
that spent 30 percent of the money received 30 percent 
vote, and the candidate who spent 20 percent of the vote 
20 percent of the vote. 
TABLE ELEVEN 
Expenditures and Votes--Controlled for Contest 
Contested Election 1974-1984 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Pearson's r 
Sig. of r 
.7936 
.0001 







Proportion of Direct 1 
Contested 
1974 1976 1978 
Pearson's r .6826 .4018 .6851 



















Proportion of Printing and Print Advertising Expenditures 
With Vote 
Contested Elections 1974-1984 
1974 
Pearson's • 7483 


















Here only TV and radio advertising expenses are considered: 
TABLE FOURTEEN 
Proportion of TV 
Contested 
Radio Expenditure with Vote 
t 19 19 
Pearson's r 




















Effect of Campaign Expenditures on Proportion of the Vote 
Contested Election 1974-1984 
rect TV & 
1 Rad. 
Winners 
Pearson's r 57 .4024 .4020 .3081 
f. r .0001 1 .0001 .01 
sers's 
on's r 63 .4844 .5178 .4037 
Signif of r .0001 .0001 1 .0001 
Incumbents 
Pearson's r .6011 .4362 .3914 .3783 
Signif. r 1 .0001 .0001 .01 
Non-incumbents 
Pearson's r . 538 14 .4351 
Signif. of r 1 1 .0001 
s 
Pearson's r is a measure of corre tion. It ranges from 1.0 to 
-1.0. If for every one of the expenditures in a contest 
the candidate received one percent the vote, the Pearson r 
score would be 1.0. (A negative correlation would have shown 
that the larger proport of tures spent, the smaller 
proportion of the vote received.) 
~ IJEFFATn) 
1974 
Glickfeld SF 003 
1976 
Gillespie IM 001 
Qmpm: lA 001 
Kennedy lA 028 
Takasugi IA 040 
~itz so 002 
1978 
SparroN AL 012 
Gcnzalez IA 003 
Sanchez IA 015 
Best MA 003 
llloero sc 003 
Q:aley SD 014 
~ VE 005 
1980 
I<oford AL 001 
Ca..1lxx.m cr 001 
lblriguez FR 004 
1982 
~ IA 080 
Brigance SI 001 
1984 
Pescner cr 006 
Ja.rrdane MY 003 
Pattern of Competition for Superior Court Positions 1974-1984 
TABLE ONE 
Superior Court Contested and Open Seats: 1974-1984 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Seats up for election 191 183 205 276 258 254 
No. of seats contested 
or open 23 22 39 36 31 28 
Percentage of potentially 
contested seats contested 12% 12% 197., 13io 12% 11% 
TABLE TWO 
Incumbents Challenged 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Incumbents up for 
Election 188 176 195 260 245 236 
No.of incumbents 
Challenged 20 15 29 20 18 10 
Percent of incumbents 
Challenged llio 9io 15% 8% 7io 6io 
TABLE THREE 
Challenged Incumbents Defeating Opponents 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
No. winning 19 9 21 16 16 7 
No. losing 1 6 8 4 2 3 
Percentage winning 95% 60% 72io 80io 88% 70% 
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Average Expenditures of Candidates 
Controlling for Incumbency 
Contested Election 1974-1984 
1974 1976 1978 1980 
$7542 $14139 $21862 $28862 
$8308 $10248 $16775 $19801 
TABLE SEVEN 
Average Exenditures of Candidates 
Controlling for Winner 
Contested Election 1974-1984 
1982 
$33375 
$18785 
Winner 
Loser 
1974 
$9725 
$7072 
1976 
$17679 
$ 8124 
1978 
$28977 
$12085 
1980 
$28308 
$18410 
1982 
$33287 
$15515 
1984 
$40257 
$39155 
1984 
$46011 
$34417 

